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Abstract 
 The global Cold War is used frequently by historians to frame the context of 
political, economic, social, military, and geographical history of the 20
th
 century.  This is 
often the case in Africa as well.  This thesis set out to explore U.S.- South African 
relations during the 1960s.  After conducting research in the State Department Records 
(Record Group 59) of the National Archives from 1967-1973 three case studies emerged 
that suggested that reexamination of how historians traditionally view U.S.-South African 
relations during this time period is necessary.  The three case studies include U.S. use of 
naval ports in South Africa, the strategic geographic location of South Africa and its 
importance to NASA’s satellite and missile tracking stations, and the policy of selling of 
weapons to South Africa by the U.S.  While this is by no means an exhaustive study of 
this time period due to limited time in the National Archives, it does offer promise for 
more research involving this topic. 
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“The story of the defeated is part of the truth and texture of those harried years.” Piero 
Gleijeses 
 
Introduction 
 The Cold War was permeated with many interactions between the U.S. and the 
international community, particularly with what was then called the Third World.  South 
Africa would be no different.  However, rather than reacting to the direct threat of Soviet 
or communist influence, the U.S. government saw South Africa an essential launch point 
for its Navy and for its space program making the United States act sympathetically 
towards the white apartheid government.  During the 1960s and early 1970s there are 
three episodes that provide for a revealing examination of the U.S. government’s foreign 
policy towards South Africa in the context of the global Cold War.  These three episodes 
include the docking of the USS Franklin Delano Roosevelt in 1967, the use of satellite 
and missile tracking stations in Johannesburg by NASA from 1960-1973 and the arms 
embargo as instituted by Kennedy and carried out by Johnson and Nixon from 1963-
1970.  These case studies, as examined in the U.S. National Archives, suggest that a 
reexamination of how the U.S. government made decisions in relation to the South 
African government, particularly in the context of the global Cold War and in the face of 
apartheid, is necessary in order to accurately appreciate the dynamic factors shaping how 
the United States interacted with the international community during this important 
chapter in World History.   
The South African government was not the perfect ally in the global Cold War. 
Their implementation of apartheid was a risk for the U.S. government because they could 
be accused of having friendly relations towards a government that employed such an 
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abhorrent method of controlling its population.  However, largely because of its colonial 
history and geographical location, South Africa possessed technologically developed 
ports for space and sea that were of high importance to the U.S.  Therefore, the U.S. 
government, specifically the Executive branch, was repeatedly forced to evaluate what 
type of relationship they wanted with the South African government and how best to 
achieve a delicate equilibrium both domestically and internationally. 
 The global Cold War was a complex and dynamic era for the United States.  It 
was a war of two political and ideological systems.  It was an economic war against 
socialism and communism.  It was a political endeavor to keep dominoes from falling.  It 
was a nuclear, military, and scientific development race against the Soviets.  It was a 
geographic race for who could dominate non-aligned states economically and politically.  
The global Cold War was not always a reaction to the fear of Soviet influence; rather, the 
U.S. did act on the fear of communism spreading, such as in South East Asia.  This is an 
important distinction to make because in the case of South Africa, the U.S. government 
was more concerned about communist influence, rather than Soviet influence 
domestically, and used South Africa as a base to fight Soviet influence in other arenas, 
such as the space race.  For the purposes of this paper, most of these aspects will be 
looked at, however the space race, intervention geographically and economically of 
newly independent states, and the fear of the spread of communism, rather than the 
Soviet influence, will be focused on when proving the thesis that U.S. relations with 
South Africa were driven by the global Cold War, but not necessarily from fear of 
immanent Soviet intervention in the area. 
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 Within the vast scholarship on U.S.-South African relations during the Cold War, 
the three case studies examined for this thesis are only briefly mentioned. Although far 
greater attention has been given to apartheid, only a handful of scholars have specifically 
looked at the implications of apartheid on U.S.-South African relations during the 
presidencies of John F. Kennedy, Lyndon B. Johnson, and Richard M. Nixon.  Thus this 
thesis fills a significant gap in the historiography on U.S. foreign policy toward South 
Africa during this period of the global Cold War.  Rather than fitting U.S.-South African 
relations into the mold of a traditional Cold War definition, as previous historians on the 
subject have done, this thesis examines three significant events in U.S.-South African 
history that illustrate the complexities of foreign policy decisions the U.S. government, 
the Executive branch specifically, made in context to South Africa, their government, and 
the global Cold War.  It illuminates the dynamic layers that allowed these decisions by 
the U.S. Executive branch to happen and permits the influence of geographical, political, 
and economic considerations, along with media perception and complexities between the 
different branches of the U.S. government to play a role in understanding the complex 
relationship between the U.S. and South African governments. 
 Thomas Borstelmann focused largely on the U.S. government’s relationship with 
apartheid.  Borstelmann’s early work primarily attended to the early years of the Cold 
War and the effect of the National Party coming to party in 1948 on U.S. diplomacy 
towards South Africa.  He synthesized the cohesion of economic and strategic interests 
the U.S. government had towards South Africa with the onslaught of the Cold War and 
the start of the Civil Rights movement.  Borstelmann argued: 
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An examination of American support for the white minority government of South 
Africa and for the colonial rulers of the rest of southern Africa offers a window on 
the complicated interplay of two major themes of twentieth-century American 
history: racism and anticommunism.
1
 
 
According to Borstelmann, southern Africa became a testing ground for the U.S. to see if 
it could create a multiracial alliance with the then-called Third World against the Soviet 
bloc.  Borstelmann stated: 
In its pursuit of the preoccupying goals of containing communism and preserving 
the ‘free world,’ the Truman administration provided critical assistance to the 
reassertion of white authority in southern Africa after World War II.  The United 
States acted, in sum, as a reluctant uncle- or godparent- at the baptism of 
apartheid.
2
 
 
Borstelmann argued that the Truman administration did not trust the black South Africans 
to maintain a Soviet-free zone in South Africa, which was essential to the U.S. for a 
variety of reasons, most notably for the amount of raw resources they had.  Borstelmann 
argued that Truman’s racism did not help matters, especially when Afrikaner nationalists 
freely lumped all serious opponents of apartheid together as “communists” because 
Truman did not think to question the claim seriously.
3
  In sum, Truman felt his options 
were limited in who to support in South Africa against the spread of Soviet influence and 
therefore went with the option that he felt was the best for the U.S. at that time. 
 Borstelmann also confronted the cohesion of U.S. racial politics with its 
diplomatic relations with a special emphasis on southern Africa; however his later work 
covered 1945-1990 globally, rather than just the early Cold War in southern Africa. 
Borstelmann focused on the effect of racial policies in the U.S. with the concern that 
                                                          
1
 Thomas Borstelmann, Apartheid’s Reluctant Uncle: The United States and Southern Africa in the Early 
Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 4. 
2
 Ibid, 197. 
3
 Ibid, 201. 
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“Soviet leaders had begun to show greater interest in expanding their influence south of 
the Mediterranean.  The [U.S.] concluded that any encouragement of racial strife ‘would 
enhance Sino-Soviet Bloc opportunity in Africa.’”4 Kennedy was of special concern to 
Borstelmann.  He found that Kennedy’s policies towards South Africa would remain in 
place through Johnson and Nixon’s presidencies.  His main policy consisted of choosing 
“staunchly anti-Communist white rulers” over the ANC or PAC, despite fears of how the 
U.S. civil rights movement might react.
5
 
Borstelmann was not alone in assuming that U.S.- South African relations during 
the 1960s and 1970s was largely driven by fear of Soviet influence and communism 
spreading to a strategic ally in southern Africa.  Robert Kinlock Massie approached the 
U.S.-South African relationship in the context of how apartheid impacted U.S. 
organizations with ties to South Africa, such as churches, universities, private businesses, 
civil rights leaders, and various leaders within the U.S. government.  For the purposes of 
this thesis, his research on U.S. government policy was most intriguing.  He portrayed the 
government as one that was divided: U.S. presidents were too concerned with the 
implication of the importance of South Africa as an ally during the Cold War to make any 
significant changes of policy towards apartheid.  More specifically, he argued: 
…the Americans also became convinced that a revolution would open the door 
for a Communist takeover or a superpower confrontation over the southern sea 
lanes and the world’s largest supply of gold.  They read with alarm the CIA 
reports that Communists had infiltrated the African National Congress….  The 
lens of the cold war thus altered- and sometimes distorted every intelligence or 
                                                          
4
 Thomas Borstelmann, The Cold War and the Color Line: American Race Relations in the Global Arena 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001),136. 
5
 Ibid, 170. 
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policy analysis, casting suspicion on all acts of resistance against colonialism or 
apartheid.
6
 
 
While Massie’s focus is not necessarily on why the U.S. Executive branch conducted 
governmental relations with South Africa in the manner it did, he does presume that 
communist expansionism, led by the Soviets, in South Africa was the framework for 
governmental decisions and therefore acted as a catalyst towards positive change in favor 
of black South Africans. 
Massie is not alone in his assumption that the Cold War was the rationale behind 
decisions being made in Washington.  Christian M. De Vos was a bit more moderate on 
the influence of the Cold War on U.S. presidents, Kennedy in particular.  He argued, 
“…Kennedy simultaneously affirmed the legitimacy of the apartheid government, not 
because the Cold War left him no other choice but because that was the only choice his 
administration was willing to see.”7  De Vos structured his historical analysis of U.S. 
decisions being guided by the overblown assumption that the apartheid government was 
the only choice for an ally in the Cold War among rival South African political parties 
because they were the safest choice in the ideological war against the spread of 
communism.   
J.E. Spence adjusted the lens and looked at the overall role of South Africa to the 
west throughout the Cold War arguing their importance to thwarting communism: 
Yet ultimately, South Africa’s projected image as the ‘bastion of the free world’ 
failed to convince Western policy makers.  Their skepticism was based on the 
argument that what the Soviets sought by projecting naval power in distant waters 
                                                          
6
Robert Kinlock Massie, Loosing the Bonds: The United States and South Africa in the Apartheid Years 
(New York: Doubleday, 1997), 128. 
7
Christian M. De Vos, “Balancing Acts: John Kennedy, The Cold War and The African National 
Congress,” Politikon 32, no. 1 (May 2005), 119. 
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was political influence rather than the means to provoke military confrontation 
with the West….  Western governments recognized that in the improbable event 
of a shoot-out in the southern oceans, the Republic’s anti-Communist posture 
would leave it little choice but to place its ports, harbours, and military facilities at 
the West’s disposal.8 
 
Spence’s claims approached a much more accurate depiction of the rationale behind 
maintaining a working relationship with the South African government in stating its 
importance to the U.S. militarily and geographically.  However, he failed to develop a 
historical narrative that supported his assertions, leaving his rationale open for further 
investigation. 
 There was clearly a tendency in the literature dealing with U.S.- South African 
relations during this time period to emphasize the role of either the communist threat 
(often embodied in opposition parties to apartheid) or the fear of the spread of Soviet 
influence.  Historians have not devoted much, if any, time on the specifics that created 
this historical context.  Too little investigation has been done on the papers, speeches, and 
communiques in the Executive branch that would explain why this assumption is correct. 
 There is a much smaller collection of literature about Soviet- South African 
relations during the Cold War.  Much of the work done on Soviet-South African relations 
during the Cold War is minimal and speculative due to documentation limitations.  
However, Vasili Mitrokhin and Christopher Andrew did a significant amount of historical 
research using archival materials snuck out of the former Soviet Union by Soviet 
archivist Mitrokhin.  Focusing on the push to engage Sub-Saharan Africa in the Cold 
War, Andrew and Mitrokhin paint a picture of a cash-strapped Soviet Union attempting 
to stay ahead of the curve as former African colonies gained independence.  A major tool 
                                                          
8
J.E. Spence, “Southern Africa in the Cold War,” History Today 49, no. 2 (Feb 1999), 46. 
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of the Soviet Union was to engage in distributing forged letters to African leaders that 
were “designed to strengthen their suspicion of the United States and their trust in the 
Soviet Union.”9 
 Andrew and Mitrokhin did look briefly at the Soviet’s interaction with the ANC 
and SACP.  More specifically, even though Moscow had “only modest expectations of 
the prospect of national liberation movements” in South Africa, they did feel that it was 
important to maintain relations with the groups that opposed apartheid and might 
ultimately come to power should there be a revolution.  Regardless of giving the ANC 
and SACP modest funding ($300,000 a year to the ANC), Andrew and Mitrokhin argued 
that “the first fifteen years of Umkhonto operations posed no significant threat to South 
African apartheid regime.”  This was largely due to the mass exile and imprisonment of 
ANC and SACP leadership.
10
 
 Vladamir Shubin analyzed the causes of armed conflict in Southern Africa during 
the Cold War.  While most of his work focused on Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and 
Namibia, he has produced a minimal amount of scholarship on South Africa.  His 
research drew from ANC archives and interviews with both Soviets and South Africans.  
Shubin offered more depth in the Soviet involvement with the ANC and SACP than 
Andrew and Mitrokhin.  Via interviews with men involved, Shubin retold how 328 
Umkohonto fighters were trained by the Soviets in Odessa from 1963-1965.  The Soviets 
attempted to teach them guerilla tactics that might be useful should they rise up against 
apartheid.  Training continued for the next two decades, but was spotty and 
                                                          
9
 Christopher Andrew and VasiliMitrokhin, The World Was Going Our Way: The KGB Battle for the Third 
World (New York: Basic Books), 438. 
10
 Ibid, 443. 
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unsustainable, as the Soviets could not get the ANC supplies needed should an armed 
uprising happen.  They also could not get the fighters back into South Africa.
11
  Much of 
the rest of the work offered by Shubin focused on post-1976 Soviet-ANC relations.  
However, his book did offer a much more detailed relationship between the Soviets and 
the ANC and SACP. 
 What is concerning about the work conducted on Soviet- South African relations 
during the time period is that much of the work focuses either on pre-WWII or post-1976 
relations between the Soviets and various political parties in the South Africa.  What does 
exist during the time period of this thesis is information that is often contested by 
scholarship done in the area, as demonstrated by Shubin and Mitrokhin and Andrew’s 
work.  Theses authors have similar research stated but drastically different interpretations 
of events.  Scholarship tends to be minimal in this realm because of the limitations on 
resources available, as stated by both sets of authors in their work. 
 Soviet involvement in South Africa was further complicated by Cuban interaction 
with sub-Saharan Africa, thus illustrating that the communist front was not always united 
during the Cold War.  Andrew and Mitrokhin only briefly mentioned Cuba by saying that 
their government saw that region as “‘imperialism’s weakest link.’” 12  Cuba clearly had 
an interest in emerging governments after colonialism began collapsing, thus begging the 
questions of whether or not they were influential in South Africa and if so, to what extent.  
Piero Gleijeses offered answers to this.  While much of his work focused on Algeria, the 
Congo, and Angola, he did spend some time examining South Africa.  While this thesis 
                                                          
11
 Vladimir Shubin, The Hot “Cold War”: The USSR in Southern Africa (London: Pluto Press, 2008), 244-
245. 
12
 Andrew and Mitrokhin, 433. 
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does not emphasize Cuba’s role in South Africa, they are pertinent to the conversation 
because they help frame the context to which the Soviets were involved with South 
African politics.  Using a variety of archival work from the U.S., Cuba, Belgium, and the 
U.K., Gleijses argued that it was Cuba’s interest in spreading a revolution throughout 
Africa that was far more concerning to the U.S. government than Soviet intentions.
13
  
Although he offered little insight to U.S.- South African governmental relations prior to 
1976, it did offer a different view of the Soviet Union in Africa.  There was an attempt to 
spark a leftist revolution, but it was led by Cuba, not the Soviet Union, and it happened 
not in South Africa, but in Angola, the Congo, and other former Portuguese and Belgian 
colonies. 
 There are a significant amount of scholarship that offers comprehensive histories 
of the Union of South Africa and South Africa.  Leonard interpreted events involving 
South Africa on the world stage during the time period of this thesis.  Drawing from a 
wide array of South African historiography that embodied post-Cold War and post-
apartheid perspectives, Thompson set out to reexamine major historical themes in South 
African history that may be more pertinent and inclusive of voices that were largely 
quieted by apartheid.
14
  Although his work was largely a domestic history of South 
Africa, he did contextualize historical events in relation to the Cold War.  Thompson 
argued that South Africa was never a high priority for the Soviets.  Proof for Thompson 
was that top leaders of the ANC- Nelson Mandela and Oliver Tambo- were not 
                                                          
13
 Piero Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (Chapel Hill: The 
University of North Carolina Press, 2002), 8-9. 
14
 Leonard Thompson, A History of South Africa, Revised Edition (New Haven: Yale University, 1995), xii-
xiii. 
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communists and therefore were never seriously courted by the Soviets.  For Thompson, a 
more important relationship was that of the U.S. and Great Britain with the South African 
government because they wanted to invest in mineral resources and open trade.  
Thompson did not connect this interest to the Cold War context.
15
   
Sue Onslow and John Daniel made strong arguments about U.S.- South African 
relations during the Cold War that resonate throughout this thesis.  Onslow edited a 
collection of works by various authors, including Shubin, Onslow, and Daniel.  Onslow’s 
intent was to allow for a more complex and holistic picture of South Africa during the 
Cold War to emerge via recent studies conducted.  She argued that the Cold War was not 
a bipolar contest between the U.S. and the USSR.  Rather: 
The region therefore must be seen as an integral part of the ‘international civil 
war’ of the twentieth century, as the battle between ‘centre-right and left’ 
interacted with the politics and militarization of the struggle in Southern African 
region, as the discourse of liberalism and arguments for evolutionary, socio-
economic change were effectively sidelined.
16
 
 
Onslow argued that South African politics during the Cold War cannot be oversimplified 
by fitting it into a traditional definition of the Cold War.  By incorporating chapters on 
U.S. nuclear aspirations and Soviet military involvement, Onslow established the 
importance of South Africa and its government to the U.S. and, to a lesser degree, the 
Soviet Union during the Cold War. 
John Daniel, who was featured in Onslow’s work, had a similar argument to 
Onslow.  He argued: 
                                                          
15
 Ibid, 216-217. 
16
 Sue Onslow, “Introduction,” Cold War in Southern Africa: White Power, Black Liberation, ed. Sue 
Onslow (New York: Routledge, 2009), 1-2. 
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Similarly misguided was the enveloping of apartheid’s mission in the Cold War 
cloak.  At the end of the day, the Cold War paradigm was a myth.  This is not to 
suggest that its arch-advocates like Botha and Malan did not sincerely believe in it 
and that they were fighting the West’s good fight.  They did.  However, wrapped 
up as they were in this profound misconception, it blinkered them from the 
realities of the South African struggle.  For the apartheid regime, the Soviet Union 
was never the real problem.
17
 
 
There is proof in documents and press clippings that showed they fully believed that they 
were essential to the west’s military and political strategies against the threat of Soviet 
aggression.  Much like Spence, Onslow and Daniel do not spend a significant amount of 
time in their work developing the actual history that guided their arguments about U.S.-
South African relations during the Cold War during the time period reflected in this 
thesis.  This thesis seeks to fill that hole in the scholarship.   
The scholarship available on U.S.-South African relations from Kennedy to Nixon 
is often minimal and presumptuous, frequently used to paint a larger picture of the Cold 
War in Africa.  To my knowledge, there is no literature that hones in on smaller events 
that shape a more detailed understanding of U.S. relations with the South African 
government in an effort to define how South African history fits into the global Cold War 
particularly during the 1960s and early 1970s.  Rather, specified history embodying 
South African- U.S. governmental relations during the Cold War tend to emphasize 
historical chapters such as mineral security and the proliferation of nuclear knowledge.  
The history of port usage for ships, space stations, and weapons sales begs us to admit to 
the historiographical account another means of inquiry that will further clarify South 
Africa’s position in the global Cold War. 
                                                          
17
John Daniel, “Racism, the Cold War and South Africa’s Regional Security Strategies 1948-1990,” Cold 
War in Southern Africa: White Power, Black Liberation, 51. 
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 This thesis is based on previously unavailable and unconsidered primary sources 
from the U.S. National Archives Record Group 59, records of the State Department.  This 
record group was selected because of its preeminence in secondary literature consulted 
prior to a visit to the U.S. Archives in Maryland.  More specifically, files from the broad 
categories of Communism, Defense, and Political Affairs and Relations from 1967-1969 
and 1970-1973 were consulted.  In addition to these materials, the primary source series 
Foreign Relations of the United States, the analyst papers of the CIA, and the 
Congressional Record were all consulted for further information.  From these collections, 
the three case studies emerged as the pre-eminent issues concerning the U.S. Executive 
branch as they appeared often in the document collections for both the Executive and 
Legislative branches.  They also drew a significant amount of attention from the media 
when searched in the New York Times and London Times historical databases. 
 Presidential policy between the 1960s and the 1970s was largely favorable to the 
South African government.  Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon all dealt with various crises 
that challenged their international image thanks to allying themselves economically and 
politically with South Africa.  Despite the potential for bad press and backlash from the 
Civil Rights community in the United States, they all felt it necessary, if not vital, to stay 
aligned with the South African government, as they were invested deeply economically, 
scientifically, and militarily.  Arms embargoes were put into place and broken with 
conventional weapons continuing to be sold thanks to loop holes in the embargoes.  Port 
policies were established, scrutinized, and ultimately disregarded in an effort to maintain 
access to air and naval ports.  Even NASA was brought under the microscope because 
their policies upheld apartheid policy in order to keep access to satellite and missile 
14 
 
tracking stations essential to landing men on the moon.  Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon all 
legitimized their actions by claiming that keeping South Africa close politically would 
allow for some sort of influence on their apartheid policy.  Whether or not they actually 
believed this is debatable. 
 There is no doubt that global Cold War politics did heavily influence major 
foreign policy decisions for Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon.  But, to what extent did it 
influence policy choices towards South Africa?  This paper will argue that the global 
Cold War did provide a back drop to decisions made, although it was not to fight the 
direct threat of the Soviet influence within South Africa’s borders.  Access to minerals, 
ports, and tracking stations were vital to global Cold War efforts.  Also, selling weapons 
to beef up the South African Defense Force’s capabilities can be contextualized in the 
global Cold War framework.  However, the U.S. did not decide upon such actions to keep 
the Soviets at bay in South Africa.  Also, the U.S. did not base their policies towards 
South Africa on the fear of South Africa becoming communist via banned groups such as 
the ANC and PAC, as was argued at the time. 
 Onslow and Daniel both suggested in their work that the way in which historians 
look at relations during this time period should be re-examined, but then do not offer 
specifics to support this idea.  The three case studies that emerged from doing research in 
Record Group 59 allow for the actual re-examination to occur.  These case studies are 
broken up and examined within the pages of this thesis.  Chapter one, while serving 
largely to contextualize South Africa in the global Cold War context, will introduce the 
importance of South Africa on the stage of the larger global Cold War.  This chapter will 
focus on Cuban- African relations during the 1960s and spread of communist influence 
15 
 
within domestic South African opposition parties, such as the ANC.  Chapter two looks at 
the first case study involving port usage by U.S. naval ships in South Africa and the 
difficulty the various branches of the U.S. government had in making a cohesive port 
policy in the face of the global Cold War and apartheid.  Chapter three discusses the 
impact of the port policies that emerged during the 1960s on NASA’s use of bases in 
South Africa to support a man landing on the moon.  Chapter four analyzes the decision-
making process and the importance surrounding the sale of U.S. weapons to South Africa 
in the face of growing aggressive apartheid policies.  It is through these three case studies 
that a common theme of apprehension and lack of clarity emerges, thus bringing to 
question the manner in which historians have previously looked at U.S.-South African 
relations via the global Cold War lens. 
 Because U.S. policy was often contested between Congress and the White House, 
it is historically significant to separate the decisions, statements, and opinions of the 
various branches of government.  Even within branches, such as the Executive branch, 
there is discussion and disagreement about the way in which to proceed when making 
policy.  This illustrates the curious advance of a dynamic policy between major 
government players within branches and between the branches. 
  
16 
 
Chapter One: Cold War Context 
There is deeper historical context that must be explored when looking at South 
Africa and the U.S. during the global Cold War.  Decisions made by the Executive 
branch of the U.S. government were undoubtedly influenced by the global Cold War 
pertaining to South Africa, but South African policy was more complex than the 
simplistic east versus west struggle.  This chapter will look at the traditional view of 
South Africa being a territory where the U.S. battled the Soviet Union economically and 
politically and expand the view to that of the global Cold War.  South Africa was a naval 
region with ports to fight the global war elsewhere, such as in Vietnam but also in outer 
space. 
 There are three major historical camps concerning communism in South Africa.  
The first camp argues that communism did not exist in South Africa or if it did that it was 
irrelevant.  The second argues that communism did it exist and its importance is of 
relevance when studying domestic and international South African history.  The third 
argues that communism’s presence is of great importance and overshadows much of how 
South African domestic and international interactions are viewed.  I am of the second 
camp.  While communism did exist and was definitely of concern for the apartheid 
government, especially communism’s connections to major opposition parties such as the 
ANC, it should not overshadow how all South African history is viewed from 1958-1973. 
 
U.S. and the Global Arena: 
17 
 
In Europe in the post- World War II setting, Greece and Turkey both threatened to 
become communist and possibly under the guise of the Soviets during their civil wars.
18
  
This resulted in the U.S Executive and Legislative branches declaring and passing the 
Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan.  For that purpose they promised diplomatic and 
economic aid to countries that could potentially fall to communist governments, not 
necessarily to Soviet influence.   
In 1950, there were major revolutions in Guatemala and Cuba.  The CIA and 
Executive branch, reacted with intensity using assassination attempts and attempted 
coups.  In 1954, Guatemala endured “Operation Success”: the U.S. army deployed 
propaganda such as strategically placed pamphlets, along with diplomatic pressure, that 
forced Jacobo Arbénz Guzmán out of power.  His policy of reclaiming unused land by 
the United Fruit Company, a U.S. corporation, and giving it to the landless population 
was not tolerated.  After a successful revolution in Cuba, the Soviet Union placed and 
activated nuclear weapons on Cuba and pointed them at the U.S., resulting in the Cuban 
Missile Crisis.  After the removal of the missiles, the U.S. Executive branch made it a 
priority to eliminate Fidel Castro from power, but ultimately failed to do so.   
Within this context, it is necessary to mention the Bandung Conference and the 
challenge of nationalist rejection of an emerging bi-polar world order.  To simplify the 
global Cold War as such would be to ignore the split that happened in April 1955 at the 
Bandung Conference.  This meeting was the first time that the decolonizing world, 
namely those in Africa and Asia, came together to attempt an establishment of a unified 
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voice that would transcend nationalistic categorizations.
19
  Its purpose was to confront 
anticolonialism, disarmament, and development despite Cold War developments in 
Southeast Asia.
20
  This acted almost as a tertiary element that complicated the idea of 
east-west relations because, despite China’s attendance (the Soviet Union did not attend), 
there is a veritable split between what the U.S. viewed as allied states in the global Cold 
War.  The Bandung Conference is significant because not all perceived eastern states 
were aligned in the context of the global Cold War; rather they made their own political 
attempts at creating a unity for themselves despite China and the Soviet Union. 
Most notably, the U.S. then expanded activity to with the former French colony 
Vietnam, after it earned independence in 1954.  Vietnam’s independence coincided with 
the Chinese communist revolution and the Korean War.  Upon Vietnam’s independence 
and the popularity of socialist- oriented Ho Chi Minh, the U.S. became increasingly 
concerned that the conversion of governments to communism was a trend, rather than 
isolated incidents; thus, the domino theory was born.  All branches of the U.S. 
government vehemently opposed the spreading of communism in Southeast Asia and 
began investing itself politically, economically, and militarily as early as Truman’s 
administration.  It joined British and French efforts as global Cold War allies.   
Kennedy and Johnson’s military intervention in Vietnam no doubt cast a shadow 
on major international decisions elsewhere in the world, including those made towards 
South Africa.  In that global strategic concept port availability in South Africa was 
crucial for troop and material movement to and from Vietnam.  It is in that context that 
                                                          
19
 Jason Parker, “Cold War II: The Eisenhower Administration, the Bandung Conference, and the 
Periodization of the Postwar Era,” Diplomatic History 30, no. 7 (November 2006), 870. 
20
 Ibid, 872. 
19 
 
troops aboard the USS Franking Delano Roosevelt returned from Vietnam in February 
1967 and needed to refuel and allow the troops leave time for their sound mind.  The 
policy originated out of a naval policy context, not a political context.  There was little 
concern in the Executive branch that the South African government, or Africa in general, 
was going to fall like dominoes to communist or socialist governments as it was feared in 
Asia.  Also, the number of countries gaining independence in the 1960s from colonial 
rule in Africa was not a motivating factor. 
 The Middle East was also an area of concern for the U.S. and the Soviets.  In 
relation to the thesis of this paper, the Suez Canal crisis would be cause for concern by 
the U.S., particularly in relation to their ability to ship goods and move military should 
they need to do so.  The leader of Egypt, Gamal Abdel Nasser, envisioned a Pan-Arab 
empire from the Atlantic to the Persian Gulf under his leadership.  In pursuit of this goal, 
Nasser understood the importance of working within the confines of the global Cold War.  
Therefore, he took to playing the U.S. and Soviet Union off of one another to create a 
more viable economic and political empire in the Middle East.  In 1955, he secured a 
pledge of military supplies from the Communist bloc to help equip the Egyptian army.  
From the U.S. and Great Britain, he received financial assistance amounting to $70 
million for his construction of a new dam at Aswan which would allow for land 
cultivation and the production of hydro-electric power.
21
   
 On July 20, the U.S. government, who had becoming increasingly agitated with 
the reliance of Nasser on military aid from the Soviet bloc and their anti-Israeli 
sentiments towards the recently formed state, withdrew their offer to help build the 
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Aswan Dam.  This ultimately led to the nationalization of the Suez Canal, which had just 
recently come under their full military control with the relinquishing of British military 
protection on June 13, 1956.
22
 
The Soviets were not very active with the region until the 1970s; however, they 
did interact in the context of the various Arab-Israeli wars.  Egypt, while not communist, 
courted the Soviet influence heavily for arms, particularly during the 1967 and 1973 wars 
with Israel.  The scramble for what was then called the Third World was in full effect by 
the U.S. and, to not as intense of a degree, the Soviets and Chinese.  Africa was no 
different. 
 
U.S.-South African Relations 1949-1960: 
 In a CIA political assessment written on January 31, 1949, it is evident that the 
U.S. regarded relations with South Africa to be vital, but not because of the global Cold 
War.  In fact, both the U.S. and the Soviet Union had a strong dislike for apartheid as 
established by Jan Smuts and expanded by Daniel F. Malan.  “In the wider field of 
international affairs South African intransigence on the racial issue and on the control of 
colonial areas has provoked criticism from non-Soviet as well as from Soviet sources, 
and has made the country something of a propaganda liability to the US and the Western 
bloc.”23  The reality was that South Africa was vital to the U.S. because of its 
geographical position and it possession of key minerals vital to the Cold War effort.  The 
CIA felt that supporting the South African government was important because it 
                                                          
22
Ibid, 276-277. 
23
Central Intelligence Agency, “The Political Situation in the Union of South Africa,” 31 January 1949, 1. 
21 
 
contributed to “order and stability in the whole of Africa.”  In addition, it had a naval 
base that was strategic for travel to Asia, as proven by use of the Cape Route during 
WWII.  It also had an untold amount of industrial potential that could be beneficial to 
U.S. private industry.
24
 
 Maintaining access and positive political relations with the South African 
government, in theory, should not have been a problem for the U.S.  As the CIA noted, 
“Politically, the Union’s orientation is unquestionably toward the West.”25  Competition 
from the USSR should have been minimal to non-existent.  The white-dominated 
government was fully on the West’s side.  However, the nine million “non-Europeans” 
who were repressed by apartheid served as a possible inroad for communists: 
The genuineness of many of the native grievances provides an excellent 
opportunity for Communist agitation….  Though the failure of the natives up to 
now to develop any effective indigenous leadership or to come together in trade 
unions indicates that the political danger point is still some distance off, continued 
Communist failure to acquire significant influence can by no means be assumed.
26
 
 
In a thirteen page report addressing the concerns, assumptions, and predictions about the 
future of South Africa, only one paragraph is spent on the threat of communist expansion 
into the country.  This is an important indicator as to the concern for communist 
expansionism, as 1949 was the start of the red threat with over bloated McCarthyism and 
the discovery of the Venona Cables in the U.S. with realpolitik guiding many policy 
decision made by Truman and Eisenhower in the early years of the Cold War. 
 In November 1950, the CIA published another report on South Africa.  In this 
report, the CIA was more concerned with the implications of apartheid on the image of 
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the U.S., being their economic and political ally.  Image was, of course, very important in 
the global Cold War, as propaganda and perception were as much a major part of the 
Cold War as the space and arms races.  “The Malan Government’s foreign policy is… a 
serious embarrassment both to the US and the UK.”  More specifically, “International 
resentment directed against the Union is greatly intensified by the harshness with which 
Malan’s Government has preached and practiced its racial program of apartheid….”27  
The CIA’s report was hypercritical of apartheid, but recognized the strategic importance 
of South Africa. 
 The 1950 report repeated and expanded on the same points as the 1949 report.  It 
too noted the economic, geographic, and military importance of South Africa to the U.S.  
Conditions were favorable for the west to maintain a Soviet-free situation for foreign 
policy decisions, saying, “It is an intensely anti-Communist government, but one also 
permeated with certain strongly anti-democratic tendencies.”28  Apartheid was the biggest 
liability with concern to possible Soviet penetration into the political system.  “Apartheid 
is also a ready-made invitation for propaganda from the Communist bloc directed against 
both the Union and the countries associated with it.”  Regardless of the possibility of a 
Soviet threat in the form of being an anti-apartheid force for the racial majority, the U.S. 
found itself unable to “disavow a country so firmly within the Western camp as South 
Africa is.”29  The U.S. did recognize the possibility of a ready-made communist 
revolution in the form of anti-apartheid groups representing the non-white population, but 
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it was not so imminent that it should trump the positives that came from maintaining a 
relationship with the South African government. 
 The 1950 report is one of the earliest reports to comment on the size of the 
military, which would balloon throughout the 1960s and 1970s thanks to the U.S., 
France, and U.K. selling them massive amounts of conventional weapons.  Should 
governments in the west choose to do so, weapons sales and industrial development 
“would make it more useful to the US and UK in its time of war.”  More specifically: 
In military matters the government has been favorably disposed towards 
cooperation with the US and UK as part of its efforts to modernize the 
obsolescent South African defense forces.  The usefulness of this cooperation is 
limited, however, by the Union’s small military budget, its preoccupation with 
internal security, and by political meddling with the armed services aimed at 
making Afrikaner elements dominant.
30
 
 
The South African government started their weapons sales requests as early as 1950, 
asking the U.S. to sell them B-29 bombers for the intended purpose of defending Africa 
from the Indian Navy.  The U.S. looked favorable on this because they were helping as 
much as they could, given they had a miniscule defense force, in the Korean crisis. The 
South African government also pled with the British government to help build up their 
navy to help defend the Cape Route and to build up naval yards that would be helpful in 
wartime for the U.S. and U.K. should they need it.
31
  These sales would be difficult for 
the U.S. to deny because of its strategic location. 
It is important to expand on why the South Africans were concerned about the 
Indian Navy.  Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, KGB operations did increase in India.
32
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The Indians did have a regional alliance with the Soviet Union, not as partners in the 
Soviet revolution, but as two states that had mutual interests, such as being opposed to 
the new Chinese government after the revolution.
33
  India also acted as a natural alliance 
with the Soviet Union because the U.S. relied on Pakistan as a "strategic counterweight to 
Soviet influence in Asia," thus encouraging the Indian government to look elsewhere.
34
  
The KGB did consider their relationship with India a success because of their continued 
alliance throughout the global Cold War against the U.S. and her allies in Asia.  By the 
1970s, the KGB had its largest presence outside of the Kremlin in India and felt that they 
were successfully influencing elections via putting in officials that remained sympathetic 
to the Kremlin, not because of the spread of communism.
35
   
The Indian Ocean itself was an important zone to control in global war because it 
was essential to trade, served as a geographically important alternative to using the Suez 
Canal, and allowed ease of access to Eastern Africa, which saw colonial powers 
withdrawing throughout the 1950s and 1960s.
36
  If one were to look at a map of states 
bordering the Indian Ocean, they would see U.S. and Soviet bases along the coast line, 
with the U.S. having bases in Mogadishu, Mombasa, Diego Garcia, and Berbera, among 
other areas.  The Soviets held bases in Mauritius, Seychelles, Socotra, and Aden.
37
  
Regardless, the Indian Ocean was seen as being a “zone of peace” probably because the 
threat of actual war was too great to conceive by the superpowers.  
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 By 1952, the CIA added an additional importance to South Africa- access to 
strategic minerals, which was essential not only in the arms race sector of the global Cold 
War, but the economy as well.  South Africa had the potential to produce a substantial 
amount of chromite, manganese, and uranium, all vital elements for the U.S.’s Cold War 
machine.
38
  In fact, ¼ of the west’s total manganese and chromite supply came from 
South Africa at the time, along with its entire supply of amosite asbestos.  In addition, 
South Africa provided large quantities of corundum, antimony, gold and industrial 
diamonds to the west.
39
 
 Despite its economic potential, its military was still considerably small and 
needed to be built up.  It was “undermanned, poorly trained, and inadequately equipped.”  
The military budget only constituted 2% of the nation’s total budget for 1952.  CIA 
analysts were concerned about this because, despite their weakness, they had 
“considerable military potential.”  They had proved themselves worthy of Western 
support during WWII and continued to be helpful to the West by sending what they could 
to the Middle East to support the British in their affairs there and to Korea to support the 
war.  The CIA saw enormous potential in their naval, air, and port facilities, which would 
“be of considerable value in event of general war, as in World War II, especially if the 
Suez Canal were denied the West.”  The bases could be utilized for ship and aircraft 
maintenance in route to conflict.  In addition, the staging and deployment of submarines 
from South Africa could be crucial during wartime.
40
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 The 1952 CIA report did discuss the potential for a communist invasion via anti-
apartheid forces.  It puts a little bit more urgency on the threat of communism in the form 
of non-white leadership, but it did not feel that it was an imminent threat.  “Though 
Communist progress will not be swift among the mass of the Natives, the Communists 
may have greater success in acquiring positions of leadership among the Native 
organizations.”  The reason for its slow encroachment was that there was a lack of 
organizers, distrust of communist leaders by the masses, and an absence of organized 
tactics by the international community for successful intervention.
41
 
 All three CIA reports mentioned have two things in common.  They all mention 
the strategic importance of South Africa in the context of war, should there be another 
World War, which has already been demonstrated.  They also all mention the concern for 
potential embarrassment against the U.S. given the growth of apartheid and their reliance 
on the government at the same time.  The blooming nature of apartheid did happen to 
correspond to the gradual reliance of the west on South Africa for military and economic 
needs. 
 The 1948 elections in South Africa were pivotal.  With the election of Malan, the 
National Party took control and kept its tight grip on it until 1994.  The National Party 
was the major proponent of the installation of apartheid for economic and political 
control by the white minority population.
42
  With the National Party came swift and 
fierce implementation of apartheid.  In 1949, they passed the Prohibition of Mixed 
Marriages Act of 1949, which is self-explanatory.  In 1950, they passed the Group Areas 
                                                          
41
Ibid, 6. 
42
Iris Berger, South Africa in World History (New York: Oxford Press, 2009), 114. 
27 
 
Act, which confined people of different races to segregated areas and would act as the 
predecessor to the Bantustans.  This law saw the increase in humiliation of the non-white 
population by enforcing such acts as the “pencil in the hair” test which deemed how 
African an individual was and consequently where they should live.
43
  In 1953, the Bantu 
Education Act was passed, which brought school education and teacher training under 
control of the Department of Native Affairs.  Prior to this, schools had been run by 
church and mission programs.  Now, the state controlled education, which meant that the 
non-white population saw their level of education plummet.  By 1970, 34.8% of urban 
Africans and 63.4% of rural Africans had no education.
44
 
 The racial policies of apartheid came to head via the Sharpeville Massacre on 
March 21, 1960.  By 1960, the white population owned 88% of the land, despite only 
constituting 15% of the population.
45
  Sharpeville was essentially a peaceful protest 
against stringent pass laws that kept the non-white population confined to certain types of 
jobs for limited wages based on the Bantustan they lived in.  Essentially, they could not 
get a job without a pass.  They could not get a pass without living in a Bantustan.  They 
could not live in a Bantustan without permission from the government.  They were forced 
to move onto Bantustans in order to get jobs.  At the protest, the South African police 
opened fired and killed 69 people.  The government also responded by banning the ANC 
and PAC.  The West was disturbed by the media images that came out of this incident 
and responded.  In April 1960, the U.S. Executive branch moved to put apartheid 
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permanently on the Security Council’s agenda.  They also set up a selective arms 
embargo.
46
  Despite the arms embargo and being under constant scrutiny for its domestic 
policies, the National Party continued its brutal enforcement of apartheid.  Between 1960-
1980, the black population living on Bantustans grew from 39.8% to 53.1%.  
Consequently, there was also a sharp increase in the number of black South Africans 
living in shanytowns, an equivalent to Hoovervilles during the Depression.
47
 
 It is questionable as to why the U.S. was motivated to implement an arms 
embargo, which would then by followed by a UN-wide embargo.  In 1960 a rash of new 
African states joined the UN.
48
  Did the U.S. support an arms embargo because it morally 
opposed the massacre of 69 people at Sharpeville?  Or, did they want to appeal to the 
newly formed/ future independent states of Africa?  J.E. Spence argues that the U.S. 
supported an arms embargo to keep the Soviets from capitalizing on its anti-colonial 
image in the UN and prevent the advancement of a Soviet- Third World alliance within 
the General Assembly.
49
  This may be true, but the reality was that South Africa carried a 
significant amount of importance economically and militarily and could potentially over-
power any of the newly formed states in southern Africa.  This could explain why South 
Africa recovered very quickly economically and politically from Sharpeville.  In the 
1960s, it saw a 6% growth economically thanks for foreign investment largely from the 
west.
50
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Cuba in Africa: 
In 1960, sixteen European colonies- French, British, and Belgian- all gained 
independence in Africa.   The U.S. State Department’s and Executive branch’s response, 
according to Piero Gliejeses, was to see Africa as the next “battleground.”  More 
specifically, it feared the new countries’ immaturity and resentment towards the west, 
which would then offer opportunities for political, economic, and military penetration by 
the east.
51
  But, the reality was that the U.S. could, and did, offer a significant amount of 
reliable economic aid.  Little did they know that the most direct challenge to their 
authority in sub-Saharan Africa would come not from the Soviets or the Chinese, but 
Cuba. 
 In 1961, Khrushchev and the KGB approved a new and aggressive campaign to 
revamp their global strategy pertaining to the so-called Third World.  Rather than 
focusing on the newly independent African states, they chose to focus on Latin America.  
The Cubans configured their own revolutionary policy targeting Africa.  Che Guevara 
was “convinced that sub-Saharan Africa was ‘imperialism’s weakest link.’”52  Whereas 
the Soviet relationships with new African leaders in places such as Algeria and Ghana 
remained weak, the Cubans sought to create a sustainable relationship.
53
  For example, in 
1963, Castro sent a group of 29 doctors, three dentists, fifteen nurses, and eight medical 
technicians to Algeria.
54
  This would be the first of multiple trips that happened 
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throughout the 1960s.
55
  In addition to medical aid, the Cubans also gave Algeria military 
aid, which would be repeated in other countries throughout Africa.  Congo and Guinea-
Bissau would also benefit from this aid.
56
   
One of the biggest areas of concern for the U.S. was Zanzibar.  In 1962, Cuba 
paid for eleven Zanzibaris to travel and train in Cuba.  They returned in 1963 to Zanzibar.  
The U.S. was very fearful that Cubans were trying to turn Zanzibar into a communist 
state.  Being that they had little intelligence available from the country, the U.S. feared 
the worst, which included that they could serve as a base for insurgency operations from 
Kenya to the Cape, all of which was friendly towards to the U.S.  It would also serve as a 
propagated example of what a successful African socialist state could look like.  If the 
Cubans were successful there, there was no telling how far the ripples of success would 
travel in Africa.  However, the reality was that Cuba was never able to spark any sort of a 
revolution and the State Department concluded that there was no Cuban influence in 
Zanzibar.  In fact, by February 1963, Zanzibar joined with Tanganyika, a non-communist 
state, to create Tanzania.
57
 
The Congo (formerly known as Zaire) would be the next unstable country that 
was cause for concern by the U.S. State Department.  The Congo had been of high 
interest to the U.S. for material reasons- namely that the Congo had uranium for nuclear 
bombs and the U.S. wanted it.
58
  Belgium, the Congo’s former colonial power, lost their 
control of the Congo when a referendum was held in June 1960 for independence.  The 
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Belgians tried to maintain their control over the armed forces and mineral resources, 
much to the dismay of the new government of Patrice Lumumba.  Lumumba wanted the 
wealth to benefit the Congolese.  U.S., British, and Belgian investors were all very 
worried.  Thus, the Belgian government created a crisis in the Katanga region of the 
Congo.  Lumumba asked the UN for help to keep the Katanga region from deteriorating 
into warfare.  The UN relented, possibly because of U.S. interests being at stake.  The 
U.S. then became intertwined by supporting Joseph Mobutu in an effort to “stabilize” the 
country and thus, played a significant role in the downfall and assassination of 
Lumumba.
59
  Che watched the U.S.’s reaction and decided that they should intervene 
militarily.  He assembled a squadron of 113 black Cubans to fight in the Congo.
60
  After 
seven months of fighting and training in the Congo, Che finally realized that they could 
not make significant progress toward a general revolution and they withdrew, but not 
before causing alarm to the U.S. about the spreading Cuban influence in sub-Saharan 
Africa.
61
 
The Cubans were not finished after their failure in the Congo.  Cuba found 
relative success in Guinea-Bissau, a Portuguese colony that was fighting for 
independence.  While the country had hostility among its ethnic groups, they remained 
united in fighting against the 20,000 Portuguese soldiers.  They called the Castro 
government for assistance and it answered.
62
  By 1967, Cuba had inserted nearly 60 
doctors and military advisers.  They also provided military aid.  Guinea-Bissau benefitted 
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greatly from the strategic disbursement of aid, knowledge, and medical care.
63
  By 1973, 
Portugal had left Guinea-Bissau and independence had been declared.  However, there is 
evidence that from 1966-1972, the Soviets had also given Guinea-Bissau aid in the fight 
against the Portugal empire.  The question is, to what extent did Cuba act independently 
or did they spark fires that the Soviets needed to tend to.  While there is little evidence 
that directly speaks to it, it was probably a joint effort begun by the Cubans and 
completed by the Soviets, not to be outdone by their revolutionary brethren.
64
 
 The longest Cuban intervention would take place in Angola; however this 
happened in the mid- to late- 1970s, outside the immediate scope of this thesis.  With that 
being said, the U.S. did know about Cuban intervention, albeit on a relatively small scale, 
throughout Africa.  Castro’s pattern of intervention did start in north Africa and 
ultimately would work its way down to southern Africa, which was concerning to the 
U.S.  The South African government, a steady ally of the U.S., became that much more 
likely because of such interventions that were largely driven by the Cubans, but partially 
aided, in some instances, by the Soviets. 
 
The Global Cold War in South Africa: 
 The 1960s was a volatile decade for South Africa.  To contextualize, Britain 
began to transfer power to African nationalists in Ghana, Sierra Leone, Nigeria, and 
Gambia in 1957.  In 1960, France gave up control over their colonies in west and central 
                                                          
63
 Ibid, 191. 
64
 Ibid, 211-212. 
33 
 
Africa.  Also, Belgium withdrew from Congo (Zaire).
65
  In South Africa, the decade 
opened with the Sharpeville Massacre on March 21, 1960 in which 69 people were killed 
in a peaceful protest against pass books.  This stemmed from the harsh pass laws that 
were passed by Hendrik Verwoerd’s National Party.  He resumed the 1930s pro-racist 
reconstruction world view and intensified racist policy by moving the black majority onto 
Bantustans and regulate them using pass books, a major source of insult and contention 
for black South Africans.
66
   
In addition to passing even more pass laws and Bantustan regulations, the white-
minority South African government banned the African Nationalist Congress (ANC) and 
Pan-African Congress (PAC).  The Executive and Legislative branches reacted to this 
with some level of shock, agreeing to place apartheid permanently on the UN Security 
Council’s agenda.  Kennedy also set up a highly selective arms embargo one full year 
prior to the UN.
67
  By 1961, the ANC, PAC, and South African Communist Party 
(SACP) all began to use violence when attacking apartheid which diverted dramatically 
from the highly encouraged use of non-violent acts by these groups to fight pass laws.
68
  
This uptick in violence of course resulted in even more laws passed by the South African 
government, including allowing for repetitive detentions of up to 90 days without trial 
(General Law Amendment of No. 76 of 1962).  By 1967, laws were passed that allowed 
detention without trial for indefinite amounts of time.
69
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 To keep the U.S. and western Europe off their proverbial backs, the South African 
government chalked up the violence used by the ANC, PAC, and SACP to the influence 
of the Soviets.  The South African government took steps to portray itself as a stable, 
civilized, and indispensable member of the west and that tolerance needed to be afforded 
towards them for taking preventative steps to maintain control particularly among the 
population that was heavily influenced by such groups.
70
  How influential were the 
Soviets in South Africa?   
Many historians feel that the reality of the threat was minimal at best.  John 
Daniel argued that they had very little influence in the region, stating that even though the 
“Cold War paradigm was a myth,” this did not mean that National Party leaders like 
Botha and Malan did not sincerely believe that they were fighting on behalf of western 
countries’ interests.71  This is not to say that the South African government did not have a 
legitimate fear of the Soviets filling in a void that was left by the crumbling colonial 
system, especially with Portugal losing their African footing in 1974, thus completely 
eliminating the geographical buffer the South African government felt between 
themselves and African states not associated with a western colonial power of some sort.  
Leonard Thompson agrees with Damiel, arguing that even though the Soviets did dabble 
in Africa, giving them weapons through East Germany to the resistance movements in 
Angola, Mozambique, and Rhodesia, the Soviets were far less menacing then the 
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possibility of a black majority deciding to openly revolt against a very small white 
minority in South Africa.
72
 
 This is not to say that there was no connection between the Soviets and the ANC, 
PAC, and SACP.  There was definitely a connection between the two, but it was not 
nearly as extensive as the South African government would have had the U.S. 
government believe.  There were a few connections between sub-Saharan Africa and the 
early Soviet Union as far back as 1921 when the Communist Party of South Africa 
(CPSA) had representation in Cominterm, later replaced by Cominform after WWII.
73
  In 
the 1960s, with African nations beginning to claim independence and newly formed 
political contingencies voicing their desire to build their societies around socialist ideals, 
Khrushchev responded with enthusiasm.
74
  Khrushchev in general was far more 
interested than his predecessors in Africa.  In the summer of 1960, Khrushchev attended 
the UN to welcome the sixteen newly admitted African states.  He liked the idea of the 
anti-imperialist fire of the first generation of African leaders and wanted to capitalize on 
it.
75
 
 Depending on the historian studied, there are a variety of views on the level of 
importance and aid the ANC and SACP received from the Soviets.  Vladimir Shubin, 
author of The Hot “Cold War”: The USSR in Southern Africa, argued that Moscow 
heavily influenced the ANC and ultimately were responsible for aiding their struggle and 
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keeping the groups afloat, particularly after the Sharpeville Massacre.  He wrote that the 
ANC and SACP got a significant amount of guerilla training from Moscow and that the 
training was conducted in Minsk and Belarus.  In addition, they requested weapons and 
received them via Dar es Salaam and Maputo drop points.
76
  Christopher Andrew and 
Vasili Mitrokhin, authors of The World Was Going Our Way: The KGB and the Battle 
For the Third World argued a different point.  They said that South Africa was the only 
KGB success story in sub-Saharan Africa but only because of the connections the SACP 
kept open with the ANC and PAC.  In addition, although Shubin leaned this way, 
Andrew and Mitrokhin argued that the ANC was “never really a full Communist puppet, 
but it was heavily sustained by the Soviet support and KGB back channels.”77 
 What did aid from the USSR look like?  In the 1960s, the USSR did begin to give 
assistance to the ANC and SACP.  Much of the aid was awarded to the Umkhonto we 
Sizwe (Spear of the Nation), or the armed wing of the ANC and SACP.  In 1963, the 
ANC got $300,000 in aid from Moscow, while the SACP got an addition $56,000.
78
  One 
of the reasons for this discrepancy in dollar amount between the groups is because the 
SACP at this point operated out of London, whereas the ANC had just moved to 
neighboring countries around South Africa and launched raids from outside borders.  As 
for the guerilla training that the ANC and SACP granted, it was reported that the Soviets 
had been sent to ANC camps in Tanzania and Zambia in 1964; however, there is little 
information to support this, according to Shubin.  He argued that it was not until 1979 
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that the Soviet instructors began to show up in ANC camps.
79
  However, from 1963-
1991, over 1500 ANC activists did get trained in Soviet military institutions.
80
 
 
Operation Mayibuye: 
The early 1960s saw a shift in the ANC from violence to non-violence.  Of 
particular concern to the ANC was the Sharpeville Massacre.  After the massacre, there 
was a conscience decision among the leadership of the ANC to begin using underground 
subversive tactics to make violent in-roads on the fight against apartheid.  Thus, the 
Umkhonto we Sizwe (commonly referred to as MK) was formed on December 16, 1961.  
Between 1961-1963, the MK undertook over 200 operations designed to damage public 
facilities.
81
 
 The most ambitious plans laid out by the MK was Operation Mayibuye (see 
Appendix B for the full text of Operation Mayibuye).  This was a six-page detailed plan 
that described how the MK might spark a mass armed uprising against the apartheid 
government.  The plan was discovered during a raid of Arthur Goldreich’s farm, known 
as Lilliesleaf.  During the raid on July 11, 1963, South African authorities found a 
hundreds of ANC documents, along with 16 major ANC leaders such as Goldreich, 
Walter Sisulu, and Govan Mbeki.
82
  These arrests ultimately led to the infamous Rivonia 
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Trials where the ANC’s top leaders were tried and placed in jail for several decades prior 
to the crumbling of apartheid in the 1990s. 
 Operation Mayibuye, while allegedly never adopted by the ANC and the MK, laid 
out detailed plans for how to spark a mass uprising.  Nelson Mandela, who was arrested 
prior to the Lilliesleaf raid, said that the plan was “entirely unrealistic in its goals and 
plans.”  The plan specifically declared areas that would be targeted, such as Port 
Elizabeth, Port Sephstone, North Western Transvaal, and North Western Cape.  It called 
for coordinated landings of four groups of 30 by ship and air to the designated areas.  
These groups would then work methodically to arm local populations that would become 
the core of future guerilla units.  After arming the people, they would pre-select targets 
that, if they were attacked, would create mass chaos and confusion, thus hoping to incite 
more people to join the rebellion.
83
 
 In addition to the military plans of Operation Mayibuye, a massive propaganda 
campaign would be launched domestically and internationally to garner more support for 
the operation.  Their means of communication would be via radio transmission to reach 
“the world and to the people of South Africa.”  The MK felt that once the rebellion was 
in full swing, they would need coordination of international support to deal the final blow 
to the fastidious apartheid regime.
84
 
 In looking at the document, there were clearly holes in their plan, or at least 
elements that were not addressed on paper.  For example, there was no mention of where 
they would get weapons from.  It could be inferred from Goldreich’s history that they 
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may have received weapons from China, East Germany, and the Soviet Union, as he 
traveled to these places prior to the raid.  But, it is unclear if he got weapons or a 
significant amount of aid from any of these countries.
85
  In addition, they never 
specifically named outside countries that would have provided aid to them in the larger 
forums, such as the United Nations.  In fact, the only other country that was named 
specifically was Castro’s Cuba, but only as an example of a successful uprising.86 
 Glenn Frankel, author of Rivonia’s Children: Three Families and the Cost of 
Conscience in White South Africa, stated the obvious about how overwhelming and 
unrealistic the plan was.  The plan called for 210,000 hand grenades, 48,000 
antipersonnel mines, 144 tons of ammonium nitrate, 21.6 tons of aluminum powder, 15 
tons of black powder, 1,500 bomb timing devices, 48,000 batteries, 260,000 detonators, 
and numerous types of machine tools with a knowledgeable workforce of 200 men to 
work with the machines and the materials.
87
  In addition to the sheer impossibility of the 
tactical side, there was a rift among the ANC and MK leadership about how realistic the 
plan was, with men like Goldreich and Joe Slovo arguing that it was possible, while 
Walter Sisulu and others liked the plan but felt it was impossible given the current 
political climate.
88
  
 Whether or not Operation Mayibuye was on the U.S.’s radar screen while they 
were making foreign policy and economic decisions concerning South Africa is unclear.  
It does not appear in any documents that were available to my research, such as the 
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Foreign Relations collection.  However, they must have known about it because it was a 
topic for discussion at the Rivonia Trials and weighed heavily in determining how the 
ANC leaders captured in the Lilliesleaf raid should be punished.
89
  The operation must 
not have been enough of a threat to garner an immediate reaction from the U.S. in the 
form of recanting the arms embargo or retracting negative statements made about 
apartheid on the record. 
 
Communism, South Africa, and the U.S.: 
 There was some level of concern in both the State Department and Joint Chiefs of 
Staff that communism was a legitimate threat.  In 1964, National Security Action 
Memorandum No. 295 was drafted, in which the United States proposed to take a tougher 
stance on the National Party’s racial policies by threatening to pull the satellite and 
missile tracking stations, suspending loans and monetary aid, and reviewing the selling of 
weapons and submarines to the South African government.  The Joint Chiefs of Staff 
were largely unhappy with these recommendations by the State Department.  Max Taylor 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff expressed his concerns to Secretary of Defense Robert 
McNamara, saying:  
For these reasons, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reiterate their views that the objectives 
of the United States toward South Africa should include its alignment with the 
Western Powers and the continuance of existing deep-space and tracking facilities 
in South Africa. As long as communist penetration and racial discord in Africa 
remain an active threat to Free World interests, stability in South Africa is 
desirable and the United States should do everything that its political and moral 
position permits to contribute to this.
90
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Clearly, not everyone was on board in believing that communism was not a threat and 
therefore that the relationship with the South African government was far more valuable 
than the fall out of associating with apartheid openly. 
 It should be noted that shortly after the Independence incident, South African 
industrialist Harry Oppenheimer, a liberal South African whose views starkly contrasted 
Verwoerd’s racial policy, came to visit the United States in an effort to maintain U.S.-
South African relations, particularly when it came to private business.  In a memorandum 
for the President’s Special Assistant McGeorge Bundy and Ulric Haynes of the NSC to 
Johnson, Bundy and Haynes specifically stressed how concerned they were by the 
increasing mandates the South African government were taking in restricting racially 
integrated actions, such as inter-racial Embassy gatherings or inter-racial crews from the 
U.S. working at bases in South Africa.  It was this type of attitude that was deemed more 
risky by Bundy and Haynes to pave an avenue for Soviet penetration than anything else: 
We are in turn deeply concerned about the accelerating trend toward Government-
sanctioned racial discrimination ("apartheid") and extreme political repression in 
South Africa. "Apartheid" in particular is a major handicap to the Free World in 
its efforts to stabilize the political situation in Africa and keep the Chicoms and 
Soviets out…  The gut problem in our relations with South Africa is that the 
policies of the Verwoerd government are driving the rest of the world into a kind 
of opposition which in turn will probably only make the South Africans more 
bitter and determined.
91
 
 
The government could have been more concerned with the connections between the 
ANC, PAC, and SACP with the Soviets, but the alienation afforded by the National Party 
was far more of a threat in this department. 
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 It would be presumptuous to assume the global Cold War cast a distinct shadow 
on U.S.-South African relations during the 1960s and early 1970s.  However, while there 
were ties between groups like the ANC, PAC, and SACP with the Soviet Union, China, 
and East Germany, it was not enough of a threat for the U.S. to react as strongly as they 
did in such circumstances as Greece, Turkey, Cuba, and Guatemala.  Thus, when looking 
at the decisions made by the Executive branch and military leaders of the U.S. during this 
era, historians must explore the issues that challenged U.S.- South African relations 
during the global Cold War, such as the NASA tracking stations, port usage, and arms 
embargoes, beyond traditional ideological parameters.  U.S. foreign policy towards South 
Africa was more complex than keeping the Soviets at bay within that country and region. 
 The following three events illustrate the argument calling for greater 
differentiation made on the previous pages.  They are ship docking procedure, satellite 
tracking stations, and the rivalry with Charles de Gaulle in the South African arms 
market. 
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Chapter Two: USS Franklin Delano Roosevelt 
 A string of incidents that involved United States naval fleet docking at various 
ports in South Africa illustrates the cross-roads of civil rights, national policy making, 
and the global Cold War in South Africa.  It is significant not because it illustrates 
another example of east battling west; rather, it suggests a vacancy of the concern of the 
Soviets by the U.S.  More importantly, it establishes the significance of the availability to 
ports technologically advanced enough that the U.S. could use during the global Cold 
War to house and fix ships that were passing through. 
 The context of this time period is important to note, particularly before looking at 
the particulars of the USS Franklin D. Roosevelt incident.  The 1960s ushered in major 
conflict on the domestic U.S. scene, namely that of the black civil rights movement and 
the Vietnam War.  Executive and Legislative branch decisions became increasingly 
scrutinized by the U.S. public throughout the 1960s with relation to the civil rights 
movement and the Vietnam War.  Relations with the South African government were 
unique in that respect because it tied together two major issues that dominated the media, 
particularly in the late- 1960s. 
 Political decisions about apartheid South Africa were being made in a country that 
was in the throes of racist Jim Crow laws.  Washington D.C. itself had a strong Jim Crow 
tradition.  In fact, African officials of newly independent African countries were very 
concerned to be posted as ambassadors in the U.S. and much preferred to be located in 
44 
 
Europe. Washington was surrounded by segregationist states, such as Delaware, 
Maryland, and Virginia.
92
   
 President John F. Kennedy was motivated to encourage the passing of a Civil 
Rights bill for a multitude of reasons.  One of the major benefits of passing such a law 
was that he knew he would improve relations with African delegates if he could show his 
commitment to decreasing segregation within the U.S.
93
  Thomas Borstelmann argued the 
significance of improving race relations within U.S. borders: 
In the southern parts of North America and Africa, racial polarization threatened 
to destroy the multiracial unity that the Kennedy administration believed crucial 
for its own political success at home and for American victory in the anti-Soviet 
struggle abroad.
94
 
 
The reality was that the Kennedy administration became more sympathetic towards with 
apartheid rule in South Africa, despite the arms embargo that will be discussed in chapter 
four, while getting tougher on segregationist governors in states like Alabama and 
Mississippi.
95
 
 It would not be until President Lyndon B. Johnson was in power that the Civil 
Rights Acts of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act 1965 were passed, leading the way to 
more integration and rights for the black community in the United States.  Between 1964- 
1968, the height of the death rattle of Jim Crow laws directly collided with the Vietnam 
War, where military recruits were proportionally higher among black than whites.  Civil 
rights leaders like Martin Luther King, Jr. saw major contradictions in demanding the 
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U.S. government for black Americans to fight for the preservation of U.S. freedoms at 
home, despite not being allowed those freedoms themselves.  While there was major 
rioting in response to the Civil Rights Acts in 175 U.S. cities in 1967, black American 
soldiers were immersed in guerilla warfare thousands of miles away in Vietnam.  In the 
words of one anonymous solider, “‘How is it possible that all these people could be so 
ungrateful to me after I had given them so much?’”96 
 When the USS Franklin Delano Roosevelt went to dock in South Africa, a trifecta 
of issues that had largely been buried by the media’s coverage of the Vietnam War 
consolidated.  U.S. policy towards South Africa became front-page news in February 
1967 because of a ship carrying black soldiers during a politically contested war.  
Unwanted exposure about U.S. relations with South Africa was revealed for all to see. 
 
The Incident: 
 On February 2, 1967, the New York Times began to carry headlines featuring the 
possibility of the USS Franklin Delano Roosevelt docking in South Africa.  On board, 
there were an estimated 100-300 black servicemen among the 3,500 total enlisted men.  
They were returning from Vietnam and expected to get leave in South Africa upon 
docking.  As reported, civil rights leaders were immediately concerned about the 
implication of leave for the black soldiers.  The NAACP sent a telegram to Washington 
urging them to reconsider docking the ship in Cape Town.  The ship was due into the port 
February 4, 1967.
97
  However, this issue did not begin on February 2, 1967; rather, it 
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started with the issue of the docking of the USS Independence in 1965 when there was a 
brief diplomatic skirmish between the U.S. and the South African government about 
leave rights for black servicemen who were docking in South Africa. 
 In May 1965, the USS Independence asked permission for planes from the carrier 
to land at South African airports, a rather routine request.  In an unusual twist, the South 
African government, led by Hendrik F. Verwoerd, agreed, but there were stipulations: the 
planes’ crews had to be white.  In the past, black crewmen had been seen landing and 
docking both at airports and naval ports.  The U.S. inquired further- was this a suggestion 
or a condition?  The Verwoerd government did not clarify.  In June 1965, Verwoerd took 
this request a step further and demanded that no black U.S. workers were to be permitted 
to work on NASA satellite tracking stations in South Africa (this issue will be addressed 
in chapter three).
98
  Verwoerd clearly took a tough line against the U.S. non-
segregationist policy by banning (officially or unofficially) mixed race crews from using 
ports or working within the borders of South Africa.  In addition, Verwoerd scolded U.S. 
embassies for holding multi-racial functions within South Africa, something that would 
obviously be unacceptable in an apartheid state.  In a memorandum from the NSC to 
Johnson, they said: 
Your accomplishments in race relations and civil rights here at home make it 
essential that our position on similar issues abroad be consistent with domestic 
policy.  Failure to do so if this issue becomes widely publicized would alienate 
members of Congress, American Negroes, civil rights groups, labor, church 
groups, and liberals in general.
99
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The NSC essentially warned Johnson of the dangers of making decisions that, while 
internationally may have made sense, would have been destructive to his image 
domestically. 
The Independence incident set a precedent of caution by the U.S. Executive 
branch in the use of South African ports because Johnson feared a backlash from the U.S. 
public by being viewed as condoning the policies of apartheid, while a race war was 
raging inside U.S.’s borders.  Essentially, it became frowned upon for the U.S. military to 
use South African ports, but that is not to say that ports were not being used between 
1965 and 1967.  There were at least four visits made by major U.S. ships, including the 
Valdez in Cape Town from December 13, 1966- January 2, 1967, the Coastal Crusader 
in Durban from October 25- November 29, 1967, the Sword Knot at various dates in 
1966-1967 in Cape Town, and the Twin Falls during various dates in 1966-1967 at Cape 
Town and Port Elizabeth.  Granted, most of these ships were contracted out and/or had 
few military personnel on board, but they still used the ports, despite the Independence 
“policy.”100 
 The Independence policy set a precedent for the U.S. Executive branch and 
military to follow when determining whether or not it was appropriate for the aircraft 
carrier USS Franklin Delano Roosevelt to dock in Cape Town, and if it were to dock, if 
they would allow leave for their soldiers, despite having black servicemen on board.  The 
State Department knew that the landing of the Roosevelt at Cape Town would be an 
issue.  In June 1967, there was a choice to permit the Roosevelt to dock in Cape Town or 
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to fuel it from an oiler in the sea and have shore leave at Rio de Janeiro.  A third option 
was to refuel in Malagasy, but this would cost an additional $100,000- 200,000.  Johnson 
preferred to go via Rio, but Secretary of the Navy Paul H. Nitze said that Cape Town was 
the preferable route.
101
  They went with Nitze’s recommendations.   
It is not clear when the civil rights community discovered or were told that the 
Roosevelt would dock in Cape Town, but the reaction was simple, strong, and united.  On 
January 30, 1967, Roy Wilkins, A. Philip Randolph, and Theodore E. Brown, leaders in 
the civil rights community, wrote to Secretary of State Dean Rusk and stated, in addition 
to the violation of the precedent set by the Independence incident and past policies 
towards apartheid, “Such a visit will [be] an insult to American Negroes, to the black 
people of Africa and to democratic [men] through the world dedicated to the elimination 
of apartheid.”102  The initial response by the Secretary’s office was that of acceptance of 
the Roosevelt docking at Cape Town.  They claimed that the Independence incident was 
isolated and that since then, the U.S. had used South African ports routinely and even 
allowed leave for mixed racial crews.  In addition, to deny the crew of the Roosevelt 
leave would be inhumane: “We deplore apartheid policy but cannot ignore the 
importance of shore leave for humanitarian and morale purposes.”103  The Secretary of 
State surprisingly admitted the use of ports since the Independence incident and went on 
to support the need for leave for the ship’s crew.  This view would change very quickly 
over the next few days prior to February 4, 1967, when the ship was scheduled to dock. 
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 When the news broke in the newspapers on February 2, 1967, naval authorities 
stuck to their rationale of allowing shore leave for morale and operational reasons.  The 
men aboard the ship were coming home from Vietnam after having 95 days without any 
sort of a break.  Cape Town was exactly halfway from Subic Bay in the Philippines to 
Mayport, near Jackson, Florida.  Thus, the port served as a great place for leave and an 
important spot for refueling prior to embarking on the last 7,000 miles.  The ports were 
equipped with the capability to fix ships should they need any repairs.  They also denied 
that allowing the leave and port visit was violating some sort of Navy policy that 
required, or strongly urged, ships to avoid South African ports.
104
   
Despite this rationale, many members of Congress protested the decision.  The 
New York Times reported that 40 members of Congress complained to Johnson that, “a 
visit would condone South Africa’s policy of apartheid.”  They also pointed out that the 
Independence incident did not merely produce a loose policy to abide by when possible, 
but that in 1965, G. Mennen Williams, the Assistant Secretary of State for African 
Affairs, made it clear that all future naval stops at South African ports should be 
canceled.  More moderate Congressmen suggested that the State Department should still 
allow leave, but make it clear that the U.S. still heavily condoned the use of apartheid.  
The result of such Congressional discussions was that Deputy Defense Secretary Cyrus 
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R. Vance and Secretary of the Navy Nitze announced that sailors would be granted 
“‘modified shore leave in connection with integrated activity only.’”105 
 The U.S. State and Defense Departments were not only being pressured by civil 
rights leaders and moderate and liberal Congressmen, but they were receiving a fair 
amount of criticism from South African press.  The incident was portrayed in a variety of 
ways in the press prior to the ship landing at the port.  The most alarming to the State 
Department was the message in pro-Nationalist paper Die Burger, which stated in 
columns and editorials that this was an attempt by the U.S. to isolate South Africa from 
the international community, and that the South African government must not succumb to 
pressure to respond to the taunting by the American Naval and State Departments.
106
  The 
ports in South Africa were clearly important to the U.S. Navy; thus, bad press by the 
South Africans would not help enable open access to them. 
 By February 4, the State Department issued a declaration suspending the leave of 
any soldiers from the Roosevelt. The Ambassador of South Africa, William M. Rountree, 
reported to the Secretary of State’s office in Washington that: 
As result painstaking review alternatives with Captain [William G.] O’Neill and 
Executive Officer FDR and senior members my staff, we have reached reluctant 
conclusion that only adjustment in fairness to all concerned which can be made to 
comply with instructions REFTEL is cancel all liberty…. 
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It is unclear if this decision was made by Rountree and the captain of the Roosevelt or by 
the State Department.  Furthermore, Rountree reported on press release alerting the 
international community of the decision: 
The American Ambassador, Mr. William M. Rountree and Captain William G. 
O’Neill, Commanding Officer of the U.S.S. Franklin Delano Roosevelt, wish to 
thank the South African authorities and public for their great generosity in 
offering hospitality to the personnel of the carrier visiting Cape Town.  Because 
of difficulties in organizing leave arrangements, it will not be possible for these 
kind offers to be accepted.  The carrier will remain in Cape Town for refueling 
and provisioning as scheduled.  The public is cordially invited to visit the ship 
during the scheduled hours. 
 
Ultimately, it was decided that integrated visits aboard the ship would be allowed, in 
addition to trying to salvage as many of the off-shore activities so long as they could be 
accommodated on board.  Rountree stated that the Captain was very persuasive in 
arguing against shore leave when he said that the impact of off-shore leave and being 
exposed to apartheid on the 10% non-white soldiers would not be worth the negative 
press that would most likely come with canceling activities planned by South African 
hosts.
107
  The press release was a polite decline designed to keep the U.S. Executive 
branch in favor with the South African government and to lessen the blow that could be 
delivered by the South African government.  But, it also took as step towards merting the 
needs of civil rights leaders and the vocal Congressmen upset by the docking of the 
Roosevelt in Cape Town. 
 The details of the leave were not released to the public, though if it had been, it 
would have cut down on some of the criticism that was delivered by domestic and 
international press.  The Navy did not solicit offers for shore leave activities, rather they 
                                                          
107
National Archives, General Records of the Department of State, RG 59, “Cape Town 737,”Def 7 SAFR-
US, 4 February 1967. 
52 
 
were deluged with numerous offers from the South African government and private 
individuals and groups.  The program for leave was planned on the eve of the visit and 
consisted of mostly integrated activities, such as church services, shopping, cable car 
rides, and bus tours.  However, there were a few segregated events, including offers of 
home stays and private dances.  On February 3, Captain O’Neill received the Naval order 
that ALL activities must be integrated.  Given that they were to dock in only a matter of 
hours, the Captain at that point decided that no leave should be granted because it would 
be impossible to sort through all of the activities and keep only the integrated ones 
available to soldiers.  Also, logistical concerns, such as the use of segregated bathrooms 
during bus tours and shipping, would have broken the official orders given by the Navy.  
Thus, according to the State Department, the Captain made the best call he could, given 
his extremely limited time constraints.
108
 
 Prime Minister John Vorster, who replaced Verwoerd after he was assassinated in 
1966 by a mentally ill person with no political motivations, did not wait long to make a 
reply to the seemingly diplomatic move by the U.S. Navy and State Department.
109
  He 
thanked South Africans that offered their homes and hospitality to the soldiers for their 
good will.  He apologized to them for putting in the time, money, and planning to provide 
a welcoming stay in their communities and homes.  In addition, he clarified that at no 
time did the South African government ever put stipulations on the leave of the inter-
racial crew.  Furthermore, Vorster expressed his surprise at the sudden decision of the 
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U.S. Navy to cancel the leave after plans and discussions had been made and agreed upon 
by both South African and U.S. parties.
110
  Vorster may have been more upset about 
being notified of the cancelation of the leave through a general press statement, rather 
than personally, than by the actual cancelation of the leave.   
The cancelation of leave and Vorster’s response made for sensational press in 
South Africa on February 5, 1967, with South African papers claiming that upset citizens 
went on board demanding answers from the ship’s crew and captain and that the ship’s 
crew was visibly grumpy at not having leave.  The Nationalist Die Beeld reported that all 
of South Africa had hoped this visit would usher in a new era of more amicable relations 
between the two countries.  Despite these headlines, the embassy in Cape Town reported, 
“Despite sharply critical nature of much of official and press reaction, public interest and 
goodwill remain high as evidence of tremendous turnout for public visiting today.”111 
 U.S. papers, including the New York Times and Washington Post, also looked at 
this event critically.
112
  On February 5, the New York Times published a “carefully 
worded” editorial, as the U.S. embassy in Cape Town would say, that looked at the 
impact of the docking of the ship domestically and internationally.  The first paragraph 
stated: 
With the carrier Franklin D. Roosevelt in Capetown, many South Africans, black 
and white, will conclude that they need not take seriously the official United 
States opposition to their Government’s racial policies and its defiance of the 
United Nations on South West Africa. 
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In addition, it claimed that the Department of Defense had “managed once again to 
interfere in the conduct of American diplomacy and create the impression that one branch 
of government is ignorant of or indifferent to the policies of another.”  The editorial 
lobbed the idea that the Navy should have known better than to even risk exposing the 
3,800 person crew to the ugliness of apartheid, despite promises of fully integrated 
activities, especially with Nitze at the helm of the Navy, considering that he was once 
chief of the State Department policy planning and should have been able to recognize 
potential policy pitfalls.
113
 
 The London Times was very critical of the events surrounding the cancelation of 
leave, more so than the New York Times, pointing out anomalies that U.S. papers missed 
in assessing the situation.  Why did the carrier need to go past the Cape?  The article 
suggested that sailing past the Cape of Good Hope was hardly routine upon returning 
from Vietnam to North America.  Also, why did the Navy potentially plan to subject a 
large amount of servicemen to the realities of apartheid by attempting to plan integrated 
and equal activities for all crew in Cape Town?  The article then turned to the 
significance of the event, specifically pointing out that the U.S. diplomatic attitude 
towards South Africa was unsteady and unpredictable at best.  In relation to England’s 
policy towards South African, the article suggested strongly that the decision to use South 
African ports undermined their own attempt to oppose the Nationalist regime and its use 
of apartheid through diplomatic means.
114
  This newspaper article raised questions that 
major papers in the U.S. failed to consider, such as why the route past the Cape was 
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selected.  However, this article’s coverage is subject to similar shortfalls as the New York 
Times because they failed to mention key glitches in their criticisms, such as the fact that 
England was selling the government of South Africa serious weapons.   
To further this negative depiction of the incident, The Times reported that the 
picture on board the ship was not as civil and pleasant as Rountree would like to have 
reported.  “While nearly 4,000 angry members of the crew are confined to their ship in 
one the world’s most hospitable ports… a bitter quarrel has broken out between the South 
Africans and American governments over what it had been hoped would be a good-will 
visit.”115 In addition, The Times reported that signs posted by the servicemen indicated 
that they heavily regretted not being able to disembark and spend time in the South 
African communities which suggested “that they disagreed with Washington orders that 
made leave impossible.”116 
This was somewhat of a different picture than what the New York Times reported.  
The New York Times did highlight the disgruntled nature of soldiers, even pointing out 
that black servicemen wanted to see what apartheid was like for themselves; however, 
short of the editorial on February 5, they hardly delved into the larger implications of this 
event on South African-U.S. relations.  They depicted a mutual disgruntlement of soldiers 
and visitors alike that was not directed specifically at either of the two governments, but 
rather at “politics in general.”  However, they did ponder what this meant on South 
African-U.S. relations, especially given headlines from South African newspapers such 
as Die Beeld, which stated, “South Africa’s hand of friendship, which was given to the 
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United States this weekend… has been suddenly and rudely knocked aside.”117  Given 
that embassy records show significant concerns about media coverage of the event, the 
U.S. government was concerned about the image being created of them by this incident. 
On February 9, 1967, a particularly lengthy Department of State airgram from the 
Cape Town Embassy to the State Department was sent depicting a news story from 
February 6.  Whereas other airgrams and telegrams being exchanged between the two 
State Department groups were short summaries of news stories from around the world, 
this one focused at length on a South African Broadcasting Company (SABC) story that 
criticized U.S. policy choices.  On SABC’s “Current Affairs,” it was alleged that because 
the visit was originally orchestrated by the Department of Defense and canceled so 
abruptly by the State Department, one could have concluded that “liberals” like UN 
Ambassador Arthur Goldberg and Senator Robert Kennedy (D-NY) were behind the 
change of plans.  More significantly, the SABC imposed the idea that apartheid was a 
“mutually accepted fact” and that people like Goldberg, who visited South Africa in 1966 
and appealed to U.S. businesses to uproot themselves from South Africa in a show of 
solidarity against apartheid, were turning the U.S. government into hypocrites who could 
not be trusted or relied upon.  The reversed decision of allowing leave was a sign of the 
times- U.S. policy was surely changing towards South Africa, said the SABC.  
Furthermore, the “Current Affairs” piece depicted the Department of Defense and private 
U.S. business as the good guys, whereas the State Department was clearly painted as the 
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“villain” in this situation.118  This negative press may have been cause for concern among 
the State Department that there was clearly a depiction of them as being disjointed from 
the other departments in government and that their move was unilateral, despite evidence 
to the contrary. 
Ultimately, on February 7, 1967, the Roosevelt left for Florida, leaving in its wake 
more questions than answers about its impact on foreign policy, the potential fall-out 
between South African- U.S. relations, particularly among the Executive branch and 
military co-operation, and the future use of South African ports, airports, and satellite 
tracking stations by the United States.  Essentially what could have been a minor bump 
for U.S. diplomacy among the Executive branch and the Joint Chiefs of Staff turned into 
a jumble of national civil rights issues crossed with global Cold War concerns and mixed 
with economic questions. 
 
Implications of the Roosevelt Visit: 
 After the Roosevelt docking, months were spent in the State Department, 
Congress, and the Department of Defense discussing what to do.  Before looking at their 
reactions, it is important to contextually frame this incident internationally and look at the 
strategic significance of the ports.  A natural place to look then would be at why the 
United States military wanted to use these ports, which leads the issue back to the Middle 
East and the Suez Canal Crisis. 
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Nasser’s nationalization of the Suez Canal on July 26, 1956, was much to the 
dismay of the West.
119
  The U.S. Executive branch and Joint Chiefs of Staff were 
surprised and concerned, particularly of the fate of U.S. ships- for both private enterprise 
and public military ships alike.  The canal was a key avenue for U.S. ships going East, 
particularly ships related to the military.  Thus, Suez was critical for ships going east for 
the Vietnam War, for access to India and the Indian Ocean, and, more obviously, to the 
Middle East.  Should the Suez have had another crisis, like the one in 1956, the United 
States needed an alternative route.  The best alternative, or what was being argued as the 
best alternative in 1967, was around the Cape of South Africa.  As early as January 4, 
1967, when discussing whether or not to allow the Roosevelt to go through Cape Town, 
the State Department took the following stance: “Department would like to use occasion 
of operationally desirably refueling visit of FDR to Capetown Feb 1-4 to establish 
principle that related flights from carrier would be permitted without racial 
conditions….”  More specifically, they knew Cape Town was an advantageous spot to 
refuel and they wanted to maintain the precedent that the U.S. Navy could use the ports to 
refuel if need be despite racial considerations.
120
   
The Legislative branch took up this debate as well.  On July 12, 1967, Joe D. 
Waggonner, Jr. (D- LA), a critic of the denial of leave for U.S. soldiers and apparent 
supporter of the Nationalist government in South Africa, said: 
South Africa has proved herself to be a valuable ally in the wake of the Middle 
East war by her cooperation in allowing American and British shipping to visit 
her ports while the Suez Canal remains closed. 
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He argued that the Cape Town route was vital to American shipping because 1500 ships 
used the Suez route and should that route’s access to U.S. ships be tampered with again, a 
viable alternative needed to be in place.  In addition, he claimed that South Africa had the 
only major dry dock in all of Africa able to accommodate cruisers and aircraft carriers, 
which were critical to immediate ship repair and maintenance during wartime.  He was 
dismayed by the “liberals” and UN for criticizing such an important ally.  He goes on to 
say: 
One is reminded of the incredibly foolish and offensive decision by the White 
House not to allow crewmen of the aircraft carrier Franklin D. Roosevelt, 
returning from the Vietnam War, to enjoy liberty in Cape Town. Clearly, it is time 
that the Johnson administration make a public statement, repudiating the anti-
South African policy which endangers the vital interests of the United States and 
other friendly maritime nationals.  Control of the Cape must remain in the hands 
of a stable, European-type government which will stand by the West in a time of 
crisis.
121
 
 
Waggoner was clearly frustrated because he saw a need to maintain access to the ports, 
apartheid or not.  The reality was that the U.S. was at war with Vietnam and had other 
adversaries located on the east side of Africa in the Middle East, Asia, and the USSR.  
Should they need a central location to repair war torn ships, and especially if the Suez 
becomes inaccessible to the U.S. again, South Africa was a logical option for transit and 
ships repairs. 
 The importance of the strategic location of South Africa for the U.S. military, 
especially in lieu of the use of Suez, was of high importance to the Navy.  Secretary of 
the Navy Nitze said that South African ports were extremely useful but not indispensable 
in relation to NASA and NSA mission requirements at the satellite and missile tracking 
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stations.  But, the use of those ports allowed for an efficiency that could not be 
substituted if they were to use Kenya’s ports again.  South Africa had the best ship repair 
facilities in sub-Saharan Africa; better than that of Kenya.  Also, in relation to refueling 
stops, particularly in the route between the Pacific and Indian Oceans, the ports in South 
Africa were very beneficial for the U.S. to use, but not irreplaceable with at-sea refueling 
or the use of other ports in the area.  However, the strategic importance of the South 
African ports during wartime was irreplaceable.  They had five major ports, ten major 
airfields, technical competence in their ports and airfields, and allowed for control of 
access to vital sea lanes should they need them to the Indian Ocean and Far East, 
especially in the event that the Suez Canal was closed to U.S. access.
122
  Even though 
there were alternatives, there were many reasons to want to uphold access to these ports 
and airfields, despite pressure at home.  This sentiment would be echoed in further 
memos from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to McNamara in that they too wanted access to 
these ports and airfields, despite the heavy objections from the home front in the U.S.
123
 
 Political idealism surfaced during the Congressional debates following the 
docking of the Roosevelt.  There were more Congressmen concerned by the use of South 
African ports than those who thought it was perfectly fine to maintain access to the ports.  
Representative Don Edwards (D-CA) called the Roosevelt situation an “unfortunate 
episode.”  He said: 
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We simply cannot do business with apartheid.  The administration apparently 
appreciated this when it refused to dock the U.S.S. Independence in 1965, rather 
than accept the application of South Africa’s racial policies.   
 
He did not want the U.S. Navy to make any more calls to South Africa and that the State 
Department “should not seek to make private accommodations with the South African 
Government in direct opposition to precedent and previous policy.”  Use of the ports and 
showing support for apartheid went hand-in-hand for Edwards.
124
   
Representative Donald M. Fraser (D-MN) agreed with Edwards and furthered the 
statement saying that the U.S. needed to have a strong, consistent, and clear policy that 
showed its commitment to racial justice in South Africa: 
The incident dramatizes all the weaknesses of American policy in Africa.  
Consultation between the Departments of State and Defense seems to have been 
negligible.  Precedent was ignored.  African sentiment was disdained.  And 
logistical needs were permitted to outweigh the clear demands for diplomacy.
125
  
  
The Congressional Record reflects a divide among those who were okay with the status 
quo of not challenging apartheid so that they could maintain access to ports and those 
who felt this showed too much support for apartheid, but it is unclear just how many 
Congressmen would have settled on either side of the debate.  Regardless, those who 
opposed the use of the ports must have asserted themselves strongly enough to the State 
Department because a need for a clear policy towards South African port usage became a 
topic of conversation after the Roosevelt visit. 
 Aside from the newspapers previously mentioned, several South African 
newspapers looked to the future implications of this visit and offered insight into the 
incident that deviated from Nationalist newspapers.  The Eastern Province Hearld, a Port 
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Elizabeth newspaper, spent a significant amount of time in the days following the 
Roosevelt visit looking at what this meant for them.  Whereas some of their fellow 
countrymen’s newspapers attacked U.S. hypocrisy, the Eastern Province Herald took a 
fairly moderate stance.  In relation to the Independence incident, the newspaper stated on 
February 6: 
South Africans are fully aware that in the eyes of the world American policy in 
this respect is considered to be right and their policy wrong.  But within the ambit 
of their laws they had opened their hearts to the American sailors and airmen now 
marooned in the Duncan Docks and they are rightly resentful of the fact that their 
proferred hospitality is spurned.  They had hoped to eradicate once and for all the 
memory of the ill-fated Independence incident…. 
 
Furthermore, on February 8, the Eastern Province Herald somewhat criticized their 
government for speaking out against the change of heart by the U.S., saying that they 
could have proved their “bigness in heart” had they turned the other cheek.  Had the 
South African government gone aboard the ship in an act of goodwill, they would have 
helped improve the relations between the two countries, rather than strain it further.   
The Evening Post of Port Elizabeth furthered this sentiment.  While they did tend 
to blame the U.S. for this incident, they seemed to understand the U.S. State 
Department’s rationale for not allowing leave in saying, “… the U.S. government is not 
prepared to allow men who are willing to die for the freedom guaranteed by their 
Constitution to be exposed to the indignities and restriction of apartheid; it would make a 
mockery of the struggle for freedom.”  They also pointed out that this incident should 
have taught South Africans that if they were to continue supporting apartheid, there 
would undoubtedly be international consequences, namely that of increased isolation 
from the “strongest military power in the West, the United States.”  An additional note is 
63 
 
what the Daily Dispatch of Port Elizabeth said, which is that despite earning the 
reputation for being the most hospitable people “in the world,” they had ultimately 
become “an embarrassment to her friends.”126  These are perspectives that did not 
necessarily forgive the U.S. State Department for their decision, but it looked at the issue 
from that of growth rather than condemnation in relations between the two governments.  
 It is unclear if the State Department was responding to pressure from the media, 
Congress, or civil rights leaders, but they did begin to take a much harder look at what 
their policy should be for use of South African ports and installations.  In a confidential 
memorandum sent on February 9, 1967 from Undersecretary of State Nicholas 
Katzenbach to Joseph Palmer II, the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, 
Katzenbach stated that the Roosevelt incident called for a review of U.S. policy in regard 
to South African ports by the U.S. Navy.  The old policy, or that which came from the 
Independence precedent, was to permit U.S. Naval vessels into South African ports if 
there was a need for provisioning and servicing, so long as there were not racial 
restrictions put upon crew.  Would this type of policy still hold or should a more hard-
line policy be put in place?  And if a more hard-line policy is put into place, how would 
that impact ships with mostly civilian crews or ships servicing the tracking stations 
located in South Africa?  How would this impact American planes?  More importantly, 
would all use of South African ports, airfields, and tracking stations need to be suspended 
because of a potentially more hard-line precedent set by the Roosevelt incident?   
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Katzenbach suggested that large warships should bypass South Africa all 
together, as it was unfair to expose large numbers of servicemen to apartheid.  Also, this 
would help “demonstrate our abhorrence to apartheid.”  Small ships, on the other hand, 
would still be permitted to use ports, especially since these tended to carry scientific 
equipment that was needed in the tracking stations.   In addition, ships with pre-approved 
clearance at the time of the memo, ships with repair contracts already made, and ships 
with majority civilian crews would be allowed, in addition to ships of all sizes if it were 
an emergency situation.  Katzenbach speculated that the continued use of the ports would 
help ease tensions between the South African government and the U.S. government in the 
post- Roosevelt era.
127
 
The State Department and Navy needed to make a decision because the Sword 
Knot, a Navy Military Sea Transportation Service (MSTS) Trading Vessel, was 
scheduled to make a stop at Durban on February 12, 1967 for two months’ worth of 
work.  As mentioned previously, the Sword Knot had visited South African ports prior to 
the Roosevelt incident.  However, on February 13, carrying electronic equipment, the 
Sword Knot had been left for four days with no word as to whether or not they could dock 
in Durban.  On board were 67 crewmen, eleven of whom were black.
128
  The Sword Knot 
was being watched by the international community to see what the U.S. would do and 
how the South African government would react. 
Behind the scenes, there were talks between the South African government and 
the U.S. State Department.  South Africa was interested in keeping the U.S.’s shipping 
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industry.  There were discussions being held between the two parties on the lessening of 
racial law enforcement on visiting black U.S. soldiers.  By direction of Prime Minister 
Vorster, local authorities and citizens were instructed to allow the crew to use any 
restaurant or bar as they pleased.  Also, there would be no arrests or trouble whatsoever 
under “immorality or race laws.”  In fact, it was thought in some circles in South Africa 
that the Roosevelt incident may have started to pave the way towards lessening 
restrictions on non-whites in South Africa: 
But I believe the Department will find interesting the fact that not only DFA 
officials but key moderate leaders like Anton Rupert, have advised that the Prime 
Minister had counted on certain liberalizing impact of FDR call to help him move 
gradually in direction improving lot of coloureds and reducing extremes of 
apartheid.  They claim that FDR affair deeply regretted set-back to plans of PM 
and factor strengthening position of Afrikaner die-hards.  Rupert said to [embassy 
officer] that he had been ‘waiting for twenty-five years for kind of forward 
movement now emerging under Vorster and which will continue despite set-back 
of [FDR] incident.’ 
 
Based on this assessment, the State Department highly recommended that the Sword Knot 
be permitted to use the Durban port.
129
 
 On February 13, Palmer made a recommendation to Katzenabach for the Sword 
Knot.  At this point, the South African government had already given the ship clearance 
“provided the crew is not restricted to the ship,” a lesson learned from the Roosevelt 
docking.  Palmer recommended three courses of action to be considered.  The first was to 
permit the Sword Knot to enter Durban and for the crew to be given liberty with the 
caveat that they avoid any organized segregated activities.  The second was to send the 
Sword Knot to a different port altogether.  The third possibility, though Palmer did not 
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recommend it, was to allow the work to be done on the Durban, but to not allow the crew 
any sort of leave.  Palmer did not like this third option because it was expected that the 
ship would be there for two months.   
There were many reasons to allow a visit to Durban, according to Palmer.  The 
Sword Knot did have a crew of 65, ten of whom were black, but it was a civilian ship, 
repairs parts had been sent to Durban already and were waiting installation, the South 
African government had already given clearance and there was presumably a contract 
already in place, and any alternative was thought to have been expensive and 
inconvenient and may have affected their “space capabilities,” of the satellite tracking 
stations run by NASA.  In addition, it would be fairly easy to spin positive publicity in 
domestic media.  Finally, and most importantly, Palmer recognized the fact that they 
needed to have South African cooperation for some time with their tracking stations, use 
of airfields for a variety of reasons, scientific relationships, and commercial relations.  
The cons for allowing the ship to dock in Durban included that there would be protesting 
at home, the repairs were not of an emergency situation, there may be other repair 
facilities that are easy access, and the South Africans would have a feeling of 
“indispensability.”  Palmer clearly leaned towards allowing the Sword Knot to dock in 
Durban because it had a civilian crew, it would keep South African relations positive for 
the time being, and the expectation of the crew avoiding segregated activities was 
feasible.
130
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 By February 14, the State Department clearly took the stance that it did not want 
the Sword Knot to dock in Durban.  Although it was not confirmed on February 14, the 
State Department did communicate to the Cape Town Embassy that they were wary of 
“feeding the fire” of the anti-apartheid feeling that was created by the Roosevelt stop.  
But, they did specify that diverting the Sword Knot did not necessarily mean that they 
wanted to discontinue the use of other ports and facilities in South Africa.
131
  Defense 
Minister of South Africa P.W. Botha made the following statement, as reported by 
Katzenbach to the Cape Town Embassy: 
Acting Secretary in regretting unpleasantness surrounding incident said press 
attention and hospitality arrangements, no matter how well intended, ballooned 
event which he had hoped could have occurred in low key.  This focused attention 
here on issue over which most Americans feel very strongly.  Fact that 
Congressional and public opinion came to head at last moment before ship arrived 
Cape Town made it impossible take any other action than we did.  To Mr. 
Katzenbach’s observation that both sides and everyone concerned shared some 
responsibility for problem, Taswell asserted that SAG had done nothing wrong 
and had received no complaints from Embassy. 
 
To which Katzenbach replied: 
 
A combat crew has worked together, fought together, taken recreation together.  
To give them leave in a place where distinctions are made is ipso facto to men 
themselves, Congress, and others a humiliation.  The nub of the problem is South 
Africa’s racial policy itself.132 
 
This demonstrates that South Africa continued to play the role of victim in the Roosevelt 
incident and the policy decisions that followed.  This sentiment was preceded by a letter 
from South African Foreign Minister Muller that reaffirmed the idea that the U.S. 
approached the South African government with hopes of an integrated visit, with which 
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South Africa provided and were harshly rejected with such short notice after spending a 
significant amount of time and resources on providing a good visit.
133
  Whether or not the 
U.S. was concerned about their feelings of victimhood is unclear, but what is clear is that 
the U.S. wanted to preserve the use of ports. 
The U.S. State Department was stuck in a no-win situation when it came to 
deciding what to do with the Sword Knot.  They were dealing with the fall-out of the 
Roosevelt stop and the wave of anti-apartheid “hysteria” that followed and they were 
trying to coddle the South African government, whose cooperation they needed for future 
port and facility use, despite the fact that they could not connect the U.S. actions to their 
own misdeeds with apartheid and the past Independence incident. 
 On February 15, after eight days of waiting in the waters by Durban, a decision 
was made that the Sword Knot would be rerouted to Mombasa, Kenya.
134
  The South 
African press immediately reacted to this cancelation.  On February 16, the Johannesburg 
Star reported that the cancelation of the Sword Knot’s visit would surely worsen relations 
between the two countries and would possibly threaten the access of the U.S.’s use of 
other ports and tracking stations within the country.
135
   
An editorial in the Cape Times suggested that the indecision by the U.S. State 
Department and the lengthy decision-making process showed a weakness not previously 
seen in the U.S. government.
136
  Not all articles in the South African newspapers were 
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negative.  The Rand Daily Mail took an anti-apartheid stance on the issue and suggested 
that rather than pointing fingers, that the South African government look at its policies 
and truly understand the full impact it was having on international policies of other 
countries.
137
 
 Kenya’s reception of the Sword Knot was not as warm as the U.S. State 
Department would have liked, especially given the conflict around their preferred use of, 
but highly debated, South African ports.  Ambassador Glenn W. Ferguson, of the Nairobi 
Embassy, warned the State Department that the United States should not play up the 
hospitality of the Kenyans opening their port to the Sword Knot.  Ferguson warned, 
“Reason is that Kenya, as independent African nation, is sensitive to allegations of being 
partial to West and US.”  More specifically, because the ship was carrying material for 
the tracking stations in South Africa, they did not want to be seen as harboring the U.S. 
during the Cold War.
138
  Kenya did not want to get embroiled in the Cold War or be 
known as a western-friendly country, which potentially could have been a problem 
should the U.S.’s space program or military need their ports again in the future.  Which 
sub-Saharan country could they rely upon with dry docks that could handle warships and 
aircraft carriers of their capacity?  This must have made the U.S. nervous about future 
ships needing to dock in the region.   
Furthermore, Katzenbach said that Kenyans were very concerned by how serious 
the U.S. Executive branch was in fighting apartheid.  They did not trust the level of 
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association the U.S. had with South Africa and felt that they themselves had sacrificed 
more than the U.S. to fight apartheid, such as ceasing sales of soda ash to them.
139
  The 
U.S. found themselves potentially losing an ally that could help them with docking and 
repair needs of large ships and aircraft carriers because of their association with 
apartheid. 
 The Roosevelt stop forced the State Department, military, and Congress to 
establish their stances on the future of South African-U.S. relations, as was already 
previously seen in Congress when Representatives used the incident as a temperature 
gauge of how they felt towards the South African government and specifically being 
connected to a country that openly touted their use apartheid.  Shortly thereafter, Arthur 
Goldberg, the lightening rod of much of the negative press around the incident, spoke out 
about what the U.S. policy should be.  In a letter to Secretary Rusk, Goldberg laid out his 
rationale for his desire for the U.S. to break their ties to South Africa.  Allowing the 
Roosevelt to even dock in Cape Town showed a relaxation of the U.S.’s stance on 
apartheid in the direction of acceptance.  If the U.S. really wanted to exert influence over 
South Africa, they should have exploited South Africa’s fear of isolation, which was so 
clearly expressed in the incidents with the ships.  This would be much more effective 
than trying to tempt them into submission by offering them tokens of friendship if they 
made the right political choices.  Thus, Goldberg proposed an immediate disengagement 
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from South Africa militarily and scientifically, namely in the tracking stations used by 
NASA and the military.
140
 
 Goldberg was not alone in asking for a clarification in policy and gladly giving 
his own interpretation of what should happen.  On February 15, Representative Julian 
Bond of Georgia, wrote to President Johnson.  In his letter he asked the President to open 
up an inquiry into why the visit was allowed to happen in the first place.  In addition, he 
berated the State Department for not only showing “indifference” towards South Africa’s 
use of apartheid, but he was appalled by Rountree and Katzenbach’s apologies to the 
citizens of Cape Town who opened their homes and communities to them, despite the 
fact that these private functions were allegedly segregated.  Ultimately, he asked that the 
use of ports be reviewed and rejected, as he felt that the U.S. should not show military 
allegiance to countries that do not uphold the basic idea of human rights for all of its 
citizens.  On February 25, Bond got an answer from Palmer on behalf of the President.  In 
the letter, Palmer restated why South African ports were used, which was that there were 
“strong operational reasons” for refueling at that particular port and that they only 
stopped because integrated activities and leave were guaranteed by the South African 
government.  However, with that being said, on February 21, it was decided that South 
African ports would not be used by U.S. Naval warships, barring any sort of emergency 
and that further use of the ports was being reviewed.
141
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It should be noted that this was a form letter sent out to other members of 
Congress or government that expressed their concern about the use of the ports, thus 
indicating an official State Department position.  For example, Representative Lester L. 
Wolff (D-NY) wrote to the President and received a letter that had parts of the letter sent 
to Bond stated verbatim, however it was signed by Douglas MacArthur II, the Assistant 
Secretary for Congressional Relations.
142
 
 
The Roosevelt in the Global Cold War: 
 There is an absence in this issue, which is that of the concern of the direct threat 
of the Soviets in the region.  Granted, South Africa was looked upon favorably for the 
fact that it offered highly technical ports and was a great alternative to the Suez Canal 
should there be another situation involving the closure of the canal.  However, the Soviet 
threat is not apparent in the documents available, thus making it is easy to forget that 
their presence existed in the first place.  While it may seem irrelevant to raise the issue of 
the global Cold War in relation to the Roosevelt  and Sword Knot stops, it is actually very 
relevant as it is easy to jump to the conclusion that most U.S. decisions, if not all 
international decisions, were made with the threat of the Soviets spreading their influence 
to particularly volatile countries during this time period. 
 A side note that offers a brief moment of closure and clarity involved private 
aircraft.  In a memo from the President Johnson’s Special Assistant Walt Rostow to 
Johnson himself dated April 19, 1968, Rostow raises the issue of whether or not civilian 
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aircraft should fly into or through South Africa.  Katzenbach suggested that an addendum 
be added to the 1947 U.S.-South African Air Transport Agreement.  Essentially, the 
amendment would enable South African airlines to fly to the U.S. for the first time, 
probably to New York, by the end of the year.  In addition, the U.S. could fly to South 
Africa.  TWA and Pan American both agreed to the plan because it was a “very good 
economic bargain for the U.S.”   
However, there was a political hurdle.  The UN General Assembly passed a 
resolution in 1962 without U.S. support that requested that all member nations refused 
landing and passage facilities to South African aircraft.  Thus, Rostow predicted that 
there would probably be some backlash from the UN community, in particular from the 
African states.  However, South Africa did fly its airline through UK, France, German, 
Italy, Switzerland, Australia, and other industrial countries at the time of this memo.  In 
addition, Rostow checked to see if there would be a huge objection from the Legislative 
branch and he found that there would be little to no domestic opposition.  He asked 
Johnson to determine if he agreed with the amendment.  Johnson checked off that he did 
agree with the amendment, thus opening up air traffic between the U.S. and South 
Africa.
143
 
 To further substantiate the claim that the Soviet threat was minimal at best, the 
National Intelligence Estimate of 1967 makes no mention of fear of Soviet expansionism 
in South Africa.  Instead of worrying about the threat of spreading Soviet influence, the 
U.S. government was concerned about racial policy and what that would amount to 
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domestically over the next five years in relation to economic development of the black 
African population and the access to living amenities.  It appears that South Africa did 
want to improve relations with the U.S. State Department particularly after the rocky few 
months following the U.S.S. Roosevelt incident, thus further illustrating that the South 
African government had no intention of allowing any sort of communist influence into 
their country, especially if it meant jeopardizing the remains of their relationship with the 
U.S. government.
144
 
 
Allowing the docking of the USS Independence, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, and Sword 
Knot was reliant more on future use of ports and bad press, rather than of concern for 
U.S. soldiers potentially being subjected to apartheid.  With the inauguration of Hendrik 
F. Verwoerd, an archetypal apartheid advocate, came an attempt to restrict black U.S. 
crews from using South African ports.  In May 1965, the U.S. was scolded publicly by 
Verwoerd for not only allowing planes with black crews to use airbases, but also because 
the U.S. Embassy held mixed-race functions, a clear violation of apartheid policy.  Rather 
than taking a stand, the U.S. continued to dock ships and land planes in South Africa until 
it became an issue when a mixed race American crew returning from Vietnam requested 
ship leave in February 1967. 
 The docking of the Roosevelt prompted anti-apartheid advocates in the U.S. to 
question what the U.S. was going to do from there on out.  What would U.S. diplomatic 
and military policy be for using naval and air bases in South Africa?  After restricting the 
crew from leaving the ship, the State Department, Congress, and Department of Defense 
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took to discussing future policy.  Access to the ports was a far higher of priority to the 
U.S. for a variety of reasons.  South Africa’s ports were capable of serious maintenance 
should the U.S. need it on any of its ships or planes.  Also, access to the Cape Route was 
important to maintain should the Suez Canal become restrictive to the west again in the 
future.  Only Congress reflected any serious concern for the friendly relations with 
apartheid the U.S. essentially maintained in allowing ships and planes to dock in South 
Africa.  Serious questioning from the Civil Rights community prompted form letters to be 
sent out on behalf of the State Department insisting they were working on the problem. 
 Was the decision to maintain access to ports and the Cape Route based on the 
global Cold War?  Yes, but not in the traditional sense of keeping communism from 
penetrating the borders via black opposition groups, such as the ANC and its armed wing 
the Umkhonto.  South Africa was strategically placed and had technological 
advancements that allowed them to be a good ally for geographical and strategic reasons, 
rather than preventing the spread of communist influence.  When the U.S. government 
received criticism domestically and internationally it was for its heavy reliance on the 
South African government, who had been denounced by the international community for 
its domestic policies.  Little is mentioned in the documentation to contextualize the 
situation into the global Cold War, unless one looks at the South African perspective.  
From their perspective, they were fearful they would lose the U.S.’s ship and plane 
business.  When they discussed future relations with the U.S. they liked to promote 
themselves as being vital to the effort against the Soviets in the global Cold War, 
particularly in preventing the spread of communism into South Africa.  Yet, the reality 
76 
 
was that Washington was not primarily concerned with this, rather they wanted to 
maintain port access without international flack. 
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Chapter Three: Tracking  Stations 
 A second case study that highlights the complexity of U.S.- South African 
relations was the use and employment of the tracking stations in South Africa.  This was 
a contentious issue because of the implications of a potential airfield and ship docking 
ban by the U.S. government after the Roosevelt incident, but also because at installations 
that represented U.S. interests for military and scientific realms apartheid was used to its 
fullest application. 
 Between 1949 and 1957, the Soviet Union had managed to create and maintain an 
impressive space program, one that clearly threatened the U.S for valid reasons.  In 1949, 
the Soviets successfully created their own atomic bomb.  In the early 1950s, they 
produced long-range bombers.  By 1954, they had successfully tested a hydrogen bomb.  
By 1957, they had fired a long-range missile over 5,000 miles.  However, the real shock 
that was concerning for the U.S., from the Executive branch to the common citizen, was 
the launching of Sputknik into space in October 1957.  The Soviets could now launch a 
nuclear missile anywhere in the world, albeit with minimal accuracy.  The U.S. had yet to 
even launch their first missile into space.
145
 
 On January 31, 1958, the chief of staff of the Air Force, Thomas Dresser White, 
delivered a new policy in response to the launching of Sputnik.  He stated that for the first 
time in U.S. history, the homeland was in “mortal danger.”  The launching of Sputnik 
eliminated the safety of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans that helped largely thwart any 
all-out assaults on the U.S. since the civil war. He said, “‘America’s answer to the Soviet 
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challenge would require the military use of space.’”146  Thus, space became vital to the 
efforts in fighting the domestic and global Cold War with the Soviet Union. 
In July 1958, Eisenhower, via Congress’s approval, signed a bill that established 
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, or NASA.  In addition to the 
establishment of NASA, there was also an overall restructuring of scientific education 
through the National Defense Education Act in the U.S. in the face of vulnerability that 
Sputnik brought with it.
147
  NASA essentially acted as a consolidating effort of all the 
diverse programs and interests in space exploration within the U.S.  NASA’s importance 
was heightened even further when in April 1961 Russian cosmonaut Yuri Gargarin was 
launched into space and orbited around the Earth.  Newly inaugurated President Kennedy 
was threatened by this major development and successfully lobbied Congress to double 
the space budget and vowed to place a man on the moon before the Soviets could do it.
148
   
The German V-2 rocket, most notable for reigning terror on the British during 
WWII, was key to space exploration, along with the scientists that developed them.  A 
major spoil of the war was German rocket technology for both the U.S. and the British.  
At a Bavarian ski resort, Garmisch-Partenkirhcen, Werner von Braun and his fellow 
scientists who were responsible for the procurement of the guided missile system were 
interrogated at length by the U.S. and British.  It was at this locale that “Project Overcast” 
was launched by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff in which 350 German specialists were 
hired to help develop a more advanced U.S. missile system.  Von Braun worked with the 
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U.S. to come up with a list of no fewer than 115 scientists that could help develop the 
U.S. program for the following 6-months.  When the Soviets learned of this, they were 
disappointed to not have gotten von Braun for themselves.
149
 
Von Braun and his group of scientists started work immediately in April 1946 in 
White Sands Proving Ground, New Mexico, with the launching of V-2 test missiles.  The 
Germans were surprised and frustrated with the lack of advancement the U.S. had in their 
development facilities.  The group of scientists were kept in this location not only to work 
on the V-2 missiles, but to also keep them away from the Nazi war crime trials that were 
unraveling at Dachau in 1947.
150
 
The scientists were moved to Huntsville, Alabama in 1950 by the Army where 
they would become the preeminent rocket development group in the U.S.  It was here 
under von Braun’s leadership that the group developed the nuclear-tipped Redstone and 
Jupiter missiles of the 1950s.  The Redstone became the vehicle to help propel the first 
satellite and first U.S. citizen into space.  They also developed the Saturn vehicles that 
helped launch Apollo spacecraft into orbit and put U.S. astronauts onto the moon.
151
 
This is not to say that the Soviets who actually occupied the region that the V-2 
development program in Germany was located, Mittlewerk, did not benefit from 
rounding up and exploiting German scientist as well. Between 1951-1954, the Soviets 
went back to Germany to round up as many scientists as they could and used their 
knowledge to develop ballistic missile development.  The result was the launch of 
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Sputnik in October 1957, which rested largely on the use of German technological 
advancements.
152
 
The U.S. saw substantial growth in its space program as it was connected to the 
military.  By 1959, ICBMs had been developed and were being tested under the guidance 
of von Braun.  Also, between 1958-1962, the U.S. developed and tested its ability to 
knock out spy satellites using nuclear explosions in space.  The testing for this became so 
enormous that the U.S. actually caused considerable damage to the earth’s 
electromagnetic field.  For example, in 1962, the U.S. exploded the 1.4 megaton nuclear 
bomb the Starfish in space.  The test was so powerful, 100 times more powerful than 
Hiroshima, that it knocked out the power grid in Hawaii and disabled three satellites in 
low-earth orbit.
153
 
The development of rockets that could deliver satellites into space was one step.  
Designing effective satellites was the next.  Satellites could serve as spies, targeters, and 
monitors of arms control agreements.
154
  Satellites also served as a way to maintain peace 
in that they could monitory the launching of missiles and give the other side ample 
warning of launches that could harm millions of people.  They also provided the means to 
establish a communication link between the U.S. and Soviet Union via the “hot line” that 
was put into place 1971.
155
 
In the early 1960s, the U.S. launched a system of spacecraft called the Vela Hotel 
program, whose purpose was to detect nuclear explosions in the atmosphere.  This system 
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was highly reliable and durable.  It helped the U.S. track what weapons were being 
tested, how strong they were getting, and, ultimately, who had the ability to detonate a 
nuclear bomb.
156
   
 
South Africa and the Space Program: 
International cooperation would play a vital role in enabling the growth of NASA.  
More specifically, NASA worked with the Committee on Space Research (COSPAR) of 
the International Council of Scientific Unions to achieve military prowess in outer space.  
COSPAR was created in 1958 to provide “an apolitical venue for cooperation in outer 
space.”  Its main purpose was to allow scientists from across the globe to work with one 
another despite military or political rivalries that existed among various states.
157
  South 
Africa was a member of COSPAR. 
South Africa would play a noteworthy role in this lofty goal.  Even prior to the 
creation of NASA, the U.S. State Department looked to South Africa for land and support 
in the form of Minitrack radio tracking stations in Esselen Park, agreed upon on October 
11, 1957 (the agreement was made by the United States Naval Research Laboratory) and 
the Baker-Nunn camera optical tracking station located at Olifantsfontein, established in 
February 1958.
158
   
South Africa had nearly a decade of importance in the U.S. science community 
prior to the Roosevelt incident, thus they were rooted in their success, at least marginally. 
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In Pretoria on September 13, 1960, six months after the Sharpeville Massacre, the U.S. 
and South African governments sat down and signed an agreement about tracking 
stations to be located in South Africa.  The U.S., represented by the NASA, and South 
Africa, represented by the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR), agreed 
to work together to advance their “mutual scientific knowledge” of space and the 
development of space vehicles, including manned vehicles.
159
   
 The 1960 agreement ensured U.S. access to key tracking stations.  Essentially, the 
South African government gave the U.S. access to various facilities for NASA and the 
military at no cost to the U.S. government in exchange for scientific collaboration.  Rules 
pertaining to the admission of U.S. citizens into South Africa to work on the sites were 
established.  The agreement stated:  
The Government of the Union of South Africa will, subject to its immigration 
laws and regulations, take the necessary steps to facilitate the admission into the 
territory of the Union of South Africa of such United States personnel… to visit 
or participate in the cooperative activities provided for under this agreement. 
 
This obviously became an issue with the Independence incident in 1965 in which the 
South African government clearly stated that the U.S. must follow all laws established 
under apartheid.  The program was intended to last for up to fifteen years and had the 
possibility of extension based on the agreement of both parties.
160
 
 South Africa became a key spot geographically for NASA, particularly during the 
Apollo and Mercury missions.  Cape Canaveral was the central point for which other 
stations were established, as it was often used as a launch point.  Originally, 
                                                          
159
National Archives, General Records of the Department of State, RG 59, “The American Ambassador to 
the South African Secretary for External Affairs,”Def 7 SAFR-US, 13 September 1960, 1. 
160
Ibid, 3. 
83 
 
Johannesburg was picked by NASA as a third-tier tracking station because it allowed for 
the determining of the initial orbit of satellites.  Other stations in this tier (the first and 
second tiers formed direct “picket lines” north, south, east and west of Cape Canaveral) 
included San Diego and Woomera, South Australia.  All of the stations were staffed by 
military personnel from the Army and Air Force except for the one in Johannesburg, 
which was staffed by the CSIR and NASA personnel. 
161
 
In 1957, a Minitrack station was opened in Johannesburg, a less sophisticated site 
to track satellites in that it required a satellite to submit some sort of signal source or 
transmitter beacon, so that radio signals could be sent out and picked up by the Minitrack 
stations, thus allowing for an accurate tracking of location.
162
  However, in 1960, work 
began on a much more sophisticated Satellite Tracking and Data Acquisition Network 
(STADAN), which allowed for tracking to evolve from the use of radio frequency for 
tracking to the use of optics.  As NASA shifted from Minitrack to STADAN, their 
location of stations shifted.  Tiers mentioned previously were no longer relevant, but 
South Africa was largely untouched and remained in existence until 1975.
163
 
In addition to Minitracking and STADAN capabilities, Johannesburg also had 
Deep Space Network (DSN) and Satellite Automatic Tracking Antennae (SATAN) 
capabilities as well.
164
  DSN was a program created as early as 1958 and allowed for the 
exploration of unmanned planetary missions and radio and radar astronomy in the 
exploration of the solar system and the universe through the use of telecommunications 
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and radio navigation networks routed around the world.
165
  SATAN replaced Minitrack 
units with more efficient and cheaper large dish antennas that were used to make satellite 
tracking possible.
166
  The Johannesburg station was critical not only because it was one of 
the few stations to have DSN and STADAN, but also because it was essential to the 
success of the DSN because it allowed NASA to maintain continuous coverage of space 
probes as they departed the planet and rotated the earth.
167
 
 Even prior to the Independence incident in May 1965 when Prime Minister 
Verwoerd began putting stipulations on crews to follow apartheid and not to allow black 
crewmembers onto racially segregated bases, there was discussion about the importance 
of the Johannesburg station.  The Director of the Office of International Scientific 
Affairs,  Ragnar Rollefson, told the State Department that Southern Africa was very 
critical to the success of NASA, in combination with launch sites in California and 
Florida.  Southern Africa was on the same parallel, which was essential for support.  
South Africa and Madagascar at the time both had tracking stations, but South Africa was 
clearly more essential to the efforts as it was located on the same parallel.  The facilities 
were used for long-range missile testing, tracking earth orbiting unmanned satellites and 
lunar and planetary probes, and tracking earth orbiting and lunar manned flights in the 
Apollo program.  Rollefson warned about getting rid of the facility that would help 
ensure its existence until 1975: 
This office had concluded that this continued use and extensions of ground 
facilities (tracking, data acquisition and command stations) under U.S. control in 
the area of Southern Africa over the next five years is a critical requirement, if the 
                                                          
165
Ibid, xiii. 
166
Ibid, 39. 
167
Ibid, 207-208. 
85 
 
United States is to carry through the space program to which it is committed 
within this decade… there is no satisfactory alternative.  Failure to meet this 
requirement will be costly in time and money.  More important, it will jeopardize 
the success of key space missions and may, in the long run, damage the image of 
the U.S. technological and scientific achievement which we seek to foster abroad 
through a successful space program. 
 
Essentially, South Africa was the only viable option to help run a successful space 
program.
168
 
 This recommendation came on the heels of turbulence involving access to other 
African stations that could have been useful in tracking.  Johannesburg was not the only 
station in Southern Africa.  Zanzibar also had a station that was essential to STADAN 
and the Mercury missions.  However, in 1960, Zanzibar became politically unstable.  By 
1963, Zanzibar was facing pre-civil war tensions.  There were elections in 1963 and 
Zanzibar gained independence.  It ultimately merged with Tanganyika and formed 
Tanzania, but the transition was not as peaceful as NASA would have like.  NASA feared 
that political tension could turn into hostility in a moment’s notice and put into place an 
evacuation plan should it come to that.  In 1964, the station was ordered to be evacuated, 
thus one of the alternatives for tracking was eliminated.
169
 
 Johannesburg was also protected by Rollefson because it was assigned to provide 
support for the Apollo mission in a backup or standby capacity.
170
  President Kennedy 
had given NASA a significant goal in putting an American on the moon by 1970 and 
NASA was determined to meet this goal.  The Gemini missions significantly helped get 
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the U.S. within a stone’s throw of achieving this goal.  Gemini saw a series of firsts- the 
first two-man flight, the first spacewalk, the first docking, and the highest orbit to date 
(850 miles above Earth).
171
  Thus, Apollo became the central element to the goal of 
walking on the Moon.   
The goal with Apollo was not only to land on the Moon and have a successful 
exploration of its surface, but to have the ships reenter Earth’s atmosphere successfully 
and safely.  This would require the best tracking possible with no possibility of 
interruptions or failures from the Earth’s bases.172  Thus, in 1964, Johannesburg received 
a $5 million expansion to make it ready for the Apollo mission.
173
  So, it is no wonder 
that Rollefson was urging the U.S. State Department and Congress not to give up on the 
South African station, particularly in the next five years when it was projected that a man 
would land successfully on the Moon. 
 The renewal of the tracking stations, which were originally set to expire on March 
31, 1962, was tied indirectly into the sale of weapons to South Africa.  (The reason for 
the sale of weapons to South Africa will be addressed in depth in the next chapter.)  In a 
secret memo sent from the embassy in Cape Town to the State Department on June 15, 
1962, it was revealed that part of the deal for allowing NASA’s and the U.S. military’s 
access to the tracking stations was tied into the South African government’s desire to buy 
weapons: 
In the latter the view of the South African government was expressed that an 
arrangement in connection with the military tracking station operations be 
“accompanied by an understanding that the United States would give more 
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prompt and sympathetic consideration to reasonable requests for the purchase of 
such military equipment as may be required for South Africa’s defence.” 
 
In the memo, it specifically stated that while the U.S. was “prepared to give an assurance 
on military procurement, it would prefer that this question not be included in the 
proposed exchange of letters covering the tracking station.”  Weapons were clearly tied in 
at some level with access to the tracking stations- to what degree is unclear, but the 
connection is undeniably present.  The Ambassador was therefore allowed to make the 
following official statement to the South African government during negotiations: 
The United States Government has in the past indicated its willingness to 
cooperate with the South African Government in defense against international 
communist aggression and to sell military equipment for this purpose.  Taking 
into account, of course, technical questions of availability, security, and 
engineering compatibility, the United States Government can assure the South 
African Government that it will give prompt and sympathetic attention to 
reasonable requests for the purchase of military equipment required for defense 
against external aggression.
174
 
 
Keeping access to the tracking stations on behalf of NASA and the military was of clear 
importance to the State Department.  It was important enough to risk public ridicule for 
selling weapons to South Africa, despite the embargoes that were put into place by the 
U.S. and U.N. to prevent weapons from going to South Africa.  South Africa was 
geographically too important of an ally in fighting the larger global Cold War against the 
USSR. 
 On April 26, 1964, National Security Action Memorandum No. 295 was handed 
down on behalf of the request the State Department made on March 10, which asked for a 
policy paper on South Africa.  In NSAM No. 295 stipulations were set for U.S. policy 
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toward South Africa.  This included the need to develop a comprehensive program of 
diplomatic activity, continue sales to South Africa (except submarines), discontinue loan 
applications by South Africans from U.S. government lending agencies, and to continue 
the use of tracking stations in South Africa by NASA and the Department of Defense but 
should prepare alternative stand-by stations should they need to leave South Africa.  With 
this last stipulation, an interesting and telling stance was taken towards continuing the 
relationship with their tracking stations: 
This program shall be carried out in such a manner as to avoid its coming to 
public notice as long as feasible, and in close consultation with the Department of 
State particularly so that the public aspects and the diplomatic aspects of our 
relations with South Africa may be coordinated.
175
   
 
Again, there was a foreshadowing of the political pitfalls that could follow the revealing 
of the nature of this program within the South African government due to the precarious 
nature of having any sort of important alliance with South Africa. 
 This same memo looks at the reality of possibly giving up the South African 
station and shifting the tracking burden to the Tananarive (Madagascar) station in case 
there was a need to walk away from Johannesburg.  Based on geographical location, 
workload, communications capabilities, U.S. and foreign staffing needs and cost, 
Johannesburg was by far the more desirable station.  Johannesburg provided the first 
major land mass that would be encountered by ships leaving Cape Canaveral (in the 
memo it is referred to as Cape Kennedy), whereas Tananarive was much further away.  
Cape Canaveral is located at 28˚N, Johannesburg is located at 26˚S, which was deemed a 
very “compatible” latitude of Cape Canaveral; however, Tananarive is located at 19˚S, 
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which did not have nearly as much satellite traffic overhead as Johannesburg.  This was 
clearly very crucial to the STADAN requisites.   
Johannesburg was also more reliable in the communications department because 
of improvements made by the South African government’s installation of a submarine 
cable, which would have allowed for a 99.8% reliability for communications.  
Johannesburg did not require a large number of U.S. staffing, as the CSIR provided a 
highly competent staff, whereas Tananarive required a much larger number of U.S. 
personnel, which would cost three times as much as the Johannesburg station.  The 
Johannesburg station was financially and technically more sound of a choice for a 
sustainable STADAN station.  More importantly was that Johannesburg also had DSN 
capabilities, which was irreplaceable at the Tananarive station.  In fact, NSAM No. 295 
clearly states, “Loss of the Deep Space Station in South Africa would significantly injure 
the space program.”  Thus, despite the political pressures that existed with being reliant 
on South Africa for anything, it was recommended for technical reasons that the 
Johannesburg station be kept open and operational.
176
 
 There was a concern that if the South African government caught wind of the 
NSAM No. 295 recommendations to be able to move out of Johannesburg with six-
months’ notice, that there would be an undesirable downfall for relations with the U.S.  In 
a status report on NSAM No. 295, the Department of State was happy to see that 
alternative space tracking facilities in Tananarive, Spain, and Ascension Island were 
being prepared, but they were worried that the South African government would figure 
out why they were building alternative sites.  They wondered if they should inform South 
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Africa about the other sites’ existence.177  But, the reality was the State Department, 
Department of Defense, and NASA did need alternatives to Johannesburg because there 
was a clear worsening of racial relations in South Africa that could potentially isolate the 
U.S.’s international position and pose major problems for U.S. foreign policy.178  This 
was of course about to be tested with the Independence and Roosevelt incidents, which 
clearly brought U.S. relations with South Africa into the spot light for an uncomfortable 
amount of time. 
 
Independence and Roosevelt: 
 The Independence incident has already been discussed at length in terms of its 
impact on naval ports and airfield use by the U.S., but what impact did it have on the 
tracking stations?  On July 4, 1965, the New York Times reported at length about a speech 
given by Prime Minister Verwoerd in which he said that integration was not a problem in 
the U.S. where black men were outnumbered ten to one, but it was in South Africa where 
white men were outnumbered five to one.  Integration would have meant the end of South 
Africa as a nation.  “The result would be black rule and the result of black rule would be 
Communism.”  This was a common statement made by various government officials in 
South Africa when discussing their importance to the U.S.  They often used the idea of a 
communist take-over in the same breath when discussing the end of white apartheid rule.  
This same New York Times article dissected what this meant for the critical tracking 
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stations located in South Africa.  Verwoerd specifically said that no black U.S. citizens 
would be permitted to work on the tracking stations at any time.  NASA and the 
Department of Defense had never assigned black citizens to work there and never had 
intended to do so.  The New York Times put more emphasis on the tracking stations than 
the port call by the Independence: 
But the tracking stations were far more important than a single port of call.  There 
can be no doubt that their removal would have had a tremendous impact here, 
shaking the confidence of investors and bringing the two Governments to the 
point of outright mutual hostility.  This was what neither side wanted.
179
   
 
It is unlikely that this sparked any sort of U.S. public outrage towards the tracking 
stations, as very little was known about them at this point by the public. 
 There is no doubt that urgency was added to the NSAM No. 295 with the 
Independence incident.  Having other stations that STADAN and DSN could use “just in 
case” were no longer just in case.  A real threat was the possibility of South Africa 
terminating its space-tracking agreements with the United States, which was very 
stressful to NASA in particular because of the progress of Apollo and the need for South 
Africa as a tracking station.  The State Department was clearly concerned for how they 
were perceived in the international arena:  
In addition to their concentrated efforts to persuade the United States and others 
to institute economic and military sanctions against South Africa, the Afro-Asians 
have sought the termination of all agreements with South Africa, specifically 
citing our space facilities, which might in some way encourage South Africa’s 
pursuit of its present racial policies.   
 
But, there was a minor voice that was beginning to be heard in that the tracking stations 
could potentially be an important card to play at a later point with South Africa should 
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the need arise.  The U.S. would be ready with alternative situations should the attempt at 
vis-à-vis diplomacy fail.
180
 
 NASA was clearly very concerned about the situation the Independence 
presented.  But they were very frank with the State Department during the midst of this 
crisis.  NASA stated very clearly that the State Department had a choice: either they 
could move the stations to Spain and Tananarive, where other tracking stations already 
existed, and put the space race on hold or they could leave the stations as is and stay on 
track for a lunar landing by 1970 and hope for the best politically.  Also, there was some 
delay in getting the Spanish tracking station established to be operational within the next 
six months, which made the South African station more critical for DSN.
181
 
Several weeks later the Administrator of NASA, James E. Webb, made it very 
clear to Secretary of State Dean Rusk that closing down access to Johannesburg was not 
ideal, not because of geography, but because of the capabilities of the different stations.  
The Madrid facility could only handle one mission at a time, which would severely slow 
progress down on Surveyor missions and Orbiter mapping missions.  In addition several 
unmanned missions needed to be launched to ensure the success of Apollo and the 
closing of Johannesburg would severely delay this process and make it impossible to land 
a lunar mission on the moon by the end of the decade.  More importantly, Webb issued a 
warning hard to ignore:  
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… the USSR has already launched four spacecraft in a vigorous effort to achieve 
a successful unmanned lunar soft landing.  Further delays in the Surveyor 
schedules would strongly reinforce their chances of being the first to accomplish 
this important mission, which would attract a great deal of attention.   
 
The earliest the Madrid facility would be ready would be in February 1967, thus South 
African facilities would have to be maintained at least until early 1967 when Madrid 
would be ready.
182
 
In addition, NASA found South Africa to be the most favorable spot for a variety 
of reasons and did not want to give it up.  In addition to all the previously mentioned 
reasons, they favored the Johannesburg station because “it was actually the most 
democratic and most stable government [emphasis author’s own] accessible to the United 
States on the continent at the time.”183  NASA pointed out the inevitable scenario that 
presented itself- the U.S. State Department found itself between a rock and a hard place.  
Should they risk their international reputation by continuing to do political and scientific 
business with South Africa or should they take actions that would delay a goal stated by 
the late President Kennedy to land a man on the moon by the end of the decade (and 
before the Soviets in the highly politicized space race)? 
 The Roosevelt docking in February 1967 posed the second major challenge to 
NASA’s attempts to hang onto Johannesburg.  With this much-publicized event came 
cries from the public, the civil rights movement, and other government officials to 
establish some kind of clear policy towards South Africa and the use of ports, airfields, 
and bases.  The conversation began immediately in the State Department and Department 
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of Defense.  On February 21, 1967, Deputy Secretary of State Cyrus Vance requested a 
prioritization of Department of Defense requirements for use of South African ports, 
yards, airfields, and real estate to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.  He specifically wanted to 
know how essential South African ports and yards were for U.S. Naval war ships and any 
other ships or vessels essential to Defense operations or under contractual obligation to 
satisfy Defense and NASA requirements and how essential land-based tracking facilities 
were.  He also requested that they come up with alternative plans to satisfy all Defense 
requirements should South African ports, airfields, and tracking stations become 
unavailable.
184
  As was discussed in the previous chapter, the Joint Chiefs of Staff all felt 
very strongly about retaining the right to use South African ports, especially if the Suez 
Canal was unavailable for use. 
 On February 7, 1967, Rountree made the implications of the Roosevelt decision to 
keep soldiers from engaging in leave clear to the State Department.  He stated the tough 
political position the U.S. found themselves in quite nicely: 
In terms of our concrete defense interests in SA, we are concerned that the FDR 
decision may render it extremely difficult for us to justify or permit other naval 
visits which have taken place on more or less routine basis….  Further cases in 
point are our project magnet flights and MAC flights in support of space tracking 
stations.  Obviously, tracking stations themselves present important policy 
question. 
 
This highlights the immediate importance and concern there was for the space tracking 
stations.  In the face of blanket diplomacy, the U.S. had a lot to lose in South Africa.  
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Furthermore, Rountree did offer his assistance as he knew that the U.S. was facing some 
immediately tough consequential decisions as handed down by the Roosevelt ruling.
185
 
 The Sword Knot issue, which arose immediately after the Roosevelt, was also very 
concerning to the U.S. State Department because it not only called for an immediate 
policy decision, but it also called for the government to actually enforce it and face the 
real reaction by the South African government to a more stringent policy regarding the 
ships.  On February 12, 1967 the Cape Town Embassy communicated with the State 
Department that the implications of the Roosevelt decision were about to become very 
evident.  In regards to the Sword Knot and the possibility of diverting it to another port, 
the U.S. State Department feared how the South African government would react.  They 
feared that their action might be interpreted as the “beginning of end to all Naval calls.”  
The Embassy said that diversion at this point could potentially be more costly than 
dealing with the domestic fall-out of the racial implications.  They stressed that if the 
South African government felt this was a beginning to an end that the South Africans 
would “be far less cooperative than heretofore with respect other U.S. military and space 
projects in connection with which we have in past had very few problems.”186  This was a 
warning that the State Department was surely not to take lightly, especially given the 
pressure of the space race and the importance that NASA afforded that particular space 
station in the years’ past. 
                                                          
185
National Archives, General Records of the Department of State, RG 59, “Cape Town’s 759,”Def 7 
SAFR-US,  7 February 1967. 
186
National Archives, General Records of the Department of State, RG 59, Department of State Telegram, 
Def 7 SAFR-US, 12 February 1967. 
 
96 
 
 Being that it was 1967, this was a legitimate fear.  The Vietnam War’s peak of 
U.S. troop and political commitment began in 1967 and would last several years 
thereafter.  While it is unclear how often ships going to and from Southeast Asia were 
traveling by the Cape, it is clear that it had been used by the U.S. Navy for troops and 
supplies heading to and from the war in Vietnam.  Thus, losing such a vital port for its 
geography and ship repair and docking capabilities could be an issue for troop and supply 
movement to and from Southeast Asia. 
 South Africa also sought a clarification in U.S. policy.  In a rather harsh message 
from South African Foreign Minister Bernardus G. Fourie to the Secretary of State sent 
via the South African Ambassador in D.C. on February 14, 1967, it is apparent that the 
U.S. concern about the impact of the Roosevelt and future Sword Knot decisions was not 
unfounded.  Fourie said that he was upset and confused by the decision to keep the 
Roosevelt from docking, especially given the fact that the U.S. asked to dock there and 
that extensive welcoming plans were laid by the community.  He also clearly warned that 
he did not know what this meant for future cordialness between the two countries and 
future cooperative exercises in diplomacy and scientific affairs.  In addition, he expressed 
confusion at how large ships would be made to pass South African ports, while smaller 
ships routinely used their services.  He asked for some sort of clear-cut policy by which 
they could expect the U.S. to follow so that relations between the two countries would 
not be harmed any further.
187
  Furthermore, in a Johannesburg Star article published on 
February 16, it was stated that the future of the tracking stations shared by CSIR and 
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NASA were in question due to the vague policy that was tending to lean towards the 
abolition of use of South African ports.
188
 
 On February 17, 1967, in the midst of the naval port controversy, Ambassador 
Goldberg, wrote a letter to Dean Rusk expressing his opinion of what should happen with 
South African policy.  In the letter, he said, in contrast to the Embassy position, that the 
U.S. government had never really had much of an influence over the South African 
government and that decisions should be based on this premise.  He opposed the idea that 
closer relations would bring forth more opportunities for the U.S. to influence or guide 
South African decisions.  In his own words, “I estimate that it is her fear of isolation 
which provides us our best lever in dealing with South Africa and I believe it would be a 
false step to reassure her of our goodwill.”  Therefore, Goldberg suggested that the U.S. 
immediately “disentangle ourselves from remaining military and scientific ties.”  
Specifically, missile and satellite tracking stations needed to be closed immediately and 
shifted to Madagascar and Spain.
189
 
 In chapter two, the Sword Knot’s docking was looked at length.  It is essential to 
revisit here because the Sword Knot was a carrying parts for the tracking station in 
Johannesburg.  This is a moment where the two case studies of docking policy of naval 
ships and the use of satellite tracking stations meet.  The Sword Knot had eleven U.S. 
black men on board, but they were not being denied access to the ports, such as the 
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Independence in 1965.  They docked the Sword Knot in Kenya, and moved the goods 
over dry land to Johannesburg.   
The South African newspaper Die Beeld carried a front-page article on the event 
shortly after the docking of the Sword Knot in Kenya with the headline proclaiming 
“Yanks Practice Deceit on our Airfield.”  The headline was below a picture of a U.S. Air 
Force plane stationed at the Jan Smuts airfield.  The article talked about how the U.S. had 
no difficulty enforcing apartheid protocol at airfields, but drew a line in the sand around 
the use of naval ports, which may not have been true, as there are other accounts by the 
U.S. State Department, as reported by the Embassies in South Africa, that said black U.S. 
crews did frequent airfields after the Independence incident.  The article discussed how 
the U.S. flights did frequent the airfields to bring in equipment and crew members to help 
with the satellite tracking stations.
190
  Seemingly separate issues collided head on because 
of the policy that could potentially be set in ruling that no ports in South Africa should be 
used by any U.S. vessels.
191
 
 In addition to dealing with the political repercussions of Roosevelt and the Sword 
Knot incidents, NASA also was contending with budget cuts required of them by the 
Legislative and Executive branches.  On April 11, 1968, NASA was set to meet at the 
Inter-Regional Group (IRG) meeting to discuss this issue of budget cuts.  NASA 
proposed to cut the DSN station in Spain and the STADAN station in Madagascar, as 
Johannesburg had both capabilities and was in a better situated place geographically.  The 
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only problem with this was that the State Department had asked NASA to have 
alternatives so that there was room for negotiation with the South African government 
should a vis-à-vis situation arise.
192
 
In April 1968, the State Department looked closely at the issue of the budget cuts 
versus the needs of NSAM-295, which stated that NASA and the Department of Defense 
needed to have alternate stand-by facilities available for use within six-months’ notice 
should Johannesburg need to be shut down for politically motivated reasons.  
Johannesburg’s station was run by CSIR and employed 237 foreign nationals, 131 of 
whom worked for STADAN and 106 for DSN.  There were only three contracted U.S. 
citizens there to act as liaison for the DSN network.  In contrast, the Tananarive 
STADAN had 233 employees just for its STADAN station, including 59 U.S. citizens, 
and Madrid’s DSN program staffed 252 people, including five U.S. citizens.  Because the 
Johannesburg station was locally operated by CSIR, NASA would be saving $520,000 
per year if they did not need to operate the Tananarive station.  For budgetary and 
logistical reasons explained previously, Johannesburg was clearly the most viable option 
at the time.  However, given the political climate, the solution became much more 
muddled.
193
 
There was a significant amount of political pressure to close Johannesburg.  On 
February 17, 1967, Ambassador Goldberg urged that NASA become disentangled from 
South Africa so that a more stream-lined policy could be put into place towards port and 
airfield usage in South Africa.  He wrote: 
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Make a firm and final decision to close our missile and space tracking stations in 
South Africa and to shift to facilities in Madagascar and elsewhere by this 
summer at the latest… I would like us at the earliest possible date to free 
ourselves of the restraints which the continuation of these facilities in South 
Africa impose upon us. 
 
Goldberg was very uncomfortable with having a potential situation arise where the U.S. 
would be vulnerable politically to South Africa.  In addition to the pressure put on by 
Goldberg, the UN also did not like the presence of U.S. tracking stations in South Africa 
and thought of it as “evidence of US-SA military cooperation.”  Essentially, the domestic 
and international community were breathing down NASA’s and the U.S. government’s 
necks to find a resolution to having a station in Johannesburg.
194
 
Ultimately, Clark recommended that the Johannesburg NASA station be closed 
and that the STADAN and DSN stations in Tananarive and Spain be kept open.  His 
rationale was built on the above considerations by the UN and Goldberg.  In addition, he 
was not concerned about the Department of Defense’s  use of the facilities because 
Johannesburg had “reportedly become less than of critical importance since last spring.”  
In addition, he felt the U.S. should retain positive relations with Madagascar and Spain 
and that closing the site there would reduce critical positions and aid that they relied upon 
from the U.S. government.
195
 
Clark received a concerned phone call from Don Morris, the representative for 
NASA at the April 11
th
 IRG meeting.  After reading Clark’s recommendations, Morris 
called Clark and said that Johannesburg was considerably important to the DSN efforts.  
After NSAM-295, NASA built a third DSN dish (the first two were in South African and 
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Spain, it is unclear where the third one was located) as they needed a secondary back-up 
dish and should stand-by stations be invoked by the U.S. government, the third dish 
would be necessary.  However, in the light of budget cuts, it would make sense to reduce 
the operations of the other dishes and keep the South African dish, as it was more 
essential in DSN.  It is important to note, that in a “very much off-the-record comment 
Don said that he would fight in NASA for a full withdrawal from South Africa, if this 
were part of a general US disengagement.”  This meant that if all U.S. interests in South 
Africa were asked to withdraw, including private businesses such as General Motors, that 
NASA would also withdraw, but without insurance from the U.S. government that this 
would happen, NASA would strongly resist any move to challenge Johannesburg.  This, 
of course, prompted Clark to change his recommendations and suggest that NASA 
capabilities in Johannesburg be severely limited- to the point where only a skeletal 
reserve is left operational for STADAN, but not necessarily shut down.
196
  NASA kept 
the station open until 1975.  The downfall of the South African station would ultimately 
be Congressional pressure in the form of a House bill that cut $3 million for NASA 
funding for stations in South Africa.  The bill was defeated, but the end had become 
clear.
197
 
 
NSSM-39: 
The conflict with the strategically important bases for NASA was an issue that 
needed to be dealt with in a quick and efficient manner.  This was an issue much bigger 
                                                          
196
National Archives, General Records of the Department of State, RG 59, “Supplementary Briefing, 
NASA IRG, April 11, ACTION MEMORANDUM,”Def 7 SAFR-US, 10 April 1968. 
197
Tsiao, 211. 
102 
 
than the State Department and its Ambassadors in South Africa and soon thereafter 
would see the direct involvement of the Executive branch, namely in the form of the 
National Security Council.  The National Security Council (NSC) was a medium for 
making policy decisions, such as port usage.  In order to understand the decision-making 
process, it is important to understand how the NSC functioned and what its intentions 
were. 
Presidents Johnson and Nixon both saw the need for a strong NSC when they were in 
office, Nixon especially.  On July 26, 1947, President Truman signed the National 
Security Act of 1947, which created the NSC.  Section 101(a) of the act best describes the 
role of the NSC:  
The function of the Council shall be to advise the President with respect to the 
integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security 
as to enable the military services and the other departments and agencies of the 
Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national security.   
 
The council largely consists of the President, Vice President, Secretary of State, Secretary 
of Defense, and the Secretaries and Under Secretaries of other executive departments, 
along with the military departments.
198
   
The NSC is largely structured by the president in charge.  Under President Johnson, 
influential names in the NSC were Bundy, Rusk, Rostow, and McNamara.   Johnson’s 
NSC sought to deliver a united message from the various departments; essentially, NSC 
meetings saw the settling of White House infighting before policy was presented to the 
other departments.
199
  President Nixon’s NSC was different.  Henry Kissinger, Nixon’s 
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NSC Advisor, was largely responsible for approving policy.  In Kissinger’s NSC, 
interagency committees would write National Security Study Memorandums (NSSM) 
and submit them to the NSC.  The NSSMs were supposed to take into consideration 
potential problems and outcomes of policy decisions.  If the policy was sound and agreed 
upon, they would become National Security Decision Memoranda (NSDM).  The NSC 
was essentially an engine driving U.S. foreign and national security policy.
200
  During 
Nixon’s first term, no fewer than 165 NSSMs were completed.201 
 Kissinger felt that the procedures they put into place were very important.  He felt 
it was important to centralize the decision making and keep secret crucial foreign policy 
decisions until the time was right to reveal them, if at all.
202
  Kissinger would later 
comment on his role as National Security Advisor: 
‘The president sees the security advisor as being at his disposal, representing his 
interest, whereas the secretary of state is seen as representing the bureaucracy…. 
After all, the State Department has 180 clients.  So they have a lot of things to get 
done each day which have a necessary priority for them. So the operation of the State 
Department, for example, is basically answering cables.  It is very hard when you are 
secretary of state to say, the hell with this, now let’s talk about long-range problems 
and work back from that…. It doesn’t tell you where to go in the long term.  That’s 
what we tried to do.  And the security advisor also ends up dealing with and knowing 
the problems that are of greatest interest to the president- which inevitably has to 
include all or many or most of the major policy issues.’203 
 
Kissinger did not deny the enormity of his role and his influence on policy making.  
Thus, when looking at policy choices towards South Africa, which Nixon was forced to 
do immediately upon taking office in 1969, it is important to keep in mind how the NSC 
worked and who was at its helm. 
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 In April 1969, the NSC was instructed to prepare a comprehensive review of U.S. 
policy towards Africa.  These efforts were headed by Roger P. Morris.  What was 
produced was NSSM-39 in 1969.  This was essentially the cornerstone to Nixon’s policy 
in South Africa during the first term of his presidency.
204
  Morris personally believed that 
no U.S. president should jeopardize U.S. investments in southern Africa.  He also felt that 
economic prosperity would translate into political liberalization, particularly in South 
Africa.
205
  In addition, he believed that economic sanctions against the South African 
government would never dismantle apartheid.
206
   
Thus, when Morris presented NSSM-39 in December 1969, he had five options 
for the departments to mull over.  (It is important to note that NSSM-39 is a policy 
toward southern Africa, not necessarily just South Africa).  The first option, known as the 
“Acheson Option,” saw the condemnation of white supremacy as excessive and that the 
U.S. should rather align themselves with the white regimes to help defend U.S. interests 
politically, militarily, and economically.
207
  The second option called for continued 
association with white regimes, but also with black governments as well in an effort to 
enlist cooperation from black states to reduce tension.  This option saw to it that the U.S. 
would also be able to continue persuading white governments through a close 
relationship, rather than dismissing them as illegitimate and losing any sway over their 
policy already held.
208
  This option called for relaxing political isolation and economic 
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restriction on South Africa.
209
  The third option strictly limited cooperation with white 
states in an attempt to safeguard its interests in the rest of southern Africa and to help its 
posture in international politics.  It also called for more aid to go to southern African 
states that were now led by black governments.  The fourth option called for the 
dissociation of relations with white governments and closer relationships with black 
states.  The fifth option saw the severance of ties to both sides in the racial conflict in 
South Africa because it was unmanageable and potentially dangerous and would 
eventually grow into a political nightmare on the international stage for the U.S. 
government.
210
 
 The NSC and State Department clashed over which option was the best.  The 
third option was favored by the State Department, as they felt that following the wishes 
of the black majority in South Africa would best suit U.S. interests.  Morris favored 
option two over option three because he felt that the State Department in choosing option 
three did so in an attempt to save face internationally, rather than try to do anything that 
might help the situation.  The State Department defended its position by saying that if 
they were forced to make more harsh decisions in the future, they would have less 
hurdles, such as domestic investment in South Africa, to contend with.
211
  Nixon and 
Kissinger probably best liked two because they felt that closer relations between the U.S. 
and South African governments might speed up the erosion of apartheid, thus they did 
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not establish any new policies from their predecessors towards the most pressing problem 
of apartheid.
212
 
 One of the major reasons for the NSC supporting option two was the investment 
in science and military that the U.S. already had there.  NSSM-39 stated: 
NASA has a space tracking facility of major importance in South Africa, and 
overflight and land rights for support aircraft are utilized in connection with 
various space shots.  The NASA station is particularly oriented towards support of 
unmanned spacecraft and will be of key significance for planetary missions.   
 
In addition to the “key significance” of the Johannesburg station for planetary 
exploration, NSSM-39 specifically addressed the importance of South Africa for the 
Department of Defense.  NSSM-39 also noted the importance of South Africa’s 
geographical position should there be another Suez Crisis and with the increasing concern 
of Soviet activity in the Indian Ocean.  The importance of port and airfield access is 
noted, particularly in emergency situations where ships need to port.  Also, the 
Department of Defense had a missile tracking station where some military aircraft traffic 
did require access to this space.  However, it was noted that the station was no longer 
needed for research and development of missiles, as it may have once been.
213
 
 The reality was that Kissinger, Morris, and Nixon all felt that option two was best 
because it could help attain the objectives the U.S. set forth in NSSM-39 for South 
Africa.  These goals included the improvement of U.S. standing in black Africa and 
internationally concerning race; to minimize the possible escalation of violence, which 
could potentially involve U.S. involvement; to minimize any opportunities the Soviets 
and Chinese might have to exploit the struggle between black and white in southern 
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Africa, particularly in relation to black nationalist movements that were gaining 
momentum with the crumbling of the colonialism; to encourage moderation of apartheid 
and similar policies in place in white government-led countries; and “to protect 
economic, scientific, and strategic interests and opportunities in the region….”214  The 
NSSM-39 applied each option to the list of goals and suggested pro’s and con’s for each. 
It is clear that option two was favored by its author. 
The authors behind NSSM-39 were obviously big advocates of keeping NASA’s 
access to Johannesburg’s stations open, which may be why it was open until 1975.  
However, revelations involving the treatment of workers at the actual station would 
eventually come to light in 1970, thus influencing Congress to ultimately rebel against 
the idea of a NASA station in Johannesburg.  It also probably did not hurt that the U.S. 
landed a man on the moon on July 20, 1969, thus successfully meeting the goal of the 
Apollo Missions. 
 
Diggs Commission: 
 The Congressional role in policy making towards NASA in South Africa is 
noteworthy.  In September 1970, the fatal blow was thrown at NASA by Congress.  It 
surfaced, thanks to letters sent by a private citizen, that NASA was allowing hiring 
practices at the South African station to follow apartheid procedure.  Lester G. Paldy, 
assistant professor of Physics at State University of New York, wrote to Representative 
Edward I. Koch of New York on July 30, 1970.  In his letter, he wrote about how NASA 
was using federal funding to hire under the guise of apartheid policies.  His letter inquired 
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if NASA falls under the jurisdiction of the House Committee on Science and 
Astronautics and if it did if they would not mind looking into the matter to see if it were 
true.   
Five days later on August 4, 1970, Koch wrote to Thomas Pain, Director of 
NASA, to inquire about the claim’s validity.  On August 19, 1970, Koch got a letter back 
from H. Dale Grubb, the Assistant Administrator for Legislative Affairs stating that he 
was looking into the issue.  In that letter, Grubb stated, “ ‘NASA does not support 
scientific research in South Africa and the only funds expended there are for the 
operation and maintenance of NASA tracking stations.’”  In a later letter between Grubb 
and Koch, Grubb stated that NASA did not do any hiring at the South African station- 
CSIR was responsible for the hiring.  By September 22, 1970, Koch was fed up with the 
situation and took it upon himself to write a letter to President Nixon stating that he felt 
that NASA was financially connected to the hiring practices of apartheid and that he 
wanted it stopped.  On that same day, Koch wrote a letter to Grubb and said: 
I believe the practices you describe in your letter of having hiring done by the 
‘national agency under contract to NASA for station operation’ is racially 
discriminating and is NASA’s way of evading its responsibilities.  I find that an 
intolerable situation and urge that a change be made. 
 
By September 28, 1970, Koch was reading these letters to Congress and demanding that 
something be done.
215
 
 Congressman Coles Diggs, a member of the Subcommittee on Africa of the 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, sought to research this issue by actually conducting a visit 
to the station in August 1971.  Diggs was one of the first black members of Congress, 
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being elected to the House of Representatives in 1954 by Michigan residents.  From very 
early on, Diggs expressed an interest in African politics, attending the independence 
ceremonies of Ghana in 1957.  Five years into his career, he was placed on the 
subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on Foreign Relations.  He slowly acquired 
legitimacy on this committee and successfully began to persuade its members to readjust 
their focus on southern Africa.
216
 
 Diggs would finally ascend to the chairmanship of the House subcommittee on 
Africa in 1969.  As chairman, he was kept busy fighting U.S. policies that appeared 
tolerant of apartheid policies.  For example, Diggs fought hard against allowing domestic 
flights to fly from South Africa to John F. Kennedy International Airport on South Africa 
Airways.  He was particularly concerned with the advertisements they made in the U.S. 
encouraging tourists to visit its resorts, places where black U.S. citizems would not have 
been allowed.  While the flights were never suspended, the Civil Aeronautics Board did 
finally pull the airline’s rights to advertise in the U.S.217 
 Diggs also fought various other issues that symbolized implicit support of South 
Africa in various branches of the U.S. government.  For example, he fought with the 
Justice Department to end the FBI’s exchange of forensic information, such as 
fingerprints, with Vorster’s police.  He also openly opposed John Hurd, the Texas 
millionaire appointed ambassador to South Africa, because he threw a whites-only party 
to honor the ten-year anniversary of the founding of the Republic of South Africa.  
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Finally, he pushed to end the sale of sixty thousand tons of sugar by white farmers at 
twice the price of world sugar prices.
218
 
Most notably, Diggs decided to research the claims against NASA.  His findings 
were extensive and telling about the true nature of affairs between NASA and apartheid 
practices.  While in South Africa, Diggs interviewed the CSIR Vice President, Dr. 
Hewitt, who was the senior officer directly responsible for the NASA contract.  He also 
interviewed the station manager D. Hogg.  In the questioning, Diggs found out that the 
South African government purchased all of the land provided to NASA; however, 
operation costs were paid for by NASA.  The tracking stations employed 224 whites 
because they had technical qualifications, whereas 61 blacks were employed in 
maintenance and general custodial work.  Whereas the black employees were paid at 
most1,020 Rand per year, the lowest paid white employee earned 1,600 Rand per year.  
Salaries were determined by the South African Public Service Commission.
219
 
 Diggs was especially concerned about the treatment of black employees at the 
station, particularly because NASA did pay for operational fees.  Predictably, he found 
that apartheid did not stop at the tracking station’s gates.  He found that all black 
employees and their families lived on site, fifteen of which lived in ten NASA-financed 
houses.  Other black employees lived in farm labor houses that were already on the 
property prior to NASA and CSIR acquisition.  The housing was rent free, but only the 
NASA housing had electricity, bathrooms, interior sewage and running water.  If any of 
the black employees or their family members got sick, they could get a ride to the 
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hospital for fifty cents.  Doctors could be called to the station, but the employees would 
have to pay for it.  In addition, black employees were not allowed into the mess and 
lounge facilities in which the Diggs meetings were held.  No mess or lounge was 
provided for them at all.  Additional segregated facilities included toilets, which did not 
need to be marked “white” or “non-white” because “employees knew which facilities 
were for them.”220  In September 1971, Diggs testified before Congress about his findings 
and said specifically about the eating conditions for black employees that, “Blacks eat 
outside under a tree, nibbling sandwiches.”221  Hewitt defended their treatment saying 
that local customs could not be totally discounted just because NASA was affiliated with 
the station and that there should be some credit given in that appropriate housing and 
eating facilities were provided based on economic “rank” of the employee, regardless of 
race.
222
  Diggs was pointing out the obvious, which was that apartheid was happening on 
a U.S. installation. 
 Hewitt and Hoggs had to do more research to answer the questions asked by 
Diggs.  In September 1971, after Diggs visited, more truths about the station began to 
surface.  Hewitt discovered that the 61 blacks employed represented 21% of the total 
staff.  These employees were not allowed collective bargaining rights.  The average wage 
for black employees was 674 Rand per year (1 Rand = $1.40).  The 56 unskilled laborers 
earned anywhere from R. 408 to R. 780 per year.  The two drivers and foreman earned R. 
492 to R. 960.  The three Lab Assistants earned R. 618 to R. 1020.  This is clearly very 
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different than what Hewitt had reported earlier in August to Diggs.  White employees, in 
comparison, earned R. 1200 to R. 9300.  It should be noted that all of these employee 
costs were “directly reimbursable by NASA.”223 
 Higher employment opportunities for black employees, or lack thereof, were also 
an issue, as discovered by Hewitt.  There were various training programs offered to 
tracking station employees.  The Radio Space Research Station (RSRS) had two training 
programs- one for electronic technicians at the Witwatersrand Technical College and one 
for engineering at various local universities.  No black employees were enrolled in these 
programs.  The trainings were paid for by CSIR; however, “salaries of these trainees 
during ‘practical experience’ actual work at station during training are charged to 
NASA.”  When asked why there were no black employees enrolled in these programs, 
Hewitt said that no black employees had ever applied, possibly because there were no 
electrical engineering programs at black schools.  Technically, they did not bar black 
employees from applying for the RSRS internships, but they did not qualify in the first 
place.  In fact, if black employees had applied and, in theory, been accepted, CSIR would 
not have provided for all or even part of their tuition.  This led the Pretorian Embassy to 
question whether or not any education was being provided to children of the black 
employees’ family.  Hewitt feigned ignorance about the educational fate of the 100 plus 
children on the grounds, but ultimately did admit that school was three to four miles away 
with no transportation provided.
224
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 The Diggs visit also inquired into the role of CSIR in the decision making 
processes.  His findings stated: 
Hewitt stressed that CSIR’s contractual obligation was to follow sound 
administrative practices within context local situation and be as frugal with 
NASA funds as their own…  Station run on reimbursement by NASA of actual 
cost and, as Hewitt pointed out to Diggs, SAG purchased site and provides it free 
of charge.  There is levy for program administration overhead which totaled R. 
156,580 in FY-71.  This includes charge of R. 270 each for white staff and R. 70 
each for African staff. 
 
This clarification is significant for the main reason that NASA dollars, U.S. tax dollars, 
were paying for apartheid policy to be applied to the tracking station, thus directly tying 
the U.S. to South Africa in a very unattractive way.  Granted, NASA tracking station 
personnel was not related to the military research installation that shared the site, but it 
was not unheard of that personnel from the tracking stations did work for military 
research because highly trained personnel were limited.
225
 
 A second site visit happened in October 1971 by Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
State for African Affairs Robert S. Smith.  On November 19, 1971, Smith met with Dr. 
Willis Shapley, Associate Deputy Administrator of NASA Gerald Truszynski, Associate 
Administrator for Tracking and Data Acquisition for NASA, about the conditions of the 
tracking station.  He recommended that ten houses built by NASA needed to be repaired 
and that more family houses needed to be built since most of the employees lived in 100-
year old farm houses that lacked water and electricity.  A school bus needed to be 
provided to kids whose school was more than four miles away.  A nurse and clinic 
needed to be located on site and that medical care provided off site should have 
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transportation costs paid for.  An indoor eating facility also needed to be built for the staff 
and that they should get fed lunch as well.  The wage scale had “room for 
improvements.”  Also, the CSIR needed to make more serious efforts to recruit non-
whites for technical positions.  If this could not be done in South Africa, then maybe 
NASA could offer training in the U.S. for non-whites so they could apply for and be 
accepted to more technical positions.  At the meeting, Shapley said that he felt 
improvements could happen without the special request or additional funds from 
Congress. 
226
 
 Shapley and Truzynski traveled to South Africa themselves on December 1, 1971.  
The U.S. government was very wary of the South African government and CSIR seeing 
this visit as an attempt to get CSIR to change as quickly as possible, rather that they 
should move at a pace as they saw fit to make equitable changes that would fix the 
human rights violations concerns.
227
  NASA did face an uphill battle, as Hewitt very 
clearly stated to NASA in a previous conversation that while improving housing and 
eating facilities was one thing and possibly doable, improving opportunities for nonwhite 
employees was far less feasible.  “He emphasized a strong belief that any precipitous 
effort in this area would impact present staff would severely jeopardize CSIR ability to 
maintain current high level of operating efficiency.”228  These thoughts would ultimately 
be repeated to Shapely and Truzynski when they visited on December 1. 
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 The issue inevitably made its way back to Congress in the form of NASA’s 
budget approval.  Using one of its tools to control foreign policy via its Constitutional 
rights, Congress debated extensively what to do about funding in relation to the 
Johannesburg’s recent findings about their enforcement of apartheid on its employees as 
revealed in the Diggs visit.  Representative Charles Rangel (D-NY) was a relatively new 
black Congressman from Harlem when he introduced a restrictive amendment to the bill 
about NASA’s budget.  Concerning the budget, NASA would not be permitted to use any 
of the budget “in the Republic of South Africa.”  Rangel’s rationale for this was:  
The continued operation of our NASA tracking station in Johannesburg, South 
Africa, however, compromises American integrity and completely undermines 
our stated goals of equal opportunity and equal justice.   
 
For Rangel, funneling tax payer dollars to CSIR and its use of apartheid was 
unacceptable, particularly because of their separated facilities, such as restrooms and 
dining halls, and dual pay scales that were incomparable.  In addition, he was very 
concerned that of the 243 visits made by U.S. personnel on behalf of NASA, there were 
no black Americans sent, possibly to honor the 1965 Independence decision set forth by 
the South African government.
229
 
There were Representatives that agreed with him.  Representative Ed Koch (D-
NY) pointed out the double standard employed by this situation: 
What, for instance, would be the response of this country if the Northern Irish 
Government said to the United States, ‘You have a facility here but you may not 
employ Catholics, or if you do, you will them at less than what you pay the 
Protestants.’ We would say, ‘This is an outrage, we cannot do that….’  Or take 
the situation when not so long ago certain Arab states said, ‘You may not have a 
Jewish soldier in this facility.’  … And so, today the black community rightfully 
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asks how we can sit here and permit Government moneys to be appropriated and 
used in a discriminatory way…? 
 
Representative Ron Dellums (D-CA) agreed with Koch and Rangel saying that his 
frustration was with the fact that the U.S. had no problem keeping open the station to 
protect a handful of astronauts but did so at the risk of the dehumanization of the dozens 
of black employees at the station.  Representatives who agreed with the amendment had 
no difficulty basing their decision on the clear human rights violations committed by 
CSIR and NASA (albeit indirectly).
230
 
This amendment tipped off a Congressional debate.  There were Congressmen 
that disagreed with the amendment for a variety of reasons.  Texas Representative Olin 
Teague opposed the amendment because of the tactical concerns, saying that it was 
unreasonable to leave a gap in a major tracking zone for the space program and then 
ultimately revise the use of South Africa to help track ships and planes in the area as well. 
Another common argument from several Representatives was that if the U.S. were to 
only cooperate with countries that subscribed to U.S. ways of life that “we are going to 
become a mighty lonesome country.”  In addition, it was pointed out that not doing 
business with the South African government and CSIR would be more detrimental to 
U.S. programs than to South Africa’s programs and that U.S. interests should be put first.  
Robert Leggett (D-CA) said: 
…I do not believe we should use the space program as a vehicle to vindicate civil 
rights theories or to use civil rights as a basis to kill the space programs…  We 
need this space station there to make the space program go.  I do not believe 
anybody should be misled that this is a civil rights vote in any way, shape, or 
form.  It is a clear effort to kill the space program.
231
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Many of the Representatives who spoke out against the amendment would preface their 
comments with the context that this was not a race issue, but a national security or 
scientific advancement issue.  Ultimately, the nays would rule the day, as the amendment 
was rejected prior to be sent on for authorization. 
In May 1973, a House bill that would have cut $3 million of NASA funding for 
stations in South Africa was defeated, but the fate of this station was becoming clear.  
When the bill was up for debate, NASA tried to argue that it was helping improve local 
conditions for black employees by providing approximately $109,000 a year on 
improvement for programs for the black community, including constructing an 
elementary school, better housing, and a small onsite medical facility onsite for black 
employees and family members to use.  However, this could not overcome the fact that 
even though black employees consisted of 25% of the total employees at the station, they 
only earned 5% of the total wages paid to employees.  In the official historical account of 
the tracking stations, NASA historian Sunny Tsiao said that “black and liberal 
politicians” were to blame for the demise of the station.  There is a tinge of blame in 
Tsiao’s account as he stated: 
The Republic of South Africa, being on the very southern tip of the continent, was 
ideal.  As unfavorable as the South African political climate was, it was actually 
the most democratic and most stable government accessible to the United States 
on the continent at the time.   
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The question is immediately raised is “Democratic for who?”  On July 10, 1973, NASA 
Administrator James C. Fletcher announced that NASA was pulling out of South Africa 
completely by 1975.
232
  
 
Throughout the various issues with NASA and access to their satellite tracking stations, 
the undertones of the space race segment of the global Cold War are clear.  The space 
race in and of itself was endemic of the global Cold War; however, there was little 
concern to the retention of the satellite stations due to the threats by the Soviet 
expansionism in South Africa proper.  The issue of the tracking stations uniquely crosses 
U.S. civil rights issues with those of South Africa’s apartheid.  The pressure of the global 
Cold War further aggravated the situation because policy employed in this situation could 
have potentially impacted decisions in other areas, such as the naval ports.   
 NASA and the Department of Defense satellite and missile tracking stations was 
another reason the U.S. wanted to maintain friendly relations with the South African 
government.  Had they decided to relocate all their ships to Kenya, for example, they 
would risk losing access to the vital tracking stations in Johannesburg.  For the U.S. it 
was far more beneficial to maintain the status quo with South Africa then risk losing 
access to their strategic location, particularly in light of the space race that had 
preoccupied the scientific community.  However, this situation is unique in and of itself 
because it is a clear example of the U.S. allowing apartheid to be used to support its own 
efforts in the space race. 
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 The Diggs Commission’s directly conveyed the connection of South Africa’s 
importance to the U.S. despite the close connection of U.S. policy and apartheid.  He 
proved that U.S. government dollars were supporting apartheid directly.  The U.S. paid 
for a significant amount of the tab accrued by the NASA- CSIR satellite tracking station 
in Johannesburg.  That money paid for property, maintenance, and staffing in 
Johannesburg.   At the station, they heavily employed apartheid policy when hiring, 
paying, and housing the black African staff.  Despite his findings, Congress was split.  
Some members found it abhorrent that the U.S. would knowingly support apartheid to 
this extent.  However, other members felt it was irrelevant as the stations were helping to 
advance the U.S. in the space race.  There was complete disregard for apartheid in 
exchange for benefitting the U.S. scientifically and militarily. 
 All branches of the U.S. government knew that supporting the satellite and missile 
tracking stations was controversial.  In NSAM No. 295 of April 1964, it was declared that 
the stations should be kept secret as they did not want a negative backlash to come from 
the public.  It also asked NASA and the Department of Defense to be prepared to move 
their tracking stations at a moment’s notice for fear of the South African government 
pulling the plug on the project or the public finding out and needing to move so as to not 
be seen as being supportive of apartheid through disregard of South Africa’s policies. 
 The controversy surrounding the tracking stations is a clear example of the U.S. 
government making decisions based on the global Cold War, more specifically the space 
race component of the global Cold War.  They were involved in the space race, which 
saw a restructuring of NASA and the educational system.  South Africa’s stations were 
certainly involved in this.  However, holding onto the stations was intertwined with 
120 
 
access to naval and air fields.  It was more complicated than just wanting to maintain the 
bases for the sake of beating the Soviets in the space race.  The Johannesburg station was 
crucial in landing a man on the moon, and therefore policy decisions reflect the need to 
win the space race. 
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Chapter Four: Weapons Sales to South Africa 
South Africa has a significant amount of natural wealth that was exploited from 
the 1860s on.  The result was to provide enough extra cash to build a strong military 
infrastructure.  During the 1960s, the South African government wanted to buy weapons, 
artillery, and vehicles.  Despite having the cash and the ability to carry, they did have a 
difficult time maneuvering around the various embargoes that were placed on them by 
the UN and the U.S. Executive branch.  Regardless, they still obtained weapons even 
after the heavy international criticism that followed the Sharpeville Massacre.  The sale 
of weapons on behalf of the U.S. and international community is an important indicator 
of the relationship South Africa had with the U.S., which was one of productivity.  While 
weapons sales were not nearly as important to the U.S. to maintain as, say, port and air 
field usage, a positive relationship was important and the sale of weapons could smooth 
any ruffled political feathers fairly quickly.   
Much of South Africa’s productivity was built off the backs of those inflicted by 
apartheid.  The non-white population was vital to the efforts of industrialization.  To keep 
the non-white population in check, numerous laws involving Bantustans, pass laws, 
education prohibition, and censorship, among others, were passed to keep the population 
encased in what could be compared to indentured servitude.  The South African 
Executive branch saw to it that they had the weapons necessary to keep this population in 
line with their rules and goals.  In 1960-1961, the estimated military budget for the South 
African government was $44 million Rand.  In 1965-1966, it was $230 million Rand.  In 
1970-1971 it was $257.1 million Rand.  By 1975-1976, when the economic boom would 
begin to fizzle, the South African government had a military budget of $948 million 
122 
 
Rand.
233
  While it can be argued that South Africa felt the need for security as its 
European colonized neighbors were gaining independence rapidly throughout the second 
half of the twentieth century, it is difficulty to not see the parallels between the passing of 
decrees and laws during this time and the need for enforcement on the home front.  From 
1967-1971, pass laws were being stringently enforced.  A result was that three million 
people were arrested during this time period for pass violations.  This is equivalent to 
25% of the population of Africans in South Africa.  On average, the police were arresting 
1,649 people daily.
234
 
This chapter will look at the embargoes set forth by the U.S. government and the 
UN and how they were broken repeatedly in the 1960s and 1970s.  There was a 
connection between weapons sales and the desire to have good relations with the South 
African government.  While some historians, such as Anna-mart van Wyk, claim that the 
weapons sales were to keep the South Africa government in the U.S.’s good graces 
because they were an important ally against the communist threat, they were actually 
used to keep access to ports and NASA space stations in an effort to stay ahead of the 
Soviets in the global Cold War.
235
  South Africa was too good an ally geographically and 
economically to throw away over the sale of weapons that could potentially be used in 
the war for apartheid. 
 
Historical Context to Economic Importance of South Africa: 
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 South Africa became economically important for Europeans as early as 1652 
when the Dutch East India Company (VOC) established a base at the Cape of Good 
Hope.  The ships traveling through the Cape of Good Hope were traveling to East Asia 
for the VOC.  With the establishment of this base came a large influx of Europeans who 
sought to provide food, supplies, and soldiers to help support the VOC.  Permanent 
establishments housed Europeans whose task was to grow wheat and vegetables and to 
breed cattle and sheep.
236
  Though the VOC did not have the intention to acquire a large 
colony to support the fort at Table Bay, it did provide a basis for later colonial conquest 
of South Africa.  The farms that were to be temporary support for the VOC became 
permanent and more expansive.
237
   
Throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the European population 
steadily grew.  There were many causes for the influx of Europeans, including French 
Protestants fleeing persecution in 1685.  Other Europeans fled confinement, regulation, 
taxes, and various types of persecution in Europe.  Also Dutch and German sailors and 
soldiers working for the VOC began to move to South Africa permanently.
238
  By 1806, 
when the British took control of the colony, there were 27,000 Europeans permanently 
residing in South Africa.
239
 
 During the nineteenth century, under British rule, farming grew exponentially in 
South Africa.  As opposed to the Dutch, the British encouraged permanent settlement by 
Europeans because they wanted the colony to become self-sufficient in its costs to the 
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British Empire.  From wineries to wool, the British began to expand on the production of 
goods for export to Europe in South Africa.  For example, merino wool was exported at a 
quantity of 20,000 lbs in 1822 to Europe.  By 1862, it had climbed to 26,000,000 lbs.
240
 
 British territorial expansion was slow and methodical during the nineteenth 
century.  This was not without conflict from the African kingdoms that resided in the 
annexed areas and the Boers, descendants of the Dutch who moved inland to farm.  
While, in most cases, the various African kingdoms were easily defeated, the Boers 
proved to be more of a challenge.  The Anglo-Boer War of 1899-1902 marked the 
completion of the process of annexing the whole of South Africa for the British.  The war 
was very destructive to property and life, with 22,000 British troops, 26,000 Boer women 
and children, and 14,000 African internees being killed.  Over 30,000 farmsteads were 
destroyed as well.
241
  While this war did result in British annexation of South Africa, it 
did not have a clear political outcome for the Boers.  Boers were allowed to govern 
themselves under the British and they were allowed to keep much of their land, with 
encouragement from the British to continue farming and developing the South African 
countryside.
242
 
 In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, South Africa experienced a 
mineral revolution that would build up their economy for decades to come and encourage 
foreign investment.  Diamonds were initially discovered in 1867 in the north-eastern 
Cape.  By 1880, the De Beers Consolidation Mines, under the control of Cecil Rhodes, 
had monopolized the industry by buying up land with known and potential diamond 
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shafts in it.
243
  The mining of diamonds rapidly increased upon the discovery of diamond 
shafts.  In 1872, output of diamonds surpassed 1,000,000 carats.  By 1888, output of 
diamonds totaled over 3,500,000 carats. Also, in 1884, major deposits of gold were 
discovered in the Transvaal in unique reef-like formations.  By 1910, exports of gold 
equaled £27,000,000.
 244
   
When the Depression hit, South Africa’s exports dropped by 25%.  This included 
diamond sales, which nearly collapsed during the early 1930s.  However, in 1933, the 
value of gold skyrocketed.
245
  In 1930, gold was worth £4 per ounce and by 1970 it was 
worth £13 per ounce.
246
  By the late 1930s, South Africa was exporting an annual average 
of £80,000,000 of gold per year.  Although gold and diamond mining was not the sole 
cause, it did significantly contribute to the growth of South Africa’s GDP by 67% 
between 1933-1939.
247
 
The success of the gold market encouraged the South African government to 
industrialize.  Industries producing machinery, electrical equipment, explosives, wire 
cable, cement, and footwear all began to experience major growth.  It also stimulated coal 
mining and the generation of electricity to provide for the growing need of energy.  
Transportation, namely railroads, was also expanded.  Because of this explosion, South 
Africa saw the need for doctors, lawyers, geologists, accountants, bankers, engineers, and 
educators grow.
248
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During WWII, the U.S. private sector began to invest in South Africa.  By 1943, 
South Africa saw U.S.-owned assets reach $86.6 million, including $50.7 million in 
direct investments.  Johnson and Johnson, Colgate-Palmolive, and Coca-Cola all found 
markets in South Africa.  Also, South African became the seventh largest market for U.S. 
auto parts and accessories.
249
  In 1958, Charles Engelhard, a U.S. citizen who ran a 
network of companies with enormous holdings in chromium, coal, gold, and uranium, 
arranged for a $30 million U.S. bank loan to the South African government, which helped 
keep South African government and industry afloat right after the Sharpeville Massacre 
in 1960.
250
  Chromium and uranium were both significant to the U.S. in the context of the 
global Cold War because they could be used to make better weapons, weapons delivery 
systems, and vehicles, such as tanks.  For example, chromium is used to harden steel and 
can be used in missiles and tanks alike to make a stronger machine.  Between 1966-1970, 
the South African economy was still flourishing at a growth rate of 7%.
251
 
 
Weapons Sales under Kennedy: 
 President Kennedy attempted to put pressure on the South African government, 
particularly after the Sharpeville Massacre, but he was up against domestic, international, 
and bureaucratic backlash should he do so.  The Defense Department valued over flight 
rights, the use of South African ports, both naval and air, and information on Soviet ship 
movement in the Indian Ocean.  The Commerce Department wanted to continue spending 
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and investing in the region as South Africa was a viable market.  The Treasury 
Department was worried about the potential destabilizing effect that the disruption of the 
gold flow could have on the international monetary system.  And, finally, the CIA wanted 
to protect its close relationships to its South African contacts.
252
 
Between 1958-1970, South Africa’s defense budget multiplied seven-fold to $350 
million in 1970s dollars.  The army possessed 200 tanks, the navy had 30 warships and 
three submarines, and the air force had 44 British jets, 50 French Mirage fighter-bombers, 
80 helicopters, and over 100 other types of military aircraft.  They developed and built 
sophisticated underground radio communication centers, underground air defense radar 
stations, and five “anti-terrorist” training centers.253  Despite having a lucrative export 
business of minerals, South Africa could not build up the largest military in the region 
without some outside help.  The United States, France, and England were all responsible 
for helping to build up their military, despite numerous embargoes and the risk of bad 
publicity should their aid be found out. 
A subsequent question that follows the statistics presented on the growth of the 
South African military would naturally be “why.”  While South Africa found itself at war 
in the 1970s with Angola, it was largely concerned with upholding apartheid, particularly 
as their cushion of apartheid-friendly neighbors began to dissipate.  South Africa felt that 
it was necessary to uphold a “total strategy” policy that involved the mobilization of all 
forces- diplomatic, economic, political, and military- in defense of apartheid.  This not 
only included total control of its people internally, but striking absolute fear in its 
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neighbors should they consider aiding anti-apartheid groups.  South Africa also liked 
being the heart of the transportation and communications systems and did not want 
neighboring countries to replace them; thus, South Africa aggressively pursued its total 
strategy in its neighboring countries in a series of undeclared wars, namely South West 
Africa.
254
 
 The development of the NASA base in South Africa was not just for assistance to 
NASA flights, but it also housed a missile tracking station.  In a letter to Under Secretary 
of State Chet Bowles from Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell L. Gilpatric dated 
March 16, 1961, Gilpatric wanted to know how essential it was to have a station in South 
Africa.  He stated: 
Many months ago it became clear that the full development of our national 
missile and space vehicle capability would require the geographical extension of 
our Atlantic Missile Range facilities into the general area of southeastern Africa.  
Such facilities are required for the testing of missiles at ranges over 5000 miles…. 
 
Furthermore, he said that a ship-based station could not remotely satisfy the need for 
local airfield support to promote the long-range missile tests.  With the State Department, 
NASA, and South African government already on board and okay to create the long-
range missile testing site, it seemed futile to avoid using the NASA base also as a base to 
do long-range missile testing.
255
  In further correspondence, Bowles did mention concern 
for the racial policies, as Sharpeville was still fresh in the minds of the U.S. government 
when dealing with South Africa.  Gilpatric addressed those concerns in a letter dated May 
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17, 1961, saying that the support provided at this base for the long-range ballistic missile 
tests were of “recognized importance to national security.”256 
 Upon hearing about the agreement made between the U.S. and South Africa, 
Adlai Stevenson, then the Representative to the U.N., wrote a letter to Secretary of State 
Dean Rusk on June 2, 1961 stating: 
While I am not fully informed about the necessity for this transaction, I am 
sufficiently concerned to presume to send you this note of caution.  At a time 
when the feeling about apartheid and the policy of the Union of South Africa is 
rising everywhere, including pressure for sanctions in the U.N., I would think that 
the necessity must be very compelling to risk the repercussions from a transaction 
of this kind if and when it becomes known, as it must be inevitably. I hardly need 
add that relations with the rest of Africa, and especially the new states, are 
important to our security too.
257
 
 
Stevenson knew how bad public and foreign relations the U.S. could get by tying 
themselves so pivotally to South Africa.  To Stevenson, it was an unnecessary and fairly 
risky new move in the light of relationships with the newly emerging African states. 
 It would not be long before the access to the missile and satellite tracking stations 
would become connected to the sale of weapons.  On June 30, 1961, the State 
Department informed the Department of Defense that there was a deal on the table for 
large aircraft to be sold from Lockheed to the South African government.  The U.S. State 
Department initially could not authorize the sale, but would delay giving Lockheed the 
final decision until the negotiations for a two-year contract allowing access to the missile 
and satellite tracking stations was complete.
258
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A few months later in September 1961, it became clear that there was a growing 
connection between weapons sales and access to the tracking stations.  The South African 
Embassy sought formal approval from the U.S. to buy seven C-130s from Lockheed:  
It is Ambassador Satterthwaite’s view that refusal of the sale may foreclose any 
further South African cooperation in the field of mutual defense and make it 
impossible to negotiate arrangements for the continued use of the tracking 
facilities.
259
   
 
The U.S. found itself in a tight spot because they wanted to make good on an intended 
practice of quid pro quo where they got access to the tracking stations in exchange for 
weapons, but they were fearful of the potential backlash they would receive from the 
domestic and international community should they approve the $100 million sale of 
airplanes.  To bout, should the U.S. have denied them the sale, South Africa would have 
still gotten the planes from France, thus upsetting the potential access to the tracking sites 
and an American corporation.
260
  The sale would ultimately be approved on September 
29, 1961.
261
 
 
French Interests in Africa: 
 France had a vested interest in Africa and would prove to be a potential 
competitor for arms sales to South Africa with the U.S. government.  Along with Britain, 
France also had an African empire, with the bulk of their colonies located in northern and 
western Africa.  The nationalization of the Suez Canal in 1956 had implications for the 
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French government that moved past the Middle East and into northern and western 
Africa.  In its failure to capture the Suez Canal and remove Nasser from power, the 
French government soon saw a renewed vigor in its African colonies to gain 
independence.  The leadership of the independence movements in the colonies saw the 
Anglo-French fiasco of Suez as a sign of the collapse of the colonial system throughout 
the world, including Africa.
262
 
As Charles de Gaulle assumed power as president of France in 1958, he faced an 
African constituency that demanded freedom from its colonizers.  The French 
government had already granted Tunisia and Morocco independence in 1956.  However, 
Algeria, home to over one million French, would be different.  Between 1956-1958, a 
brutal war was waged between the Algerians and the French.  This war would ultimately 
come to an end under de Gaulle.  In September 1959, de Gaulle stated publicly that 
Algerians had a right to determine their own future.  At the Evian Conference in France 
in May 1961, negotiations began between the two governments to usher in independence 
through a referendum to be held on July 1, 1962.  Over 6 million Algerians voted for 
independence and thus earned it on July 3, 1962.
263
 
 With independence in the other French West and Equatorial African colonies in 
the late 1950s and early 1960s, came the need to establish a continued French military 
presence to support newborn local security forces, to assure stability in the region, and to 
protect French citizens and their interests in the newly independent states.  De Gaulle 
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realized that having a full-blown French military in the former colonies would be 
politically undesirable and very expensive, thus he sought to provide local forces with the 
resources and training they would need to uphold the goals of having a military presence 
in the former French colonies.
264
  In essence, de Gaulle’s military strategy was that of 
“out of sight, but not out of mind”: 
President de Gaulle saw clearly… that the large colonial army could best be used 
as the nucleus for the formation of national armies.  Although a continued French 
military presence in the newly independent countries might be desirable from a 
French point of view, it should be discreetly limited in size and restricted to a few 
carefully chosen bases and logistics facilities.  To combine effective deterrence 
with political sensitivity, the French sword must be out of sight, but not out of 
mind.
265
 
 
To sustain this policy, de Gaulle’s government had to assure access to weapons and 
training to the former French colonies. 
The French government expanded its military assistance through formal 
agreements to other former non-French colonies including the Congo, Burundi, Rwanda, 
the Ivory Coast, Gabon, Senegal, and Cameroon, among others.  The rationale behind the 
expansion was to protect economic interests, often in the form of raw materials, and to 
protect French residents.
266
  Although the French did not have a formal agreement with 
South Africa, they justified the selling of weapons to South Africa as being a contribution 
to the safety of South Africa from external threats.
267
  Thus, the French became major 
sellers of weapons to the South African government throughout the 1960s and 1970s and 
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would become a constant competitor to the U.S. Executive branch, which sought to sell 
weapons to South Africa to help maintain positive relations with them. 
Africa would not be the only location where de Gaulle, Kennedy, and Johnson 
would have conflicting interests.  In addition to the challenge of weapons sales, de Gaulle 
also sought to improve relations with Latin America.  After becoming President, de 
Gaulle traveled to Latin America in early 1961 to strengthen diplomatic ties.
268
  Relations 
between Kennedy (and later carrying over into Johnson’s presidency) and de Gaulle 
became more complicate when de Gaulle opposed a joint plan for coordinated defense of 
the Atlantic.  Why he rejected a joint plan for defense of the Atlantic is unclear, but it was 
most likely part of de Gaulle’s goal to establish French policy in Latin America as he saw 
fit, rather than fitting his foreign policy goals into that of what the U.S. White House had 
already established.
269
 
 
Kennedy’s Embargo Challenged: 
 In 1963, the South African government asked for submarines; however, this 
request was tangled up in the embargo the U.S. imposed on South Africa in August 1963.  
In a speech given by Stevenson to the UN on August 2, 1963, the U.S. announced its 
official position to stop selling weapons to South Africa: 
…the United States has adopted and is enforcing the policy of forbidding the sale 
to the South African Government of arms and military equipment, whether from 
government or commercial sources, which could be used by that government to 
enforce apartheid…. 
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There was, of course, a stipulation to the embargo of weapons, namely that existing 
contracts would be honored and that weapons used for “defense against external threats, 
such as air-to-air missiles and torpedoes for submarines” must be honored.270  These 
segments of Stevenson’s speech eventually gave the U.S. enough wiggle room to justify 
the sale of several different types of weapons, including small arms and planes. 
 The immediate aftermath of the speech created much speculation among the 
South African government and invigorated UN members.  While various African 
countries cheered the action by the U.S., it was speculated that the South African 
government would seek retaliation.  The New York Times stated that, “Much American 
investment could suffer and United States Government agencies in the country, such as 
missile-tracking stations, could find their facilities withdrawn.”271  Regardless, the UN, 
possibly inspired by Stevenson’s speech, followed suit and banned arms shipments, 
ammunition, and military vehicles to South Africa in a 9-0 vote on August 7, 1963.  The 
original draft of the resolution called for a boycott of all South African goods to refrain 
from exporting materials of military value; however that was removed from the 
resolution.
272
 
 The U.S. immediately had to deal with several situations challenging the 
embargo, the first of which was the sale of four 1700 ton attack submarines that the South 
African Naval Chief of Staff “urgently” requested on March 16, 1963, five months before 
the embargo was set into motion.  Each submarine would have cost $40 million.  At the 
time, U.S. policy was to sell military equipment for external defense only, which made 
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the U.S. Executive branch look at this request closely.  Rusk told President Kennedy that 
a “yes” to the sale would be very beneficial for good military relations, help keep 
tracking stations open, and provide an alternative for the Suez should there be a crisis 
there again.  He did not say why a “no” would be beneficial, as he feared that relations 
with the South African government were deteriorating and saying no to the sale might 
have been a serious casualty for them.  He asked Kennedy for guidance, but it is clear 
that he was hoping for approval on the sales.
273
 
  Rusk elaborated further on why he thought the U.S. should sell the submarines to 
South Africa.  He felt that by selling South Africa weapons, the U.S. would maintain a 
hand in helping to influence and promote human rights and democratic ideals.  This 
would echo that later established NSSM-39.  In addition, he said, “But I believe it is 
worth reminding ourselves that there are other states where obnoxious practices of one 
sort or another exist.”  He listed countries such as Korea, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Spain, 
and Turkey to make his point.  Furthermore, he said: 
I will admit that apartheid presents a case of unusual difficulty but I would not put 
it ahead of the violations of human rights within the communist bloc or in the 
certain countries governed on authoritarian basis with which we have correct and 
sometimes even friendly relations.
274
   
 
Rusk clearly felt it was a good idea to sell the submarines, and possibly other weapons, as 
the U.S. had in the past looked the other way when there were clear violations happening 
in the name of maintaining precious allies, particularly in regions of value, such as the 
Middle East, Southeast Asia, and Eastern Europe. 
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 Although he was not specifically commenting on the sale of submarines to South 
Africa, on July 11, 1963, McNamara weighed on the weapons sales debate in a letter to 
Rusk.  He was a moderate in the debate, seeing both advantages and disadvantages on 
selling weapons.  On the one hand, he knew the importance of maintaining good 
relationships with South Africa, particularly in light of U.S. military and NASA access to 
the Atlantic Missile Range tracking station, saying, “this station has contributed greatly to 
our missile development and other space programs and will continue to be important after 
1963, although not vital.”  However, he felt it necessary to take into consideration 
upsetting the “African bloc.”  McNamara felt it was essential to maintain positive 
relationships with other sub-Saharan African nations should the U.S. lose access to South 
African ports and airfields.  In short, McNamara stated, “Given these considerations, it 
should be our basic objective, to the extent that it is possible, to avoid prejudicing our 
relationship with either side in this dispute.”  He was hoping that there would not even be 
a vote in the UN to have serious economic sanctions and an arms embargo against South 
Africa.
275
 
 Ultimately, McNamara would lean towards Rusk’s side in advocating for the sale 
of the submarines to South Africa.  Rusk and McNamara made a strong case to sell 
submarines to South Africa.  Their first point referenced a statement South African 
Foreign Minister Louw said on September 10, in which the U.S. and Britain could not 
count on continued support against communism and that the Simonstown Agreement on 
use of naval facilities might be dissolved in the wake of statements the British and U.S. 
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made at the UN and in other venues about apartheid.  Their second point focused on how 
U.S. companies that produced ships stood to make $75-90 million for the sale of the 
submarines, thus benefitting the U.S. balance of payments.   The third and final point 
specifically stated how the U.S.  
must remember that the South Africans agreed to establish the missile and 
satellite tracking facilities because of an exchange of Aide Memoires on June 15, 
1962, which noted that the U.S. was willing give ‘prompt and sympathetic 
attention to reasonable requests for the purchase of military equipment required 
for the defense against external aggression.’276   
 
This illustrates the connection between access to facilities to the sale of weapons to South 
Africa. 
 Kennedy responded more cautiously to the sale of submarines.  By the time of his 
assassination, the South African navy had modified their request to smaller submarines 
totaling a value of $38 million.  They also wanted a $35-40 million air defense system for 
the Simonstown Naval Base.
277
  On September 23, 1963 it was made clear that Kennedy 
wished to table the sale of the submarines: 
The U.S. can make no decision before the end of this year regarding the sales and 
any eventual decision will be taken in the light of the circumstances at the time 
the questions considered, under our policy stated in the UN Security Council in 
August.
278
   
 
This issue would not be resolved until Johnson’s administration due to Kennedy’s 
assassination. 
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 Even though the sale of the submarines was continually getting tabled, various 
personnel- diplomatic and military- weighed in on the issue.  In November 1963, a team 
was sent to South Africa to discuss the sale of the submarines.  The team ultimately 
recommended that they do sell the South African government three conventional 
submarines.
279
  It is unclear specifically who was on the team, but various members of 
the Defense Department were involved.  On April 13, 1964 Chairman Joint Chiefs of 
Staff Maxwell D. Taylor highly recommended to Secretary of Defense McNamara that 
the sale of the submarines should be completed.  He believed that not selling the weapons 
would compromise U.S. military interests in the country, of which there were many, 
namely the Atlantic Missile Range tracking station.  He felt that there was a resentment 
growing among the South African government and military towards the U.S. and the 
quick, decisive sale of the submarines would help smooth this over.
280
  Ultimately, the 
sale of the submarines would be fatally postponed upon the release of NSAM No. 295 in 
April 1964.
281
 
 A New York Times article from October 10, 1963 praised the U.S. government for 
following through on the arms embargo, regardless of debating the idea to sell 
submarines to the South African navy.  Despite filling remaining contracts to sell them $3 
million of air-to-air missiles, submarine torpedoes, and spare parts for seven C-130 
transport planes, the U.S. was seen as holding up the embargo.
282
  There is no mention of 
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submarine sales.  Although, one has to wonder, given the context of Stevenson’s speech, 
and the recommendations made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, would selling submarines 
have violated the embargo?  Stevenson specifically stated that if the weapons were for the 
general defense of South Africa, that they would not be blocked.  This would become an 
issue under the Johnson administration. 
 
Weapons Sales Under Johnson: 
 President Johnson’s interaction with South African weapons sales was more or 
less much of the same as what Kennedy did.  On one hand, he acknowledged the arms 
embargo, but at the same time was still selling them weapons that did not overtly violate 
the U.S. and UN arms embargo.  Johnson’s administration dealt with the Roosevelt 
incident and retained the satellite and missile tracking stations.  However, they had a 
favorable situation in that South Africa was continually seeking U.S. approval and trying 
to stay in the U.S.’s good graces due to the negativity associated with its racial policies. 
 Johnson’s administration lacked consistency in its policy choices towards South 
Africa.  The reality was that the arms embargo had too many loop holes and the U.S. was 
fearful that they would lose access to invaluable ports and tracking facilities, despite the 
reality that South Africa was not going anywhere, barring any major embargoes.  In 
addition, Johnson had an administration that was split on how to deal with South Africa.  
One side, represented by UN Ambassador Arthur Goldberg, was that of zero tolerance.  
He argued that the State Department should discourage any more investment in South 
Africa and to try and void any existing contracts already in place.  He wanted a total arms 
embargo, despite the fact that France was becoming a major supplier of arms.  On the 
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other side, Undersecretary of State George Ball opposed all that Goldberg stood for.  He 
vehemently opposed the 1962 arms embargo because he felt that South Africa’s 
weapons’ industry and economy were developed well enough that the sanctions would 
not work.
283
 
 In a telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in South Africa on 
January 11, 1964, shortly after Johnson took office, Rusk clarified the U.S.’s position on 
weapons sales.  This memo provided the justification needed to skirt around the 
provisions of the arms embargo, thus helping establish Johnson’s policy on weapons 
sales to the South African government.  The telegram clarified that there was certainly a 
need to uphold the December 4 and August 2, 1963 announcements made by Stevenson 
at the UN to embargo arms that might be used to uphold apartheid.  However, if weapons 
were “for maintenance of international peace and security and for the common defense 
effort in the interest of the world community” then it would be highly considered.  In 
addition, the telegram points out very clearly that the satellite and missile tracking station 
access was contingent on weapons sales and that should the U.S. chose to fully enforce 
the embargo that they would most likely need to vacate with six months’ notice.284 
 On April 24, 1964, the National Security team put out NSAM No. 295.  This 
memo made three pivotal decisions.  First, it stated that, “Existing policy regarding 
military sales to South African will be continued.”  Essentially, weapons being sold for 
international defense would continue to be sold, except for the submarines, which were to 
be postponed and considered at a later date.  Second, it suspended applications for U.S. 
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government loans and investment guarantees, thus protecting what investments were 
already there, but preventing further investment from happening.  Finally, it also gave 
NASA and the Department of Defense a warning that they should be ready to close up 
their programs and move to an alternative placement at six-months’ notice.285 
Not surprisingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were visibly irritated by it, as they felt 
that their views and expertise were not represented in NSAM Mo. 295.  They were very 
concerned that it would force the South African government into having upper hand, 
particularly in concern to the missile and satellite tracking stations, because the U.S. had 
now solidified their position in supporting the arms embargo.  The Joint Chiefs of Staff 
felt that the NSAM No. 295 would force the U.S. to follow its previous mandates to a “T” 
and close loopholes that already existed to allow for some sales of weapons.
286
  In 
addition, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Maxwell D. Taylor specifically said: 
As long as communist penetration and racial discord in African remain an active 
threat to Free World interests, stability in South Africa is desirable and the United 
States should do everything that its political and moral position permits to 
contribute to this.
287
   
 
The Joint Chiefs of Staff’s decisions were governed by Cold War experience.  They 
wanted the Executive branch should head their advice and curb NSAM No. 295 as the 
South Africa government was a very important ally militarily for the U.S., particularly in 
relation to port and airfield access. 
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 The NSAM No. 295 was immediately challenged when the South African 
government asked Lockheed to sell them 16 P3-A ASW aircraft.  This sale would total 
about $100 million for the U.S. company.  On August 31, 1964, the South African 
government informed Lockheed that if they did not sell them the aircraft, that they would 
instead order French Breguet Atlantique planes.  The Departments of Treasury, 
Commerce, and Defense were all supportive of the sale, but the Executive branch was 
hesitant to make a move on the sale.  The reality was that South Africa provided a great 
market for weapons sales, as it was estimated that they would potentially buy $300-$400 
million dollars over the next five years on weapons.  However, the NSAM No. 295 
stopped and shelved all sales.
288
 
 The Lockheed sale was ultimately not approved.  William H. Brubeck of the 
National Security Staff informed MacGeorge Bundy, the President’s Special Assistant for 
National Security Affairs, that: 
You should realize that in the eyes of almost all the world this sale associates us 
with the British, French, and Portuguese as helping the South Africans- and the 
rest of the world includes, with varying degrees of intensity, everyone from 
NATO partners like Norway, through Latin America to the Afro-Asians.  I don’t 
want to overstate the practical significance of this, but its symbolic and emotional 
impact does count for something- the racism issue is, in the long run, a real one in 
coping with the Chicoms.
289
 
 
Clearly, diplomatic rationale trumped Cold War rationale, as provided by Taylor in the 
previous memo.  The U.S. government was clearly walking a thin line between keeping 
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an important ally and not forsaking their other allies in the region or in similar 
developmental status, such as Kenya.   
 A National Intelligence Estimate (N.I.E.) was published on May 20, 1964 by the 
CIA analysts.  This largely focused on South African relations with the West and their 
prospects for change.  The first sentence of the N.I.E. is, “The Nationalist government is 
firmly entrenched in power….”  The N.I.E. goes on to lay out why exerting change in 
South Africa would be difficult if not completely fruitless, stating, “We consider it 
unlikely that any outside pressures brought to bear on South Africa would cause the 
government to alter its basic domestic policies.”290  Part of the reason that the Nationalist 
government would not change is because they did not need to- the opposition in South 
Africa, such as the United Party, was divided and had such a small percentage of the vote 
in past elections (this is among white voters, as blacks were disenfranchised).  In 
addition, South Africa was moving quickly towards self-sufficiency, largely driven by the 
gold industry and successful foreign investments.
291
  White South Africans did not want 
to change- the majority of white South Africans wanted to maintain apartheid as they 
benefitted greatly from it.
292
 
 The May 20
th
 N.I.E. discussed at length the probability of success in outside 
forces bringing change to South African racial policies.  The CIA argued, “We consider it 
unlikely that any outside pressures brought to bear on South Africa would cause the 
government to alter its basic domestic policies.”  One of the reasons for the likelihood of 
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change being slim was because the CIA was concerned that economic sanctions on South 
Africa would be nearly impossible to carry out.  The reality was that the countries that 
would need to enforce the embargo were economically intertwined with South Africa, 
such as the U.K.  The 1963 arms embargo exemplified the potential failure of a more 
drastic embargo.  The CIA pointed out the enormous holes within the embargo that 
countries could literally fit a submarine through, saying: 
South Africa still has little difficulty in obtaining adequate supplies of arms of all 
sorts.  For example, arrangements have recently been made to produce small arms 
under license from various Western European firms.   
 
The French, British, and Americans were able to get away with continuing to send arms 
so long as they were not for upholding apartheid, but rather in defense of the country.
293
 
 More specifically, the CIA felt it highly unlikely that the U.S. would want to 
establish and uphold a more stringent embargo.  They had many reasons to put off 
establishing a loftier embargo.  At the top of that list was the missile and satellite tracking 
station.  Also, the U.S. had over $600 million of private investment, which was seen as a 
source for considerable leverage by the South Africans.
294
  In addition, the U.S. liked 
having access to naval ports in the post-Suez crisis world.  Like the British and the 
French, the U.S. was too entwined economically to effectively enforce an embargo. 
 In 1965, a National Policy Paper on South Africa clearly laid out the economic 
and military prowess the South African government had in the region and with its trading 
partners.  Their military had emerged to be fully modernized and efficient on the ground, 
air, and sea.  Ultimately, their goal was to be completely self-sufficient economically and 
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militarily.  Their shortages in basics were in petroleum products, some automotive and 
airplane parts, wheat, cotton, and rubber.  However, they did produce over 50% of the 
world’s gold and sold large amounts of its uranium to the U.S. and U.K., thus creating a 
situation in which they could trade for the materials they needed.  And trade they did, not 
only in gold and uranium, but also livestock, sugar, wool, and fruit.  In addition to trade, 
the South African government encouraged foreign investment to help obtain their goal of 
self-sufficiency.  The British exceeded over $3 billion in investment, while the U.S. had 
over $600 million.  Businessmen found it agreeable to invest there, as they had very high 
returns on their investments.
295
 
 The National Policy Paper contemplated what appropriate steps the U.S. should 
take in South Africa in order to retain the international community’s good graces but also 
to maintain investments and maximize from a supple market: 
Difficulties of enforcement, adverse effects on the people of South Africa as well 
as the race relations situation, and the consequences for other countries, such as 
the UK, all need more searching analysis that is currently being undertaken in the 
Department of State.  
 
Ultimately, the National Policy Paper laid out a series of questions for which there was 
no easier answer: 
Should the US avoid intervention in South Africa because the short-term situation 
is relatively stable and might be worsened by interference?  Should the US join in 
treatment of South Africa as a pariah nation and back up this condemnation with 
pressures going beyond the arms embargo?  Is apartheid so dangerous to 
international order in Africa and so susceptible to Communist exploitation that the 
US must seek ways to resolve the issue?  …Are there constructive ways in which 
the US and its allies can show South Africa a path toward racial harmony?  
…Failing these, should we progressively dissociate the US from South Africa 
with respect to arms, space, investment, trade and cultural relations?
296
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These questions ultimately shaped the issues that Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon’s 
administrations dealt with when discussing weapons sales, the satellite and tracking 
stations, and the use of naval ports.  The South African government had so much to offer 
as an ally during the Cold War that apartheid almost became forgivable, even during the 
height of the Civil Rights Movement. 
 Regardless of NSAM No. 295 and the National Policy Paper, the sale of weapons 
continued.  Despite the Joint Chiefs of Staff being concerned that NSAM No. 295 and the 
embargo would ultimately close any loopholes to allow for weapons sales, the loopholes 
still existed.  It is essential to remember that the original arms embargo, as stated by 
Stevenson in front of the UN, allowed for the sale of weapons so long as it was for the 
national defense of South Africa.  NSAM No. 295 did not change this.  The arms 
embargo and NSAM No. 295 would be tested in 1966-1967 with the approval of sales for 
Cessnas to South Africa. 
 On February 21, 1966, the sale of eight Cessna Aircraft (Model 411), worth $1.5 
million, was discussed at length by the State Department and National Security Affairs.  
It is questionable as to why these eight Cessnas were a cause for concern, as 50 Cessnas 
had already been approved for sale, totaling $39 million in sales.  The State Department 
made two very solid arguments as to why the Cessnas should not be sold.  First, the intent 
for the use of the aircraft was to survey and locate smugglers, as they were equipped with 
a special type of radar.  They were not for an external threat.  This would very clearly 
violate the UN arms embargo of 1963. Second, it would have been be very easy to use 
these weapons in an unintentional way, such as to enforce apartheid among its 
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population.
297
  It is clear that the U.S. State Department was fearful not only of violating 
the arms embargo, but that their weapons would be directly used to enforce apartheid, 
which could have been a political nightmare for the U.S. 
 Even though the Cessna sale was denied, presumably because of the embargo, it 
did provoke a conversation about the extent to which other countries were following the 
UN arms embargo, such as the U.K., France, and Italy.  On December 20, 1967 Under 
Secretary of State for Political Affairs Rostow informed Under Secretary of State 
Katzenbach, Rostow that, “The basic problem is that we adhere to a more restrictive 
interpretation of the Security Resolution that most other countries, while France openly 
ignores it.”  What prompted this concern were the sales of the French Mystere aircraft, 
the Italian Piaggio aircraft, and the British Beagle 206 civilian aircraft.  The Mystere jet 
and Piaggio aircraft had U.S. engines and/or components in them, so the U.S. was 
concerned, should they be following the arms embargo as it were stated, that they were 
violating it.  More importantly, it was unclear what the intent of the need for the weapons 
were for South Africa.  This created a difficult situation for the U.S.: 
The net result is that the U.S. balance of payments suffers, the British balance of 
payments suffers, we create friction with our European allies and give de Gaulle 
another chance to say that you cannot do business with the United States without 
ending up having the United States dominating your foreign policies. 
 
Thus, it was recommended by Rostow to move towards a “more realistic application of 
the arms embargo,” in particular that was more in line with the British who were at least 
attempting to justify the sales by saying they were for the defense of South Africa.
298
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 On February 17, 1967, UN Ambassador Goldberg wrote a letter to Secretary of 
State Rusk stating his views on how to handle South Africa.  He strongly felt that the 
U.S. would be hurting not only themselves diplomatically if they continued to have any 
sort of relations with the South African government, but the South Africans themselves.  
He felt that is was far more important to protect their interests on the continent of Africa 
over retaining relations with the South African government.  Moving away from their 
government was the U.S.’s only viable choice because Goldberg felt that U.S. persuasion 
of the South African government was minimal at best.  Pertaining specifically to weapons 
sales, he said that the U.S. should: 
Continue strictly to enforce the arms embargo including, as we have in the past 
year, embargo of all dual purpose equipment for South African military, such as 
trucks and executive-type aircraft for VIP transport, whether others do so or not.  
At the same time, we should take whatever steps we can to assure that the arms 
embargo is similarly observed by South Africa’s other trading partners and that 
orders not filled United States suppliers are not thereby lost to competitors.
299
 
 
It is unclear how Rusk took the advice from his UN ambassador, but based on events that 
followed, it seems as if the advice fell on deaf ears.  Whereas Goldberg was more 
concerned about U.S. relations with the rest of the continent, other various government 
officials were more concerned with the lack of adherence the other countries gave to the 
UN embargo and its impact on U.S. private investment and access to ports and airfields, 
as discussed previously.  In addition, particularly under Nixon, it was felt that the U.S. 
must retain connections to the South African government because they could influence 
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their race relations positively, as expressed in NSSM 39, which will be discussed in the 
next section. 
On May 4, 1967, CIA analysts produced a second N.I.E. on South Africa.  While 
the N.I.E. largely focused on the issues South Africa was having with its sub-Saharan 
neighbors, it did broach the subject of weapons sales.  The N.I.E. stated: 
South Africa especially wants to improve relations with the US and, if possible, to 
obtain some expression of US approval for its attempts to appear more flexible.  It 
will probably permit the US to use present space and tracking installations at least 
during the period of this estimate, provided that the US does not participate in 
significant sanctions against South Africa.  We believe, however, that the whites 
will hold steadfastly to their policy of white dominance and that significant 
changes in South Africa’s policies either in response to domestic developments or 
external pressures are highly unlikely in the next five years.
300
 
 
This statement generalized a steadfast belief that would structure much of the policy 
choices around U.S.-South African relations. 
 In the N.I.E., the CIA addressed their relations with the west, more specifically, 
the U.S., U.K., and France.  The N.I.E. stated that, “South Africa values its affiliation 
with the West and never fails to stress its strong anticommunism and its present and 
potential importance to the West in military and strategic terms.”301  There are repeated 
examples to confirm this in the chapters on the Roosevelt incident and the use of the 
tracking stations.  In fact, the CIA felt that Vorster’s government was trying campaign 
specifically to the U.S. government to get greater sympathy for their plight and their 
attempts at reform.  They did not need to campaign so heavily to the U.K. and France for 
several reasons.  The U.K. had self-interest in deterring UN measures for sanctions 
against South Africa because it would have seriously damaged the balance of payments 
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owed to the U.K.  France benefitted greatly from the embargo because they had begun to 
make significant amounts of money off of South Africa’s military needs.  They stood to 
make an estimated $90 million annually in sales from the South Africans, selling them 
such things as armored cars, electronic equipment, Mirage II jet aircraft, helicopters, and 
submarines.  Regardless of the close ties to the British and French, the South African 
government still sought out the best relations with the U.S. because they regarded the 
U.S. as “the leader of the West and the first line of defense against communism.”  They 
wanted to encourage U.S. trade and investment and were willing to provide the U.S. with 
access to the space and tracking stations so long as there were no major sanctions placed 
against them by the U.S.
302
 
 France was making serious economic gains on weapons sales to South Africa.  
The French Consul General Romain Vuillaume met with the U.S. Consulate in Athens to 
discuss weapons sales.  Even though he said he would deny it publicly, Vuillaume 
confirmed that the French government traded a significant amount of weapons- 100 
aircraft, over 100 AMX tanks, two destroyers, and large quantities of other war materials- 
for gold, as the gold market was doing very well.  When he was asked how France would 
manage such a large order, Vuillaume commented that they would “renege on other 
commitments if necessary which were either already made or were reportedly in 
process….”  Vuillaume offered a similar argument that was echoed in the halls of the 
U.S. State and Defense departments, which was that continued relations with the South 
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African government might enable them to have some sway over their domestic and 
international policies.
303
 
 A few months after the N.I.E. was published, it was found that a significant 
amount of napalm and other dangerous chemicals were being produced at a plant in 
Umbogintwini, Natal using U.S. machinery and parts.  Even though U.S. citizens were 
not necessarily employed at the M.W. Kellogg Company’s (Kellogg’s international 
branch) sites in South Africa, they were there supervising the construction and operation 
of an ammonia processing plant when they discovered, using “infra-red analyzers,” that 
there had been some testing of bombs using nitrogen, methane, and ammonia.  Much of 
the reporting on the explosives development and testing was reported by Ray Browne, an 
“instrumentation superintendent” working with M.W. Kellogg Company to help 
construct and operate ammonia processing plants in South Africa.  He reported, “ ‘There 
are 2,500 pounds of liquid ammonia,’ and various other low flash point chemicals and 
fuels that ‘could do a lot of damage if they got loose…’”  In addition, even though they 
had not observed any blasts, suspicious materials shipments to and from the plant had 
workers on high alert.
304
 
 Not only was the U.S. State Department worried about the weapons production, 
but they were worried about the extent that private U.S. companies were involved with 
the production of materials such as napalm.  In addition to Kellogg designing and 
implementing usage of the plants, Motorola, Pacific Pumps, Mercoid Corporation, The 
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Foxboro Company, Belco, and other various companies all helped contribute elements 
that went into the processing plant.  The high pressure tanks, centrifuges, the motors, the 
pumps, the governor valves, all control equipment, walkie-talkies, and round storage 
tanks were all provided by U.S. companies.  It is unclear how much help South Africa got 
from these companies, other than purchasing it, but it is fair to assume that some help in 
assembly may have transpired, by Kellogg or the companies themselves.
305
  This is a 
minor, but informative, blip on the weapons sales screen because it points to a weakness 
in the arms embargoes and policies passed by various presidents- that of private 
corporations looking to sell their products, despite what might be built with it. 
 On February 10, 1968, Goldberg received a note from Joseph J. Sisco, the 
Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs.  It was revealed that 
U.S. policy reaffirmed the decision, and recommendation by Goldberg, that U.S.- 
manufactured aircraft and aircraft components would still not be sold to the South 
African government.  This was in reference to the sale of Mystere 20 aircraft that was 
sought by the South Africans.  While this decision seems very clear, it was followed 
immediately with the decision that U.S.-made components would still be exported to 
“third countries” for re-exportation to South Africa in finished products, so long as the 
finished products were not of a “ ‘weapons nature’”.  In addition, there was a “Grey 
Areas Committee” that met to decide on whether or not the “third country” weapons 
components would visibly violate the embargo, because if they did the, sale would be 
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denied.
306
  This letter is extremely significant because it very strongly alludes to the fact 
that the U.S. government under Johnson still wanted to sell weapons to the South African 
government so long as they did not get caught for violating the embargo.  It also 
mentioned a “Gray Areas Committee,” which was never mentioned previously, whose 
job was seemingly to erase “Made in U.S.A” labels from components used on potential 
weapons sold to the South African government. 
 The letter from Sisco to Goldberg barely preceded Senate Congress Resolution 
60, produced February 28, 1968, which further opened the door to weapons sales to 
South Africa, much to Goldberg’s demise.  The resolution offered eight reasons to loosen 
the arms embargo on South Africa.  Among these eight reasons included recognizing 
South Africa as an important ally in the Cold War diplomatically, that the U.S. may need 
to rely on their ports and trade routes should another Suez crisis occur, and their 
allowance for use of naval ports and airfields, particularly for the satellite and missile 
tracking stations.  Ultimately, they proposed: 
That it is the sense of the Congress of the United States that the United States 
Government immediate cease its unfair, harmful, arbitrary, and costly policy of 
prohibiting the sale of military goods to the armed forces of the Republic of South 
Africa in keeping with the needs of the Republic of South Africa in maintaining 
her defenses against aggression and to allow the Republic of South Africa to be 
military prepared to defend sea routes, coastline, and other areas vital to 
maintaining peace in the world, and to allow the Republic of South Africa to 
continue effective support as an ally to the United States.
307
 
 
Congress essentially gave the U.S. State Department the okay to go ahead and sell 
weapons directly, or indirectly through “third countries” to South Africa, as they saw it 
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vital to positive relations with the South African government diplomatically and 
militarily. 
 Under Johnson’s leadership, hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth of weapons 
were sold to the South African government by the U.K., France, Italy, and U.S.  The 
British made ten-year contracts worth £200 million.  This included 16 Buccaneer strike 
aircraft, eight Nimron maritime reconnaissance machines, four missile frigates, six 
HS125 light jet transports, as well as ship-to-air missiles, radar, and other equipment.
308
  
The French flagrantly sold $100 million worth of weapons, including Mirage jets, 
Alonette helicopters, AMX tanks, Panhard armored cars, and Daphne-class coastal 
submarines.
309
  The U.S. also sold their share of weapons, including 22 Cessna Model-
185 light planes, Lockheed C-130 Hercules transports, and AL-60 single-engine 
transports.  In addition to directly selling their own models, the U.S. supplied major 
components, such as engines, to Italian aircraft that were sold to South Africa, including 
the Piaggio P-166, the AerMacchi Am-3C, and the Atlas C-4M.
310
  Despite weapons 
being sold, it could be argued that the U.S. had some sort of political conscience to at 
least discuss the fact that weapons were being sold despite a U.S. government imposed 
embargo in 1963, a UN embargo in 1964, and a restatement of embargo by the U.S. State 
Department in NSAM No. 295.  Regardless, the U.S. Executive branch skirted around the 
embargo because they feared political reparations from the South African government 
concerning their access to ports and the satellite and missile tracking stations. 
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Weapons Sales Under Nixon: 
 With Nixon’s swearing in as president in 1969, he too found himself struggling 
with U.S. foreign policy in weapons sales and base usage in South Africa.  The 
Department of Defense, namely the Chiefs of Staff, highly praised the South African 
government’s aid in the global war against communism.  They wanted to keep open the 
avenues of communication created by weapons sales in exchange for base access.  On the 
other side, there was a softer voice that argued the U.S. government should not be selling 
the South African government weapons, nor should they be utilizing their bases, as the 
argument for change via monetary influence was a bad myth.  Nixon’s response was to 
unleash Kissinger and the National Security Council on the problem, thus producing 
NSSM-39. 
 Upon discussing NSSM-39, there were five proposals set forth in December 1969, 
prior to the publication of NSSM-39.  Option one called for closer association with the 
white regime in order to better protect the U.S.’s economic and strategic interests.  
Option two sought closer relations with Pretoria in an effort to persuade it to move its 
political system towards reform.  Option three wanted highly limited cooperation with the 
South African government in an attempt to safeguard its economic investments while 
saving face in front of the international community.  Option four suggested total 
disassociation with Pretoria and closer relations with black nationalists.  And, finally, 
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option five wanted disassociation from both sides in order to become disentangled from a 
problem that only was projected to get worse despite the west’s best efforts.311   
Through time, it became evident that the first, fourth, and fifth options were not 
agreeable by any department’s standards.  While the State Department preferred option 
three because they believed constructive engagement would not work, Roger Morris, the 
architect of NSSM-39, Nixon and Kissinger all highly recommended option two because 
they believed that change to apartheid would ultimately only come through them.
312
  One 
historian, Joan Hoff, felt that option two was racially motivated, saying that it was “the 
racist ‘tar baby’ policy adopted for all of Africa in 1970 favoring cooperation with white 
minorities against black nationalist movements….”313  Whether or not it was racism or 
some other driving factor, option two became the option of choice because white 
minorities were seen as being permanent, whereas black nationalists could only find 
success through violence or extreme political measures, such as communism, thus 
making white minorities the only viable choice to support.
314
 
 Given the economic implications of doing anything but working with the South 
African government, it was no surprise that the root of NSSM-39 became option two.  At 
the time that Nixon came into office, South Africa was the U.S.’s 15th largest capital 
market, even though it only accounted for 2% of its total overseas earnings. The thirteen 
largest companies in the U.S. owned 25% of all U.S. investment in South Africa.  Also, 
South Africa was responsible for providing the U.S. with six of its 35 most important 
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commodity imports, including ferrochrome metals, manganese, chromium, and 
vanadium, (all of which are used to make stainless steel) and nonferrous metal fluorspar 
(helps purify steel) , and platinum (used to modify and strengthen various types of 
metals).
315
  In addition, over 300 U.S. companies had invested there, thus helping the 
United States to have a healthy trade balance with imports totaling over $600 million and 
exports equaling $1,160 million by 1974.
316
 
 Nixon did face an elevation of tactics used in apartheid by Pretoria, which may 
have made discussions around how to handle the relations more complicated.  By 
Nixon’s inauguration, South Africa had over 6,000 laws and 4,000 regulations, 60 public 
statutes, and a full-fledged system of legal detention that was used to keep blacks 
disenfranchised and disempowered.
317
  After 1968, Prime Minister John Vorster was 
seemingly determined to separate development with an increased vigor; he wanted the 
black majority to live on homelands separate from whites.  Even though black South 
Africans constituted 85% of the population, Vorster wanted them moved onto 13% of the 
land.
318
  Vorster justified the moving of blacks onto the nine different Bantustans as a 
return for them to their “homeland.”  In reality, black South Africans faced being 
uprooted from their homes in urban areas to a “homeland” many of them had never seen.  
Also, there were not enough jobs in the Bantustan locations.
319
  Unfortunately for 
Vorster, jobs that relied on lower waged workers, black Africans, were located in 
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industrial centers away from the Bantustans.  The act of total segregation was impossible 
for Vorster as it would have unintended consequences of removing the cheap labor that 
wealthy white South Africans so heavily relied on.
320
 
By July 1970, African states had enough of the continued sales of weapons to the 
South African government and pushed the UN to tighten its embargo on weapons to 
South Africa.  In a vote 12-0 on July 23, 1970, the UN approved Resolution 282, the 
prohibition the sale of equipment or vehicles that could be used by the military.  The 
rationale for the bills was that the resolve of the arms embargoes from Resolutions 181, 
182, and 191 dissolved at a rapid pace resulting in a heavily armed South African 
Defense force.  Resolution 282 reiterated the previous resolutions and broadened its 
conditions.
321
  It included the ban of sales of spare parts, patents, and licenses for arms, 
aircraft, and naval vessels.  It also called for a ban against training South African forces 
by UN member nations.
322
  The resolution also very specifically stated, “Calls upon all 
States to strengthen the arms embargo by implementing fully the arms embargo against 
South Africa unconditionally and without reservations whatsoever….”  The U.S., U.K., 
and France all abstained from the vote.
323
  
Regardless of increasing apartheid laws and the passing of Resolution 282, Nixon 
still believed that option two of NSSM-39 was the best policy to implement regarding 
South Africa.  He, and Kissinger, made it clear that economic sanctions were not going to 
work and that they should be avoided.  However, an arms embargo was a different matter 
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and was thus handled separately despite NSSM-39.
324
  In 1970, Nixon set out to resolve 
the “gray area” issue of the 1963 arms embargo.  The result was National Security 
Decision Memorandum 81 (NSDM 81).  In the August 17, 1970 memo, Nixon made it 
clear that the U.S. was going to stick to the original 1963 arms embargo, but that some 
clarification was needed.  In NSDM 81, it specifically stated that nonmilitary dual-use 
items which were “preponderantly employed for civilian use” would be manufactured 
without military specifications.  Also: 
Non-lethal dual-use items which are preponderantly used by military forces, but 
which do not have a clear and direct application to combat or to internal security 
operations, will be licensed for sale to civilian purchases for civilian use, and may 
be licensed to military buyers…  Such items will be built to military 
specifications. 
 
However, dual-use items that had a “clear and direct application to combat or internal 
security operations (including aircraft suitable for troop transport), will not be licensed to 
military buyers.”  Under such guidelines, Nixon allowed the sale of Lear jets and Cessna 
dual-engine 401s and 402s to the South African Defense Forces.  However, Cessna 
single-engine 180/ 185s, Lockheed Orion P-3Cs, and L-100 aircraft were not to be sold to 
SADF.
325
 
 While NSDM 81 did try to clarify the so-called “gray area” sale of weapons, it 
still allowed for the sale of some very serious weapons.  During the 1970s, under Nixon, 
Ford, and Carter, the U.S. sold South Africa M-47 tanks, Commodore V-150 and M-113 
AI armored personnel carriers, M-109 155mm self-propelled guns, 205A Iroqouis 
helicopters, Lockhead F-104FGA/ Interceptor, Lockhead L-100 transport, Augusta Bell 
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205 A helicopter, M-47 Patton I Tank, M-113 AI armored personnel carrier, V-150/200 
Commando personnel carrier, and M-109 155mm self-propelled guns.
326
  With the sale of 
such weapons, it is unclear what NSDM 81 had planned to accomplish, other than 
allowing civilians to buy and use planes that had military capabilities so long as they 
were not manufactured to military specifications. 
 In addition to continuing to sell weapons to the South African government, the 
U.S. State and Defense departments also continued to train South African Defense 
Forces.  In October 1970, the question of how to deal with continued training of the 
SADF via training films and direct contact was discussed at length.  In the memo it was 
suggested, and eventually accepted, that the U.S. would continue to sell unclassified 
defense training films to the SADF.  In addition, SADF military personnel could 
participate in military correspondence classes so long as they were unclassified, could not 
be applied to internal security of South Africa, and were not related to combat training.  
They could take classes in the areas of economics, management, law, and safety and 
health.  Finally, visits of SADF military personnel was to be kept at a minimal and with 
the guidelines that it was not for training that could help with their military capacity and/ 
or if it significantly helped U.S. objectives.
327
   Although visits appeared to be curbed by 
the U.S., it is still in direct violation of U.N. Resolution 282, which stated, “…by ceasing 
provision of military training for members of the South African armed forces and all 
other forms of military co-operation with South Africa.”328  It is unclear how many 
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members of the SADF visited the U.S. during this time and for what purposes and how 
many unclassified Department of Defense training videos were purchased. 
 
The arms embargoes over Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon’s presidencies were influenced 
for an implicit concern about apartheid.  While the Joint Chiefs of Staff were very 
concerned about the implications of the embargo on the global Cold War, the Executive 
branch seemed more concerned with their continued access to the South African ports 
and satellite and missile tracking stations and protecting investment within South Africa.  
Even CIA analysts recognized that there was a minimal risk of the Cold War rearing its 
head in the South African government in the form of black nationalists.  Regardless of the 
increasing restrictions of apartheid, the U.S. government continued to sell weapons to 
South Africa in a vain attempt to influence the government, but more likely to retain its 
economic, scientific, and military interests in the region, as they were far more valuable 
in the context of the global Cold War than the ill-perceived threat of communism or 
Soviet threats spreading in to South Africa via black nationalists. 
 Ironically, it was the U.S. under Kennedy that began to scrutinize the South 
African policy of apartheid after Sharpeville and ultimately propose an arms embargo.  
However, the U.S. allowed for loopholes to exist within its embargo so that the sale of 
conventional weapons, such as planes, tanks, and spare parts, could be sold, thus giving 
the South African government the illusion that the U.S. was at least temporarily okay 
with the enforcement of apartheid.  The stipulation was that the weapons had to be for 
international security and not to be used for domestic implementation of apartheid, 
however this was never seriously upheld, except in times when weapons sales were 
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leaked to the press.  This clearly was violated as Nixon addressed it within the Grey 
Areas Committee and produced NSDM-81, which allowed weapons to continue to be 
sold to civilians so long as intention for weapons were not to wind up with the 
government and used for domestic enforcement of apartheid.  There was also concern 
that the British, French, and Italians were so flagrantly violating the UN arms embargo 
that why shouldn’t the U.S. do the same?  The U.S. Executive branch saw the advantages 
to selling weapons but feared public reprisal for violating the arms embargo, so they 
continued to be subversive in their weapons sales, selling weapons to civilians and third 
parties and selling components to be used in British, French, and Italian planes, arms, and 
tanks. 
 The loopholes within the embargo are due to the global Cold War context.  South 
African leaders when requesting weapons would reference themselves as being on the 
front line of keeping the communists at bay.  In addition the loophole specifically called 
for weapons to be sold for international conflict.  It could be argued that the loophole 
existed to allow for weapons sales should, for example, the Soviets actually made 
headway into the newly formed African nations and became a major threat on the 
continent.  However, this was unrealistic and was not the probably rationale behind 
loopholes existing in the UN and U.S. embargoes.  Rather, weapons served as a means to 
maintain access to ports and satellite tracking stations. 
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Conclusion 
The three case studies examined in this thesis reveal a complex and dynamic 
relationship between the U.S. and South African governments, between the different 
branches of the U.S. government, and within the U.S. Executive branch itself within the 
context of the global Cold War.  Previous notions of the U.S. foreign policy decisions 
being based solely on the tradition Cold War structure must be reexamined for accuracy.  
The United States sought to maintain normal relations with South Africa by making and 
breaking arms embargoes to keep its access to ports, tracking stations, and economic 
investments despite the enormous human rights violations that were occurring in South 
Africa.  South Africa was an ally for the U.S. during a global war, despite the political 
implications being a regional ally with an overtly racist country could bring, particularly 
during the Civil Rights era.  However, the reasons for South African remaining an ally in 
the face of apartheid were not as simple as promoting democracy in the face of an 
aggressive Soviet charge in Africa or South Africa representing a proxy war in Africa.  
Rather, South Africa was a vital ally in the global Cold War and maintaining friendly 
relations with them resonated past the borders of South Africa. 
Prior historical work on U.S.-South African government relations suggest a 
multitude of conclusions, depending on the historian consulted.  Whereas Thomas 
Borstelmann and Robert Kinlock Massie contextualized the U.S. Executive branch 
decisions in the context of fear towards Soviet-backed communist expansionism, other 
historians, namely Sue Onslow and John Daniel, found that this contextualization 
oversimplified relations between the two countries during the Cold War.  To address the 
practicality of a communist threat, Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin argued that 
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the ANC and SACP only received modest support from the Soviet Union and where 
therefore never a threat to the South African government.  Although in agreement that a 
communist revolution was impractical in South Africa Vladimir Shubin saw the Soviet 
influence as a threat that was thwarted by logistics, such as getting the soldiers trained in 
guerilla combat in Odessa back into South Africa undetected. 
This thesis set out to understand the depth of the significance of South African-
U.S. governmental relations in the context of the Cold War.  While it aligns itself with 
the conclusions of Onslow and Daniel, it adds to the historiography by contributing to our 
understanding of why the Executive branch chose to support apartheid despite growing 
domestic and international concern for doing so in the U.S.  The case studies selected for 
this paper from the National Archives clearly highlights the importance of having good 
relations with the South African government to maintain a vital ally in sub-Saharan 
Africa in the context of the global Cold War. 
 South Africa as part of the global Cold War was not a simple U.S. versus the 
U.S.S.R. conflict.  This research revealed how many ambiguous layers made decision 
making difficult for the U.S. government in all of its branches.  In many ways, the South 
African government was a perfect ally for the U.S., particularly in the face of the threat of 
the domino theory in Southeast Asia and Africa.  They were a modern country situated in 
a region traversed by U.S. naval ships.  They had ports that could be highly beneficial to 
them should the Suez be closed to U.S. access again.  They were a crucial location for 
monitoring space flights and satellites.  However, they employed apartheid, a ruthless 
manner of ruling the black majority.  How could any of the branches of the U.S. 
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government support apartheid South Africa, particularly given the domestic framework 
of the Civil Rights Movement that was reaching its peak during this time period? 
 The answer is not simple, nor is it clear.  The U.S. Executive branch often framed 
their policies based on prior decisions.  If the U.S. chose not to dock ships in South 
Africa, what would this mean for the use of other ports, in particular the ones used for 
satellite and missile tracking?  If the U.S. stopped collaborating with South Africa 
scientifically, what did this mean for advancements in the ambitious goal of landing a 
man on the moon by 1970?  If the U.S. stopped selling weapons to South Africa, what did 
this mean for maintaining access to shipping yards that could handle the high-level needs 
of U.S. naval ships that needed clean access to the Indian Ocean?  In reviewing 
diplomatic papers during this time period, it is clear that policy choices involving South 
Africa were slow and hypocritical. 
Decisions about ports usage, support for NASA, policy papers such as NSSM-39, 
and the continued sale of weapons despite the arms embargo reveal the disregard the U.S. 
had towards apartheid in making its decisions.  Ethics played little, if any, part in 
decision-making.  Public image, on the other hand, was of a high concern for the U.S. 
State Department, Department of Defense, Executive branch, and Congress, particularly 
with the domestic issues of the Civil Rights Movement and Vietnam War hampering 
many of the decisions they made towards the region. 
 Access to the naval and outer space stations was tied to the sale of weapons to the 
South African government.  While there is no solid document that states as much, it is 
eluded to in several policy memos in the State Department.  The sale of weapons is the 
glue that held access to the South African government together for the U.S.  The U.S. did 
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not sell weapons to South Africa to keep the Soviets from penetrating; rather, weapons 
were sold to the South African government to maintain amicable status to ensure access 
to bases and tracking stations, which was more vital to U.S. efforts in the global Cold 
War.  This notion goes above and beyond previous scholarship that regards U.S. foreign 
policy choices based largely (or solely) on concerns related to the Soviets in the Cold 
War. 
 Further research on U.S.-South African relations during the global Cold War is 
necessary.  Whereas this thesis looks closely at the State Department, Congress, and the 
Department of Defense based on Record Group (RG) 59 of the National Archives 
(Department of State papers) and the Congressional Record, future research pertaining to 
U.S. foreign policy decisions should look at papers concerning the Department of 
Defense (RG 330), U.S. Senate (RG 46), House of Representatives (RG 233), Joint 
Committees of Congress (RG 128), National Security Council (RG 273), the CIA (RG 
263), Joint Chiefs of Staff (RG 218), the Department of the Navy (RG 340, 341), and the 
Department of the Navy (RG 38, 80, 340, 428).  These were all selected because of the 
prominence their departments were afforded in State Department documents regarding 
South African relations.  Looking into these archives may help illuminate further 
complexities among the branches and wings of government involved with determining 
foreign policy towards South Africa.  Further research in the Archives will hopefully 
reveal further case study history that illustrates U.S. policy choices and the conflict, or 
agreement, various segments of the U.S. government had in producing policy towards the 
South African government. 
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In addition, to create a clearer South African perspective, it is imperative to access 
South African archives to view Presidential, Presidential Cabinet, and Parliamentary 
papers to discern the complexity of the global Cold War from the South African 
government’s perspective.  Papers of the ANC would also help create a more substantial 
and holistic picture of South Africa’s domestic conflict in relation to the global Cold 
War.  Finally, to look more in-depth at port availability and the impact of weapons sales 
to the South African government on southern Africa, access to other African state’s 
archives, such as Kenya, would be necessary. 
This thesis expands on current scholarship that has only begun to suggest that 
U.S.-South African relations is not merely structured on traditional definitions of the 
Cold War, those often being heavily influenced by the role of Soviet expansionism or the 
fear of communism spreading throughout South Africa.  Rather, it is important to look at 
specific examples of the two governments interacting to illuminate the complex 
relationship between them.  Through these examples, it becomes much clearer that the 
U.S. sought to maintain a positive relationship with the South African government so that 
they could keep an important ally in the global Cold War.  Further research conducted on 
the premise of this thesis will hopefully reveal more examples of South Africa’s 
importance to the U.S. as a global Cold War ally and clarify the exact intentions, goals, 
and perceptions the U.S. government had with the South African government. 
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Appendix A: Timeline of South African History: 
 
Below is a timeline of major South African events beginning with the founding of the 
Cape Colony at Table Bay by the Dutch East India Company to the April 1994 elections 
in South Africa.  The timeline contains selections from the chronology as printed in The 
Making of Modern South Africa by Nigel Worden. 
 
1652-  Dutch East India Company establishes settlement at Cape Town 
1806-  British establish permanent control over Cape Colony 
1828-  Ordinance 49 imposes pass controls on African workers in Cape Colony 
1836-  Settlers leave eastern Cape (‘Great Trek’) 
1867-  Discovery of diamonds in Kimberley 
1886-  Gold discovered in Witwatersrand (Johannesburg) 
1894- Glen Grey Act establishes a separate land and tax system for Africans 
(eastern cape) 
1899-1902- South African (‘Boer’) War: British conquest of Transvaal and Orange 
Free State 
1903-1905- South African Native Affairs Commission recommends blueprint for 
segregation 
1910- Union of South Africa established 
1912- Foundation of SANNC (predecessor to ANC) 
1913- Native Land Act segregates land ownership and restricts African land 
ownership to the ‘native reserves’ 
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1923- Native (Urban Areas) Act provides for urban segregation and African 
influx control 
1934- South African Party (under Smuts) and National Party (under Hertzog) 
form coalition government 
1936- Native Trust and Land Act consolidates reserves 
1950- Population Registration Act; Immortality Act; Group Areas Act; 
Suppression of Communism Act 
1951- Bantu Authorities Act 
1952- Abolition of Passes and Coordination of Documents Act extends pass 
laws; ANC launches ‘Defiance Campaign’ 
1953- Separate Amenities Act; Bantu Education Act; Criminal Law Amendment 
Act 
1955- Native (Urban Areas) Amendment Act extends urban influx control 
1959- Foundation of Pan African Congress (PAC) 
1960- Sharpeville shootings and State of Emergency; Banning of ANC, 
Communist Party and PAC 
1961-  Umkhonto we Sizwe guerilla movement founded; South Africa leaves 
Commonwealth and becomes a republic 
1964- Rivonia trials sentence ANC leaders to life imprisonment 
1969- Foundation of South African Students’ Organization (SASO) under Biko 
1976- Revolt in Soweto and other townships 
1977- Detention and murder of Biko;  banning of Black Consciousness 
organizations 
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1978- P.W. Botha introduces ‘total strategy’ policy 
1984-1986- Widespread resistance; State of Emergency and troops moved into 
townships 
1986- Repeal of pass laws 
1989- Botha replaced by F.W. de Klerk 
1990- De Klerk unbans ANC, PAC, and Communist Party; Nelson Mandela 
released from jail 
1991- Repeal of Group Areas, Land, and Population Registration Acts; 
Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) formed to 
negotiate democratic constitution 
1994- ANC wins first non-racial election; Mandela becomes president
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Appendix B: Operation Mayibuye 
Operation Mayibuye- “The Return”- was a sabotage campaign designed by Umkhonto 
We Sizwe, the armed wing of the ANC.  The idea behind this sabotage campaign was to 
force the white South African government to negotiate with the ANC.  The six-page 
proposal found during a raid on the leadership of the ANC at Lilliesleaf was a complex 
plan that outlined a detailed process to conduct a sabotage campaign against the South 
African government.  The plan caused a split in the ANC leadership because some 
members felt it was unrealistic, whereas others argued not only was it realistic, but it was 
already underway.
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  Below is the text of Operation Mayibuye in its entirety. 
 
PART I.  
The white state has thrown overboard every pretence of rule by democratic process. 
Armed to the teeth it has presented the people with only one choice and that is its 
overthrow by force and violence. It can now truly be said that very little, if any, scope 
exists for the smashing of white supremacy other than by means of mass revolutionary 
action, the main content of which is armed resistance leading to victory by military 
means. 
The political events which have occurred in the last few years have convinced the 
overwhelming majority of the people that no mass struggle which is not backed up by 
armed resistance and military offensive operations, can hope to make a real impact. This 
can be seen from the general mood of the people and their readiness to undertake even 
desperate and suicidal violent campaigns of the Leballo type. It can also be gauged by 
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their reluctance to participate in orthodox political struggles in which they expose 
themselves to massive retaliation without a prospect of hitting back. We are confident 
that the masses will respond in overwhelming numbers to a lead which holds out a real 
possibility of successful armed struggle . 
Thus two important ingredients of a revolutionary situation are present: - 
a. A disillusionment with constitutional or semi-constitutional forms of struggle and 
a conviction that the road to victory is through force;  
b. A militancy and a readiness to respond to a lead which holds out a real possibility 
of successful struggle.  
In the light of the existence of these ingredients the prosecution of military struggle 
depends for its success on two further factors: - 
A. The strength of the enemy. This must not be looked at statically but in the light of 
objective factors, which in a period of military struggle may well expose its 
brittleness and  
B. The existence of a clear leadership with material resources at its disposal to spark 
off and sustain military operations.  
The objective military conditions in which the movement finds itself makes the 
possibility of a general uprising leading to direct military struggle an unlikely one. 
Rather, as in Cuba, the general uprising must be sparked off by organised and well 
prepared guerrilla operations during the course of which the masses of the people will be 
drawn in and armed. 
We have no illusions about the difficulties which face us in launching and successfully 
prosecuting guerrilla operations leading to military victory. Nor do we assume that such a 
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struggle will be over swiftly. We have taken into account and carefully weighed 
numerous factors and we mention some of them: 
a. We are faced with a powerfully armed modern state with tremendous industrial 
resources, which can, at least in the initial period, count on the support of three 
million whites. At the same time the State is isolated practically from the rest of 
the world, and if effective work is done, will have to rely in the main on its own 
resources. The very concentration of industry and power and the interdependence 
of the various localities operates as both an advantage and a disadvantage for the 
enemy. It operates as a disadvantage because effective guerrilla operations can 
within a relatively short period create far greater economic havoc and confusion 
than in a backward, decentralised country.  
b. The people are unarmed and lack personnel who have been trained in all aspects 
of military operations. A proper organisation of the almost unlimited assistance 
which we can obtain from friendly Governments will counter-balance its 
disadvantage. In the long run a guerrilla struggle relies on the enemy for its source 
of supply. But in order to make this possible an initial effective arming of the first 
group of guerrilla bands is essential. It is also vital to place in the field persons 
trained in the art of war who will act as a nucleus of organisers and commanders 
of guerrilla operations.  
c. The absence of friendly borders and long scale impregnable natural bases from 
which to operate are both disadvantages. But more important than these factors is 
the support of the people who in certain situations are better protection than 
mountains and forests. In the rural areas which become the main theatre of 
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guerrilla operations in the initial phase, the overwhelming majority of the people 
will protect and safeguard the guerrillas and this fact will to some measure 
negative the disadvantages. In any event we must not underestimate the fact that 
there is terrain in many parts of South Africa, which although not classically 
impregnable is suitable for guerrilla type operations. Boer guerrillas with the 
support of their people operated in the plains of the Transvaal. Although 
conditions have changed there is still a lesson to be learnt from this.  
Although we must prepare for a protracted war we must not lose sight of the fact that the 
political isolation of South Africa from the world community of nations and particularly 
the active hostility towards it from almost the whole of the African Continent and the 
Socialist world may result in such massive assistance in various forms, that the state 
structure will collapse far sooner than we can at the moment envisage. Direct military 
intervention in South West Africa, an effective economic and military boycott, even 
armed international action at some more advanced stage of the struggle are real 
possibilities which will play an important role. In no other territory where guerrilla 
operations have been undertaken has the international situation been such a vital factor 
operating against the enemy. We are not unaware that there are powerful external 
monopoly interests who will attempt to bolster up the white state. With effective work 
they can be isolated and neutralised. The events of the last few years have shown that the 
issue of racial discrimination cuts across world ideological conflict albeit that the West 
proceeds from opportunistic premises. 
The following plan envisages a process which will place in the field, at a date fixed now, 
simultaneously in pre-selected areas armed and trained guerrilla bands who will find 
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ready to join the local guerrilla bands with arms and equipment at their disposal. It will 
further coincide with a massive propaganda campaign both inside and outside South 
Africa and a general call for unprecedented mass struggle throughout the land, both 
violent and non-violent. In the initial period when for a short while the military adv. [sic] 
will be ours the plan envisages a massive onslaught on pre-selected targets which will 
create maximum havoc and confusion in the enemy camp and which will inject into the 
masses of the people and other friendly forces a feeling of confidence that here at least is 
an army of liberation equipped and capable of leading them to victory. In this period the 
cornerstone of guerrilla operations is "shamelessly attack the weak and shamelessly flee 
from the strong". 
We are convinced that this plan is capable of fulfillment. But only if the whole apparatus 
of the movement both here and abroad is mobilised for its implementation and if every 
member now prepares to make unlimited sacrifice for the achievement of our goal. The 
time for small thinking is over because history leaves us no choice. 
 
PART II. 
AREAS. 
1. Port Elizabeth - Mzimkulu.  
2. Port Shepstone - Swaziland.  
3. North Western Transvaal, bordering respectively Bechuanaland & Limpopo.  
4. North Western Cape - South West.  
 
PART III. 
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PLAN. 
1. Simultaneous landing of 4 groups of 30 based on our present resources whether 
by ship or air - armed and properly equipped in such a way as to be self sufficient 
in every respect for at least a month.  
2. At the initial stages it is proposed that the 30 are split up into platoons of 10 each 
to operate more or less within a contiguous area and linking their activities with 
pre-arranged local groups.  
3. Simultaneously with the landing of the groups of 30 and thereafter, there should 
be a supply of arms and other war material to arm the local populations which 
become integrated with the guerrilla units.  
4. On landing, a detailed plan of attack on pre-selected targets with a view to taking 
the enemy by surprise, creating the maximum impact on the populace, creating as 
much chaos and confusion for the enemy as possible.  
5. Choice of suitable areas will be based on the nature of the terrain, with a view to 
establishing base areas from which our units can attack and to which they can 
retreat.  
6. Before these operations take place political authority will have been set up in 
secrecy in a friendly territory with a view to supervising the struggle both in its 
internal and external aspects. It is visualised that this authority will in due course 
of time develop into a Provisional Revolutionary Government . 7. This Political 
Authority should trim its machinery so that simultaneously with the 
commencement of operations it will throw out massive propaganda to win world 
support for our struggle, more particularly: -  
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a. A complete enforcement of boycott,  
b. Enlisting the support of the international trade union movement to refuse 
handling war materials and other goods intended for the South African 
Government,  
c. Raising a storm at the United Nations which should be urged to intervene 
militarily in South West Africa.  
d. Raising of large scale credits for the prosecution of the struggle  
e. Arranging for radio facilities for daily transmission to the world and to the 
people of South Africa.  
f. If possible the Political Authority should arrange for the initial onslaught 
to bombard the country or certain areas with a flood of leaflets by plane 
announcing the commencement of our armed struggle as well as our aims, 
and calling upon the population to rise against the Government.  
g. Stepping up transport plans, e.g. a weekly or bi weekly airlift of trainees 
outside the country in order to maintain a regular, if small flow of trained 
personnel.  
h. In order to facilitate the implementation of the military aspect of the plan 
it is proposed the National High Command appoint personnel to be 
quartered at Dar under the auspices of the office there.  
 
PART IV. 
INTERNAL ORGANISATION. 
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In preparation for the commencement of operations when our external team lands, 
intensive as well as extensive work will have been done. For instance, guerrilla units will 
have been set up in the main areas mapped out in Part I above as well as in the other areas 
away from the immediate scene of operation. 
Progressively sabotage activity throughout the country will be stepped up before these 
operations. Political pressure too, in the meanwhile will be stepped up in conjunction 
with the sabotage activity. 
In furtherance of the general ideas set out above the plan for internal organisation is along 
the following pattern: - 
1. Our target is that on arrival the external force should find at least 7,000 men in the 
four main areas ready to join the guerrilla army in the initial onslaught. Those will 
be allocated as follows: -  
a. Eastern Cape - Transkei 2,000  
b. Natal - Zululand 2,000  
c. North Western Transvaal 2,000  
d. North-Western Cape 1,000  
2. To realise our target in each of the main areas it is proposed that each of the four 
areas should have an overall command whose task it will be to divide its area into 
regions, which in turn will be allocated a figure in proportion to their relative 
importance.  
3. The preparation for equipping the initial force envisaged in I above will take place 
in three stages, thus:  
a. By importation of Military supply at two levels:  
186 
 
i. Build up of firearms, ammunition and explosives by maintaining a 
regular flow over a period of time.  
ii. By landing additional [supplies] simultaneously with the arrival of 
our external force.  
b. Acquisition and accumulation internally of firearms, ammunition and 
explosives at all levels of our organisation.  
c. Collection and accumulation of other military such as food, medicines, 
communication equipment etc.  
4. It is proposed that auxiliary guerrilla/sabotage units in the four main areas be set 
up before and after the commencement of operations. They may engage in 
activities that may serve to disperse the enemy forces, assist to maintain the 
fighting ability of the guerrillas as well as draw in the masses in support of the 
guerrillas.  
5. It is proposed that in areas falling outside the four main guerrilla areas MK units 
should be set up to act in support of the activities in the guerrilla areas, and to 
harass the enemy.  
6. In order to draw in the masses of the population the political wing should arouse 
the people to participate in the struggles that are designed to create an upheaval 
throughout the country.  
 
PART V. 
DETAILED PLAN OF IMPLEMENTATION. 
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In order to implement the plans set out above in Parts I to 111 we establish Departments 
which are to be charged with duties to study and submit detailed reports and plans in 
respect of each of their Departments with the following terms of reference: - 
1. Intelligence Department 
This Committee will be required to study and report on the following: - 
a. The exact extent of each area  
b. The portions of the country that are naturally suited for our operations and their 
location within each area.  
c. Points along the coast which would be suitable for landing of men and supplies 
and how these are going to be transferred from the point of landing to the area of 
operations.  
d. The situation of enemy forces in each area, thus: -  
i. the military and the police as well as their strength  
ii. military and police camps, and towns, and the distances between them,  
iii. system of all forms of communication in the area,  
iv. the location of trading stations and chiefs and headmen's kraals.  
v. air fields and air strips in the areas.  
e. Selection of targets to be tackled in initial phase of guerrilla operations with a 
view to causing maximum damage to the enemy as well as preventing the quick 
deployment of reinforcements. 
In its study the Committee should bear in mind the following main targets: -  
i. strategic road, railways and other communications  
ii. power stations  
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iii. police, stations, camps and military forces  
iv. irredeemable Government stooges.  
f. A study of climatic conditions in relation to seasons, as well as diseases common 
to the area.  
g. The population distribution in the areas as well as the main crops.  
h. Rivers and dams.  
i. And generally all other relevant matters  
2. External Planning Committee which shall be charged with the following tasks: - 
a. Obtaining of arms, ammunition and explosives and other equipment  
b. In co-operation with our internal machinery, making arrangements for the 
despatch of items in I above into the country  
c. Obtaining of transport by land, sea and air for the landing of our task force and for 
the continued supply of military equipment.  
3. Political Authority 
We make a strong recommendation that the joint sponsoring organisations should 
immediately set about creating a political machinery for the direction of the revolutionary 
struggle as set out in Nos. 6, 7 and 8 of Part 11 and to set up a special committee to direct 
guerrilla political education. 
4. Transport Committee. 
This Committee is assigned the following duties: - 
a. The organisation of transport facilities for our trainees  
b. To organise transport for the re entry of our trainees  
c. To undertake any transport duties assigned to them from time to time .  
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5. Logistics Department - Technical and Supply Committee 
Its Functions are: - 
a. To manufacture and build up a stock of arms, ammunition from internal sources.  
b. To organise reception, distribution and storage of supplies from external sources.  
c. To organise the training of personnel in the use of equipment referred to in (a) and 
(b) above.  
d. Obtaining of all other relevant supplies necessary to prosecute an armed struggle, 
to wit, inter alia, medical supplies, clothing, food, etc., and the storage of these at 
strategic points.  
e. Acquiring equipment to facilitate communications.  
f. To undertake all duties and functions that fall under the Department of Logistics.  
 
PART VI 
MISCELLANEOUS 
1. Immediate Duties of the National High Command in Relation to the Guerilla Areas: 
a. To map out regions in each area with a view to organising Regional and District 
Commands and NK [sic] units.  
b. To achieve this we strongly recommend the employment of 10 full time 
organisers in each area.  
c. The organisers shall be directly responsible to the National High Command .  
d. The NHC is directed to recruit and arrange for the external training of at least 300 
men in the next two months.  
2. Personal 
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a. Intelligence Alex Secundus Otto  
b. External Planning Committee Johnson, Thabo and Joseph together with a senior 
ANC rep. as well as co-opted personnel, seconded to us by friendly Govts.  
c. Transport Committee Percy secundus Nbata.  
d. Logistics Dept. Bri-bri secundus Frank  
3. Special Directives to Heads of Departments. 
The Heads of Departments are required to submit not later than the 30th May, 1963, 
plans detailing: - 
a. The structural organisation of their Department  
b. The type and number of personnel they require to be allocated to them and their 
duties and functions.  
c. The funds required for their work both for immediate and long term purposes.  
d. Schedule of time required to enable them to fulfill given targets and what these 
are.  
e. Other matters relating to the efficient execution of the Departments Plans.  
4. Organisation of Areas. Organisers and Setting up of proper Machinery Rethau and 
James for this task
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